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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance Singapore-style is government-led and combines a punitive rule of law 
with a softer touch of non-statutory rules. One rule of relevance is the requirement to comply 
with the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code) or to explain non-compliance (Code 
compliance). The research objective in this study is to describe the corporate governance 
practices of, and Code compliance among, the smaller companies listed on the Singapore 
Exchange. Descriptions in past research were based on self-disclosures of listed companies, 
and theory was not considered as they were business rather than academic studies. Smaller 
companies had not been granted the attention they deserve in past research although they 
comprise more than 80% of all listed companies.  
 
To fill these gaps, the study focused on smaller listed companies (SLCs) to collect the 
insiders’ views of social actors which the researcher reinterpreted to make the descriptions. 
Findings gathered on four research questions covered topics on attitudes and motivations; 
problems and difficulties; the Code’s impact on practices; and the actions and changes for 
improvement. The abductive research strategy along with the idealist ontology and the 
epistemology of constructionism consistent with the interpretivism paradigm was selected to 
answer the research questions. Sensitising concepts, derived from literature review of theories 
and a professional practice framework, were identified to guide the research and together with 
themes developed from research findings formed the basis for theory development.   
 
Research findings contribute to corporate governance theory, policy, practice and future 
research. Regulators may find the comprehensive feedback from the social actors on the 
regulatory improvement actions and changes on their respective wish lists useful in future 
corporate governance policy deliberations. Managers in SLCs can benchmark their 
organisational experiences with corporate governance and Code compliance to the 
interpretations of the social actors for performance improvements. The methodological and 
theoretical considerations and further theorising on the attitudes and motivations among 
entrepreneurs in SLCs toward corporate governance in the study may interest academics in 
future research. Due to data collection difficulties, the descriptions are restricted to findings 
collected from a total of 24 persons of whom 21 participated in individual interviews and 
three in a focus group discussion, respectively. Another limitation may arise from the 
researcher’s reinterpretation of the social actors’ interpretations of the social reality.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Overview of the Research and Thesis 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Flow of the Introductory Discussions 
1.1 • Contextual Background 
1.2  • Research Topic and Problem
1.3 • Research Objectives and Questions
1.4 • Historical-Contextual Reviews
1.5 • Research Methodology
1.6 • Layout of the Thesis
1.7 • Summary
Section HeadingSection
 
 
 
 
1.1 Contextual Background  
 
This thesis submitted to satisfy the remaining Doctor of Business Administration degree 
requirement was focused on the corporate governance practices of, and Code compliance 
among, the smaller companies listed on the Singapore Exchange. Corporate governance 
Singapore-style is government-led and primarily achieved through a hierarchy of rules, 
combining firm regulatory governance backed by the heft of primary and secondary 
legislations with a lighter touch of non-statutory rules. Firm regulatory governance is 
exemplified by the punitive punishment of heavier fines and imprisonment for non-
compliance with legislations such as the Companies Act and the Securities and Futures Act. 
Contrariwise, violations of the Singapore Exchange’s non-statutory rules in the Listing 
Manual face disciplinary actions ranging from reminders on the lighter end to fines, among 
others, with expulsion being the more punitive.     
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Included in the Singapore Exchange’s non-statutory rules is the Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance (hereafter, the Code) which had been incorporated into the Listing Manual, along 
with the requirement to comply or explain. The Corporate Governance Committee that 
developed the Code adopted the philosophy of comply or explain, providing for voluntary 
compliance and disclosures of practices with explanations on departures from Code 
recommendations (hereafter, Code compliance). Thereafter, the Singapore Exchange adopted 
the Code including the Corporate Governance Committee’s recommendation that required 
listed companies to disclose Code compliance in annual reports from the 1
st
 of January 2003. 
Since the Code’s initial issue date in 2001, it had undergone two subsequent updates 
beginning with the first in 2005 and followed by the most recent modification in 2012.     
 
 1.2 Research Topic and Problem 
 
Studies on the state of corporate governance of companies listed on the Singapore Exchange, 
pre- and post-Code Compliance since the 1
st
 of January 2003, tended to share one of two, but 
rarely both, characteristics. In respect of the first characteristic, these studies either covered 
companies of all sizes or focused on just the larger ones. As to the second characteristic, the 
studies either investigated Code compliance with all recommendations or specific Code 
principles and their accompanying guidelines only. Two studies in particular shared both 
characteristics and which warrant specific mention; these studies are more fully explored and 
described later in the next section on the Literature Review. One study completed in 2007 
(hereafter, the 2007 study) was commissioned by the Monetary Authority of Singapore and 
the Singapore Exchange; both regulators are tasked with the joint-responsibility for 
monitoring corporate governance in listed companies. The second of the two studies of 
especial relevance to this research is an annual study that computes the Governance and 
Transparency Index of listed companies.        
 
Two arguments were proffered to justify the study leading to this thesis which covered only 
smaller listed companies, defined in this study as companies with market capitalisation of 
below SGD 500 million. First, smaller companies comprise the majority of all listed 
companies. Based on market capitalisation data on the companies listed on the Singapore 
Exchange, more than 80% have market capitalisation below SGD 500 million. Furthermore, 
the fact that past studies tended to either cover companies of all sizes or focused on just larger 
companies disclosed that smaller companies had yet to be afforded the emphasis they deserve. 
Second, while the 2007 study and the annual Governance and Transparency Index provided 
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comparatively more comprehensive descriptions on corporate governance among listed 
companies they were limited to a business study perspective only. Several observations from 
an examination of the two studies in particular revealed research gaps that presented an 
opportunity for the study underlying this thesis.    
 
Firstly, both the 2007 study and the annual Governance and Transparency Index were 
business research studies and theory was therefore not a consideration in each of the studies. 
Secondly, the descriptions of corporate governance practices and Code compliance in both 
studies were based on self-disclosed information by the listed companies themselves in annual 
reports. Additionally, the annual Governance and Transparency Index only published 
information that were limited to basic index data comprising the raw scores and adjustments, 
plus other information highlights. Furthermore, although the 2007 study also collected data 
from two focus group discussions, descriptions on practices and Code compliance based on 
the findings gathered from this source were however, in highly summarised form. Thirdly, the 
total scores of listed companies in the annual Governance and Transparency Index indicated 
that most of the smaller listed companies lagged behind in practices and Code compliance. 
This observation was however, not addressed in the descriptions and although the 2007 study 
delved into this issue in the focus group discussions descriptions in the findings as mentioned 
earlier were scanty.   
 
In summary, smaller companies with market capitalisation of less than SGD 500 million is a 
sizeable majority of all listings on the Singapore Exchange. Additionally and evidently, the 
total scores of listed companies from the published annual Governance and Transparency 
Index indicated that most of the smaller listed companies lag behind in practices and Code 
compliance. More pertinently, almost half (48%) of smaller listed companies scored 30 points 
and below in the 2011 Governance & Transparency Index, graded on disclosures in annual 
reports in the preceding calendar year. This figure rose to over 80% when the number of 
smaller listed companies with scores of below 50 on the 2011 Governance & Transparency 
Index is taken into consideration. Two among the handful of studies on the state of corporate 
governance of listed companies provided relatively more comprehensive descriptions but 
were from a business perspective and based on self-disclosures of the companies. An 
academic study underpinned by theory and focused on smaller listed companies is needed 
therefore, to provide descriptions based on insiders’ views of social actors that also address 
the low annual index scores.             
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1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
The Code is now 13 years old since it was first released in 2001 and it had been updated twice 
already, first in 2005 and mostly recently in 2012. Also, listed companies had been required to 
disclose their corporate governance practices together with departures from the Code in 
annual reports for 11 years already, for the calendar years from 2003 to 2013. As the 
preceding discussion on the research problem had established, the research objective aimed to 
describe the corporate governance practices, including Code compliance, of smaller listed 
companies from the perspective of social actors. The research gathered data to answer four 
‘what’ research questions, starting on the attitude within smaller companies towards corporate 
governance in general and Code compliance in particular.  
 
More specifically, research findings were sought to describe what they understand corporate 
governance and Code compliance to be and what motivates them to comply or explain. The 
next question that followed was on the issues faced by the smaller listed companies in 
corporate governance, in particular the problems and difficulties encountered and the more 
challenging Code principles and guidelines. Question three was designed to elicit answers to 
describe the impact of the Code in influencing corporate governance practices and compliance 
among smaller listed companies, comparing the pre- and post-Code states. Lastly, views were 
sought on the effect of stakeholders – shareholders; regulators; and various business and 
professional organisations – in influencing practices and Code compliance among smaller 
listed companies and, what further changes are needed.  
 
1.4 Historical-Contextual Reviews 
 
1.4.1  Corporate Governance Theory, Practice, and Research  
 
Corporate governance, labelled a recent development in Clarke’s (2004) compilation of 
selected readings on the subject, is a comparatively young discipline among the social 
sciences. Two frequently cited pioneering work that inspired subsequent development in 
corporate governance theory and research only dated back to the 1930s (Durisin and Puzone, 
2009). Studies surveying research in the field (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis, 2001; Tosi, 
2008; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009) consistently referred to Berle and Means’ (1932) work on 
corporate ownership and control (Tricker 1993). Often cited as the earliest on corporate 
governance and described as inf1uential (Clarke 2004), their work led to another ground 
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breaking research by Chandler (1977) into the corporate manager’s ascendance. Separately, 
Coase (1937) initiated work on property rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which Alchian 
(1965), Demsetz (1967) among others extended, and Jensen and Meckling (1976) drew on to 
theorise the firm (Denis 2001). Even so, the term corporate governance was neither found in 
the literature nor was it a field for serious academic research until the late 1980s (Tricker 
1993). 
 
In the journal’s inaugural editorial, Tricker (1993) attributed the launch of Corporate 
Governance: An International Review to events in the preceding two decades that had 
heightened awareness to issues in corporate governance. Commencing in the 1970s, questions 
were raised about corporations and society with calls for broader representation on the Board, 
increased corporate accountability, and stronger regulation. For example, a study committee 
in the UK proposed union-appointed employee representatives on the board while the EU 
attempted to require member states to implement the German two-tier supervisory board 
model. It was not until the 1980s that other developments brought about changes in the way 
companies were governed; one was the growth of hostile takeovers in the US in the decade’s 
first half. The explosions of corporate scandals in the UK, US and elsewhere as well as a 
heightened seriousness to study, research and teach corporate governance came in the second 
half. Such developments led to further evolution, and by the early 1990s were sufficient for 
Tricker (1993, p 2) to declare that “the concepts and practices of corporate governance [had] 
come of age”. 
  
Tricker (1993) made specific reference in his editorial mentioned earlier to the development 
of a code of best practices (Cadbury 1992) in the UK, more commonly referred to as the 
Cadbury Code. Developed against a background of corporate financial scandals in the UK, the 
Cadbury Code contained recommended best practices to strengthen corporate governance in 
listed companies (Arcot and Bruno, 2006). During the 15-year period from 1993 to 2007, the 
Cadbury Code was among the list of the more heavily cited work on corporate governance in 
published research (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). Durisin and Puzone (2009) surveyed 1,000 
publications and 48,000 citations in the journal, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review and 15 other top journals in accounting, finance and management published from 
1993 to 2007. By the third five-year period in 2003-2007, the authors found collective 
evidence of a matured research field and confirmed sophistication, depth, rigour and 
intellectual consistency in corporate governance research. The evolution of corporate 
Corporate Governance Singapore-Style: 
Practices and Code Compliance among Smaller Listed Companies 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 1, Introduction                                                                                                        7 
 
 
 
governance theory, practice, and research has a short history but the governance issues linked 
to economic and human social activities dated back centuries.  
 
1.4.2 Corporate Governance, Singapore-Style 
 
“Forms of corporate governance are shaped nationally by their economic, political and legal 
backgrounds, by their sources of finance, and by the history and culture of the countries 
concerned” (Cadbury, 2004, ‘Foreword’, in Clarke (ed), 2004, p ix). Similar to other 
countries, Singapore’s form of corporate governance had been influenced by its economic, 
political and legal systems; sources of capital and funding; as well as its history and culture 
(Cadbury 2004). Sir Adrian Cadbury, chairman of the committee that delivered the 
eponymous Cadbury report (Cadbury 1992) with an accompanying code of best practices that 
pioneered corporate governance development worldwide had left out corporate scandals. 
Corporate scandals in the UK, US and elsewhere since the latter 1980s heightened interest in 
corporate governance (Tricker 1993) and Singapore was not spared.  
 
Historian Gerda Lerner (cited in Lewis 1995-2009) advocated learning from the thinking, 
actions, problem solving and choices made by past generations. The interconnected impact of 
macro-environmental, historical, and cultural factors plus industry forces on Singapore’s 
corporate governance development at two levels is depicted in the analytical framework in 
Figure 2.3, Chapter 2, page 25. The evolution of Singapore’s style of corporate governance is 
analysed at the two levels shown in the right column of the analytical framework. To provide 
the historical-contextual background to the analysis in Chapter 2, an overview of Singapore’s 
early history is set out in the remaining paragraphs.    
 
Most accounts of Singapore’s history, for example the oft-cited academic text by Turnbull 
(1989), begin with its founding by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. G K Tregonning, the former 
Raffles Professor of History at the then University of Singapore, therefore unsurprisingly 
asserted that “modern Singapore began in 1819” (cited in Kwa et al, 2009, pp 8, 53). 
Tregonning’s further declaration that earlier occurrences were not of “particular relevance to 
an understanding of the contemporary scene” (Kwa et al 2009, pp 8, 53) had since been 
challenged by Kwa and co-authors. Archaeological evidence available since 1984 pointed to 
pre-colonial Chinese influence 500 years earlier, coinciding with the Yuan and Ming 
dynasties in China and the Johor-Riau sultanate in the local region. Evidently, Singapore was 
already a significant centre of commerce in the 1300s, a busy port benefiting from an earlier 
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wave of global trade driven by the Chinese market (Kwa et al, 2009). Since its founding by 
Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819 however, Singapore was of strategic importance as a free port 
and trading base to serve British commercial interests (Gulati, 1992; Nizamuddin, 2007, 
Williams, 2009).  
 
Some historians nevertheless argued that Singapore was also of strategic value to the British 
and others as a defence base. This had stretched from the days of the Anglo-Dutch regional 
rivalry in the early 19
th
 century to the early 1900s when threats from Japanese “expansionist 
ambitions” emerged (Kwa et al, 2009 p 151). When the Japanese invaded Singapore on 31 
January 1942, Lee Kuan Yew, a pre-university student and later prime minister viewed it as a 
certain presage of the British Empire’s fall (Lee, KY, 1998). The observation proved to be 
prescient as a post-WWII Britain, financially-weakened and saddled by domestic economic 
problems, soon faced decline as a global power. Two concurrent events accelerated this 
development: globally, the emergence of the United States as a superpower and regionally, 
the rise of nationalistic sentiments. Faced with the inability to maintain the British Empire, an 
alternative plan was to grant independence to its territories but to keep them within the realm 
of British influence under a commonwealth.  
 
Described as “the British Grand Design” (Kwa et al, 2009, p 157) and in the context of 
Singapore, the plan entailed a political union of Southeast Asian British territories. This 
included Singapore, the Federation of Malaya, as well as the Borneo Territories that 
comprised Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. For Singapore, the road to this merger 
commenced in 1946 with first becoming a separate Crown Colony, then partial and full self-
government by 1955 and 1959, respectively.  After the People’s Action Party won the 
elections and assumed full internal self-governance from the British in 1959, Lee Kuan Yew 
who became prime minister was “not jubilant” (Lee, KY, 1998, p 306). The economy was too 
dependent on entrepot trade which had comprised about 70 percent of GDP in the British 
colonial days. This situation was further aggravated by high unemployment, the communist 
threat, and union unrest among other social problems that included a growing population. 
Although Singapore embarked on an industrialisation policy to diversify the economy, the 
government’s economic plans were limited by market size.  
 
Singapore and Malaya, its northern neighbor, were historically governed as one British 
territory before Singapore became a separate Crown Colony in 1946 (Kwa et al, 2009). The 
government recognised the compelling economics of reunification with the Malayan 
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hinterland which would then provide the common market Singapore needed to support its port 
economy and manufactured products (Lee, KY, 1998). Realistically however, certain 
roadblocks had to be cleared which included Malaya’s concern with Singapore’s 
predominantly Chinese population and hence its exposure to communism. With a heavy 
Malay population, Malaya’s concern with racial imbalance after a merger with Singapore was 
mitigated with the inclusion of the Borneo Territories under the British plan (Kwa et al, 
2009). The indigenous populations of the latter were considered similar to the Malay race and 
hence counterbalanced the post-merger racial composition. As well, Malaya’s fear of an 
independent Singapore turning communist was perceived to be a greater evil which in turn 
rendered the merger proposition a better alternative.  
 
Lured by its pressing economic need for a hinterland which out-weighed residual post-union 
risks, Singapore joined Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak to form Malaysia in 1963 (Lee, KY, 
1998, Kwa et al, 2009). However, the British grand design did not play out as it was 
originally intended, since not only did Brunei not join the Federation of Malaysia but 
Singapore was expelled two years later. Sensitive and explosive race issues surrounding racial 
composition and meritocracy re-surfaced which ultimately led to irreconcilable disagreements 
between Malaya and Singapore resulting in the latter’s ouster from Malaysia. When 
Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965 and once again without a hinterland, the 
prognosis for her survival was not encouraging (Lee, 2000). Lee Kuan Yew recalled further in 
the opening chapter to volume two of his memoirs almost three decades later that all the 
predicted doom in the foreign press only added to his gloom. The nation’s founding father and 
his team set out to build the new country’s own economic hinterland and to prove the 
prognosticators wrong.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
1.5.1 Research Strategy and Paradigm 
 
Among two possible choices – induction and abduction – available to answer the research 
questions, the aim of the abductive research strategy was a natural fit with the research 
objective in this study. As Blaikie (2010, p 84) explained, the aim of the abductive research 
strategy is “to describe and understand social life in terms of social actors’ meanings and 
motives”. The descriptive aspect in the aim of the abductive research strategy comported with 
this study’s research objective that had been introduced earlier. To recap, it was to describe 
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the corporate governance practices, including Code compliance, of smaller listed companies 
from the perspective of social actors.  
 
A combination of the idealist ontology and the epistemology of constructionism were adopted 
along with the selection of the abductive strategy. This position assumed social reality to be 
represented in the thinking and interpretations of social actors who construct, conceptualise 
and interpret their own actions and those of others, as well as social situations. Consequently, 
the researcher had to initially enter the world of the social actors to learn the social reality 
from these insiders. Transitioning to the stance of an expert in the next step, the researcher 
then reinterpreted the reality gathered in order to describe it in the technical language of the 
social scientist. In this regard and discussed in the methodological framework, the conceptual 
model presented in Chapter 3 comprising theory-derived sensitising concepts either 
incorporated into the abstract-analytical model or stand-alone were applied in data analysis.      
 
To wrap up this discussion on research strategy and paradigm, adoption of the ontological 
assumptions of the idealist as well as the epistemological assumptions of constructionism was 
tacit embrace of the interpretivist paradigm. Under this paradigm, the approach of the 
interpretivist is to view social reality as a cycle of interpretations and reinterpretations. The 
ontology of interpretivism sees social reality as the interpretations of the social actors, that is, 
it is pre-interpreted even before the social scientist uncovers it. Application of these 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives in the reduction and analysis of the primary data 
collected in the research is addressed in the discussions on the methodological framework.       
 
1.5.2 The Conceptual Model 
 
Among the past academic researches and business studies explored and discussed in the 
literature review in Chapter 2, only one of them which was an academic research had 
considered theory. This particular academic research had adopted theory applied by a 
previous researcher and incorporated the hypothesis in testing the link between corporate 
governance practices and company performance among Singapore listed companies. The 
research underlying this thesis aimed to fill the gap in theory application in past academic 
researches and business studies on corporate governance among listed companies in 
Singapore.  
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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Three sets of theory-derived sensitising concepts based on left- and right-brain theory, 
enterprise risk management concepts, and the use of metaphors were applied in initial 
theorising to build the abstract-analytical model.  These three sets of sensitising concepts: left-
brain, right-brain, and both brain; risks, opportunities, controls, and monitoring; and 
organisational sensemaking, respectively, were incorporated into the abstract-analytical model 
referred to as ‘approaches to risks-opportunities-controls’. The abstract-analytical model and 
remaining sensitising concepts derived from stewardship theory and servant leadership theory, 
stewards and stewardship, formed the conceptual model that provided context to the research.  
 
1.5.3 Methodological Framework  
 
A methodological framework incorporating research methods was built to: first determine 
data sources, type and form; and then select, collect, reduce and analyse the data. The 
constructed methodological framework presented in Table 4.1, Chapter 4, page 82 is 
comprised of a series of work steps from determination of data sources to data analysis. 
Matched against each work step are the specific objectives shown in the second column, 
followed by a summary of the research methods to accomplish the objectives. The research 
methods applied in each of the four work steps are discussed in the four corresponding sub-
sections in Chapter 4.    
 
 
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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1.6 Layout of the Thesis 
 
The organisation of the thesis, after the Introduction chapter, is set out in two parts containing 
three chapters each. See Table 1.1 below. 
 
Table 1.1 
Organisation of the Thesis 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Heading Sub-Heading 
 
Chapter 1, Introduction Overview of the Research and Thesis 
 
 
 
PART ONE: STAGING THE RESEARCH 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, and RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Heading Sub-Heading 
 
Chapter 2, Literature  Review Corporate Governance Theory, Practice, and 
Research 
 
Chapter 3, Theory Underpinning the 
Research 
Theoretical Review and the Conceptual 
Model 
 
Chapter 4, Research Methodology   Research Strategy and Methodological 
Framework  
 
 
 
PART TWO: REPORTING THE RESEARCH 
 
SINGAPORE PRAGMATISM in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Heading Sub-Heading 
 
Chapter 5, Findings Data Collection and Reduction 
 
Chapter 6, Findings Analysis Synthesis and Analysis 
 
Chapter 7, Conclusion Reflections on the Research 
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1.7 Summary 
 
Descriptions on the corporate governance practices and Code compliance of the companies 
listed on the Singapore Exchange in past studies had relied on the companies’ self-
disclosures. The study completed for this thesis, which is submitted for the Doctor of 
Business Administration degree, aimed to be different in at least two ways. Firstly, it is 
focused on the smaller listed companies only which deserve to be given prominence since 
they comprise more than 80% of companies listed on Singapore Exchange. Secondly, 
descriptions on the corporate governance practices and Code compliance of smaller listed 
companies are based on the insiders’ perspectives of social actors. Besides the addition of a 
different study to the research literature and the contribution of new knowledge, there are two 
possible benefits from the research. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE: 
 
STAGING THE RESEARCH 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corporate Governance Theory, Practice, and Research  
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
Part One of the thesis, comprising chapters 2 to 4, presents the literature review; theory 
underpinning the research; and research methodology to provide for the staging of the 
research. In this first of the three presentations, the aim is to discuss the combination of 
contextual, historical, methodological, and theoretical literature reviews (Neuman, 2003). 
Buck (in Merchey, 2004a), Carr and Chandler (in Seaman and Smith, 2012, pp 46 and 50, 
respectively), Lerner (in Lewis, 1995-2009), and Sowell (2006) had all advocated unveiling 
history to see forward. The advice of the novelist, three historians, and the economist, 
respectively, to draw on history to look forward is considered in the analysis of the literature 
on corporate governance theory, practice, and research.       
 
To David Carr, a historian and philosopher (Seaman and Smith, 2012, p 46), past events 
inform where people and their activities had been and where they are headed. The 
distinguished business history scholar, Alfred D Chandler, Jr (Seaman and Smith, 2012, p 50) 
reminded people to know where they had been to know where they are going. Historian Gerda 
Lerner (in Lewis, 1995-2009) promoted learning from the thinking, actions, problem solving 
and choices made by past generations. Economist Thomas Sowell (2006) urged learning from 
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the history of economics, examining the emerging new thinking and debates among 
intellectuals, to obtain a deeper understanding of the existing ideas that continue to evolve. 
 
Pearl S Buck, the prolific American novelist and 1938 Nobel Laureate in Literature summed it 
up concisely and precisely – searching the past is a prerequisite to understanding the present 
(in Merchey, 2004a). The flow of the analyses summarised in Figure 2.1 on the previous page 
serves as a preview to the discussions in this chapter. Analyses into the theory and practice of 
corporate governance, and corporate governance research in sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively, provide the historical context to the research. Additionally, the historical-
contextual analysis in section 2.3 reviews the types of studies and methodologies as well as 
common theories found in past research.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Theory and Practice 
 
 
 
 
The directors of … companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private [co-partnery] frequently watch over their own. Like 
the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. (Smith, 1776, p 576) 
 
 
Adam Smith, quoted above, is acknowledged as the first to identify and describe the corporate 
governance conundrum (Berle and Means, 1932; Denis, 2001; Clarke, 2004; Islam et al, 
2010). Corporate governance issues surfaced under laissez-faire capitalism in the days of 
Smith with the emergence of the corporate form of business organisation, an alternative to the 
pre-existing sole proprietorship and partnership organisational forms. From a functional 
perspective, the OECD (in Clarke, 2004, p1) defines corporate governance as how companies 
are structured and managed while it also entails how power is exercised in companies (Clarke, 
2004). Fundamentally, corporate governance issues arise when managers are perceived to 
exercise their power indiscriminately and selfishly to the detriment of shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Rodrigues and Antonio, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding Smith’s (1776) early discourse on the subject matter, corporate governance 
theory and practice was labelled a recent development in Clarke’s (2004) compilation of 
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selected readings. A comparatively young discipline among the social sciences, two 
frequently cited pioneering works that inspired subsequent development in corporate 
governance theory and practice just dated back to the 1930s (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). 
Berle and Means’ (1932) work on corporate ownership and control (Tricker, 1993) was the 
earliest on corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis, 2001; Tosi, 2008; 
Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Described as inf1uential (Clarke, 2004), their work led to 
another ground breaking effort by Chandler (1977) on the corporate manager’s ascendance. 
Separately, Coase (1937) initiated work on property rights which Alchian (1965), Demsetz 
(1967) and others extended, and Jensen and Meckling (1976) applied to explain the principal-
agent problem in theorising the firm (Denis, 2001).  
 
On another note, governance issues relating to ensuring resources are allocated for intended 
organisational purposes and not directed elsewhere had existed ever since people organised 
economic activities to achieve mutual goals (Clarke, 2004). Such corporate governance issues 
arise in business and other organisations characterised by the separation of ownership and 
management, especially in big corporations (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977).     
Arguably, the indiscriminate and selfish exercise of power in the corporate form of business 
organisation share similar characteristics reminiscent of two earlier economic systems that 
preceded laissez-faire capitalism. Property rights, ownership of capital, the exercise of power, 
and the ideas to reform the tyranny of feudalism and mercantilism provide the philosophical 
and theoretical foundations to corporate governance issues.  
 
The theory and practice of corporate governance is analysed first from a big picture 
philosophical and theoretical perspective before narrowing down to a country view, 
specifically in Singapore. Presented in Figure 2.2 on the next page, sub-section 2.2.1 begins 
with a global view on two aspects, focusing initially on the tyrannies in the two earlier 
economic systems and the reformation ideas. These ideas were from the philosophical and 
conceptual thinking of Adam Smith and the Scottish Establishment, which Hugh Trevor-
Roper (in Davidson, 2005, p 10) identified as comprising Smith and five other “intellectual 
pioneers”. Then the focus turns to examining the corporate governance conundrum as a new 
tyranny that emerged from the corporate form of business organisation and which had since 
evolved to a wicked problem. From a country perspective specific to the research, sub-section 
2.2.2 analyses the theories underlying Singapore’s approach to regulatory governance and the 
practice of corporate governance Singapore-style at both the regulatory and company levels. 
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2.2.1 Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Governance 
 
In his magnum opus the Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) criticised feudalism and 
mercantilism as well as championed laissez-faire capitalism (Anderson and Tollison, 1984) 
but the economic systems shared a common theme, tyranny. Tyranny or “oppressive power”; 
“an oppressive, harsh, or unjust act”; and the “cruel and unfair treatment by people with 
power over others” (Merriam-Webster online, viewed 6 February 2014, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/tyranny) harks back to feudalism. Smith (1776) also saw tyranny 
continuing into capitalism where in its earliest form under the mercantile system, Smith first 
accused producers of oppressive power in their unfair treatment of consumers. Quoted earlier 
from his Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) then went on to identify and describe the corporate 
governance conundrum, a new tyranny that emerged from the corporate form of business 
organisation. Although tyranny is common among the systems, Table 2.1 on the next page 
contrasts the different sources and exercise of power along with the oppressed and exploited 
powerless parties at the receiving end.    
 
2.2.1.1 Tyranny in, and Reformation Ideas from, Feudal and Mercantile Systems  
 
In human affairs, individuals and institutions rely on power – physical, economic and moral – 
to exercise authority in directing and controlling economic and social activities (Moody, 
1979). John Dalrymple wrote in 1757 that “power follows property” which John Swinton 
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Table 2.1 Power Execution in Economic Systems: A Comparative Analysis 
 
 Feudalism 
 
Mercantilism Capitalism 
S
o
u
rc
es
 o
f 
P
o
w
er
 
Property rights 
The beneficiaries were: 
(a) The king (the ultimate 
beneficiary); 
 
(b) Lords or nobles (the 
king’s vassals); and 
 
(c) Villiens (vassals to lords 
/nobles; may be peasants).  
 
Commerce 
The producers, comprising 
of merchants and 
manufacturers, via 
ownership of capital. 
Managerialism 
The rise of managerialism 
in the “modern corporation” 
led to the ascendance of the 
corporate managers, the 
“new princes” among the 
managerial ranks (Berle and 
Means, 1932, p 124).  
P
o
w
er
 E
x
ec
u
ti
o
n
 
(a) The king granted land/ 
related property – houses, 
animals, and serfs (fief) – to 
lords (vassals) in return for 
loyalty and protection; 
 
(b) Lords/nobles sublet 
property to their own  
vassals (villiens); 
 
(c) Villiens subdivided 
property to earn rent but not 
to sell. 
 
Producers lobbied the 
government to create a 
monopoly through policies 
centred on trade, especially 
international trade, via:  
 
(a) Import restrictions 
(tariffs and quotas); and  
 
(b) Export promotion 
(subsidies and tax rebates). 
Managerialism created 
“economic” empires” in 
“the hands of a new form of 
absolutism” (Berle and 
Means, 1932, p 124). 
Consequently, some 
managers may act selfishly 
and not to the interests of 
shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Rodrigues 
and Antonio, 2011). 
 
 
T
h
e 
O
p
p
re
ss
ed
 /
  
E
x
p
lo
it
ed
 P
o
w
er
le
ss
 
(a) Peasants who were 
freemen, cottagers and 
small holders made rent 
payments in money or 
produce, while those who 
were villiens provided 
military services to their 
lords; 
 
(b) Peasants who were serfs 
owned by the lords tilled 
the lord’s land; performed 
other services on the lord’s 
home, mines or roads; and 
made tax payments to the 
lords in livestock.   
(a) Taxpayers taxed twice: 
(i) First, from financing the 
export subsidies with their 
tax monies; and (ii) Again, 
from being taxed indirectly 
through paying higher 
prices for goods at home. 
 
(b) Consumers denied 
cheaper goods from 
neighbouring countries. 
 
(c) Individuals precluded 
from pursuing their own 
best interests in production, 
merchandising, and moving 
labour across borders. 
Shareholders-owners had 
been relegated to mere 
suppliers of capital.  
 
 
Sources: 
(1) Feudalism: Forstater, 2007; The Middle Ages Website (http://www.middle-
ages.org.uk/serfs.htm; accessed 19 November 2012). 
(2) Mercantilism: Smith, 1776; Fetter, 1935; Hahn, 1947; Rachleff, 2006; Forstater, 
2007. 
(3) Capitalism: Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler 1977; Rodrigues and Antonio, 2011.
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apparently re-phrased later in 1765 to “power always follow property” (in Davidson, 2005, pp 
53 and 50, respectively). Both Dalrymple’s and Swinton’s expressions had described the 
feudal system where property was central to the exercise of power by the king as well as the 
nobility and their own vassals. Smith (1776) criticised the feudal system’s limited property 
rights to the privileged few (Berle and Means, 1932) as a key reason that hampered growth 
and improvement in the Scottish agricultural economy (Kim, 2009). To Smith (1776, p 298), 
low productivity negated cheap labour, as slaves needed only to be fed but people deprived of 
property rights “[ate] as much” and worked “as little as possible”. Others in the Scottish 
Enlightenment also objected to feudalism because it had delayed the transition from 
agriculture to commerce (Davidson, 2005).   
 
Since the time of mercantilism, the earliest form of capitalism (Forstater, 2007), power 
derived from commerce had been extended to the common people (Dalrymple, 1759, in 
Davidson, 2005, p 53). Smith (1776) devoted eight chapters in Book IV of the Wealth of 
Nations, probably the most widely read (Fetter, 1935), to confront mercantilism. This critique 
of mercantilism (Elmslie, 2004) was described as severely critical (Skinner, 1993); attacking 
violently (Endres, 1991); an assault on doctrine (Fay, 1934); and a low opinion of trade 
balance (Fetter, 1935). More specifically, Smith (1776) accused the producers, represented by 
merchants and manufacturers, as conspirators of the mercantile system solely for their own 
interests while totally neglecting that of consumers. He criticised mercantilism’s foreign trade 
restriction for hindering exercise of individual rights when it was individuals acting in their 
own best interests under laissez faire that created national wealth (Moody, 1979).       
 
Smith (1776) and fellow Scottish Enlightenment intellectuals saw the private commercial 
sector as the emergence of economic freedom under a new morality and an alternative to 
feudalism (Bruyn, 1999). Marxists perceived feudalism from a political lens, a class struggle 
between upper class nobility landowners who exploited the social relationship with lower 
class peasants (Davidson, 2004a). The Scottish Enlightenment however, viewed commerce as 
the antidote to the feudalistic poison where the market economy was interpreted as a civil 
society to shield individuals from feudal rule (Bruyn, 1999). Furthermore, it was not just 
“philosophical and economic liberalism” (Rachleff, 2006, p 460) from feudal monarchal rule, 
but also from government controlled mercantilism to a civil society of free market capitalism 
(Bruyn, 1999). Before a commercial society could thrive however, Smith (1776) recognised 
the need to suppress the nobility’s power (Davidson, 2005), not through class revolution but 
by demanding less interference to develop capitalism (Pascal, 1938). This entailed eliminating 
past institutions, taxes, monopoly and privilege that mercantilists lobbied for to advance their  
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vested interests, and reforming national policy to promote liberty and an efficient economy 
(Skinner, 1993). 
 
Observing property rights, institutionalised by fair contractual arrangements, operating in 
Europe’s transition to the modern economy convinced Smith (1776) that it was a precursor to 
capital growth and wealth accumulation (Kim, 2009). Writing in his 1997 book on capitalism, 
Albert Hirschman (in Davidson 2005, p 46) interpreted the primary impact of Smith’s (1776) 
Wealth of Nations to be economic justification for pursuing individual self-interest. Smith 
(1776) based his wealth of nations theory on small businesses (Bruyn, 1999) since people 
were mainly employed in agriculture and handicraft was the primary industry at that time 
(Moody, 1979). The early brand of capitalism that began in the laissez-faire era centred on 
individual owners driven by the profit motive to compete in an assumed perfect market of free 
competition (Forstater, 2007). These individuals, who were otherwise not involved in 
subsistence farming, exercised liberty to pursue economic activities after their own best 
interests, guided by the “impersonal authority” of market competition (Moody, 1979, p 113). 
Found deep in his magnum opus where he critiqued mercantilism, Smith (1776, p 343) 
famously characterised laissez-faire capitalism which he had championed (Anderson and 
Tollison, 1984) as “led by an invisible hand”.   
 
Recapping, Smith’s and fellow Scottish intellectuals’ thesis for reform involved replacing 
feudal and mercantilist power abuse with economic freedom and less interference for 
individuals to pursue capitalism and commerce under free market competition. The economic, 
ethical, and philosophical underpinnings to corporate governance, at both the regulatory and 
company levels, entailed actions summarised under the labels of economic liberalisation; 
property rights; individual self-interest; civil society; and self-policing. While the economic 
and philosophical ideas may seem intuitive under laissez-faire capitalism, the ethical and 
philosophical concept that civil society, self-policing, and self-interest can co-exist stretches 
the imagination on human nature and behaviour. In Scottish Enlightenment thought 
nevertheless, the market economy was intended to be self-policing with a moral life of its own 
where individuals accounted for their own lives and actions (Bruyn, 1999). Following the 
next analysis on the new tyranny and wicked problem, these ideas are revisited in the theory 
and practice of corporate governance, Singapore-style and Part Two on research findings and 
interpretation.        
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2.2.1.2 Laissez-Faire Capitalism and the Rise of a New Tyranny and Wicked Problem 
 
Laissez-faire capitalism and the separation of ownership and management in the corporate 
form of business organisation, especially in big corporations, spawned the new tyranny of 
managerialism (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977). The vision that Adam Smith and 
the Scottish Enlightenment had of the market as a civil order was shattered by the rise of 
power in big corporations which brought two unintended consequences. One, power in big 
corporations caused the consequent decline in moral standards (Bruyn, 1999), for example, 
the monopolistic rate fixing practices of railroads in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
(Clarke, 2004). Two, liberty under laissez-faire that had overturned feudalism and mercantilist 
monopoly in turn eliminated competition resulting in a return to governmental regulation 
(Bruyn, 1999; Clarke, 2004). In the example of the railroads, farmers had appealed to state 
legislatures and courts to curb their authority (Clarke, 2004). Power ascendance in big 
corporations (Bruyn, 1999) arose from technological advancements and transportation 
developments that replaced handicraft trade, and led to new markets and sources of raw 
materials, respectively (Moody, 1979; Clarke, 2004). 
 
The corporate form of business organisation opened up property rights (Demsetz, 1967; 
Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972) to the general public who provided funds for corporations to 
invest in new technology and expand operations. Additionally, the big and modern 
corporations (Berle and Means, 1932) became powerful since, notwithstanding possible 
bankruptcy and liquidation, they had relative longevity compared to the shareholders who 
came and went (Davis, 2011). Smith (1776) observed that individual investors were attracted 
to the corporate form of business which afforded trouble-free company ownership without the 
hassle of running a business they might not even understand. Besides describing the corporate 
governance conundrum quoted earlier, Smith (1776) also cautioned that this appealing 
investment vehicle came with other risks some of which even extended beyond the loss of the 
invested sum. To Clarke (2004), Smith (1776, in Clarke, 2004, p 2) disapproved of the 
corporate form and viewed it with dismay, while Berle and Means (1932) described Smith’s 
reaction as a strong repudiation. Analyses subsequent to Smith had not been any more 
positive; for instance, Berle and Means (1932) concluded that the corporation was an 
untenable form of business organisation.  
 
“Wicked problems” was first used by Horse Rittel to describe “the mischievous and even evil 
quality” of social problems (Churchman, 1967, p B-141). For example, racial discrimination 
(Humpage, 2005); crime, healthcare, nuclear energy, poverty, terrorism, water resources 
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(Batie, 2008); a financial crisis (Kesavan et al, 2009); and climate change (Crane and Landis, 
2010) present wicked problems. Usually applied to public governance and policy (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973; van Bueren et al, 2003; Sam, 2009; Ferlie et al, 2011), application of the 
concept to other disciplines had also caught on. Some examples are operations research and 
management science (Churchman, 1967); organisation and management, in particular, 
leadership (Beinecke, 2009); information systems (Harrell and Sage, 2010); and corporate 
social responsibility in sustainable mining (Everingham, 2012). In corporate governance, the 
term wicked problems had been applied to management tasks that had included: linking 
governance to firm performance (Sharp and Stock, 2005), and setting corporate strategy 
(Camillus, 2008). In a paper on dilemmas in planning, Rittel and Webber (1973, p 160) wrote 
that the problems encountered in execution were wicked problems and listed “ten 
distinguishing properties” to justify their joint declaration. 
 
Four of “the 10 properties of wicked problems” (Camilus, 2008, p 101), pertaining to problem 
identification are summarily examined to argue that the new tyranny of managerialism had 
evolved to a wicked problem. Summarised and combined into three short statements, these 
properties identify and describe wicked problems as: unique and unprecedented; complex and 
uncertain, and symptomatic of other problems; and characterised by diversity, conflict, and 
confusion. The six remaining properties which describe solutions to wicked problems as 
continuous and judgmental, the effectiveness of which is impossible to evaluate, and which 
carry unintended consequences are not evaluated. The wicked corporate governance problem 
that Smith (1776) first identified and described was certainly unprecedented in that it had 
arisen from a new form of business organisation. With the ascendance of corporate managers 
or managerialism (Chandler, 1977) in modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932), the 
“visible hand of management” (Donaldson, 1990, p 379) replaced Smith’s (1776) invisible 
hand. Separation of ownership-control, together with the dispersal of ownership especially in 
large corporations, limited owners’ influence on management actions (Davis, 2005; Durisin 
and Puzone, 2009; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Tosi, 2008). Additionally, unrestricted 
actions increased the likelihood that managers acted in their own interests rather than the 
owners’ (Tosi, 2008) and strayed from profit maximisation (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; 
Williamson, 1981). 
 
Corporate governance as a wicked problem is complex in part because human nature is at the 
heart of the beast. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1759, in Skinner, 1993, pp 38-
39) linked man’s mean spirited self-interest to personal ambition, an inherent human drive. 
Managers’ self-serving behaviour may include resting on past successes (Hicks, 1935); risk 
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avoidance (Fellner, 1949); and organisation slack (Cyert and March, 1963; Williamson, 1963) 
– all cited in Branch (1973, pp 24-25). Pursuing personal satisfaction, they avoid work (De 
Scitovszky, 1943; Reder 1947) and may prefer leisure to pecuniary benefits (Monsen and 
Downs, 1965) as well as satisficing (Radner, 1975, in Simon, 1979, p 508). Being the 
“administrative man” of bounded rationality the manager “satisfices” that is, settling for what 
is satisfactorily acceptable, for example, a price that is fair rather than maximising objectives 
(Simon, 1947, pp 118-9). Management present accounting results favourable to themselves 
(Salamon and Smith, 1979) and push more agency costs in mergers and acquisitions to 
owners (Kroll et al, 1990) - cited in Tosi 2008, p 158. As well, while companies pursue 
various social and political objectives, managers may tend towards using their positions to 
advance personal beliefs over and above the organisational purpose (Branch, 1973).  
 
The remaining part of statement three that identifies and describes the wicked problem in 
corporate governance as uncertain and symptomatic of other problems is reflected in the 
proliferation of multiple theoretical perspectives. Smith’s (1776) initial identification and 
description; the manager’s ascendance and managerialism (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 
1977); and the principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1776) had already been 
mentioned. Then there is also stakeholder theory discussed next in the examination of the last 
of four properties of wicked problems relating to diversity, conflict, and confusion. The 
multiplicity in theories to describe and explain the tyranny of managerialism and the wicked 
nature that corporate governance practice had evolved into is illustrated in Vibert (2004). In 
his handbook of ideas and explanations, agency theory and stakeholder theory are among 32 
categories of theoretical perspectives on the organisational behaviour of firms (Vibert, 2004). 
Also due to multiple stakeholder demands discussed next, the practice of corporate 
governance had evolved to the status of a wicked problem with no one “definitive 
formulation” (Rittel and Weber, 1973).            
 
Last in the four properties on problem identification are the diversity and conflict, as well as 
the confusion, in explaining a wicked problem arising from the multiple stakeholders 
involved (Rittel and Webber (1973). Confusion arises not only from the usually limited 
information available on wicked problems but also from the ramifications of the problems on 
the social system (Churchman 1967; Camillus 2008). Wicked problems typically involve 
multiple stakeholders with a variety of agendas and diverse values that often conflict with 
each other (Churchman 1967; Balram and Dragićević 2006; Camillus 2008). In a society 
populated with pluralistic interests, there is always room for disputes on what is universally 
just and equitable to satisfy all constituents (Rittel and Webber 1973). Stakeholder theory 
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defines another aspect of corporate governance arising from the combined economic and 
social roles which had since been widely expected of companies (Tricker, 1993; Cadbury, 
2004). Interestingly, more than two centuries earlier Smith’s (1776) critique of the 
mercantilist producers’ selfish actions that exploited consumers comported with stakeholder 
theory which views customers as “secondary stakeholders” (Bruyn 1999, p 42).  
  
2.2.2 Corporate Governance, Singapore-Style – Theory and Practice 
 
 Forms of corporate governance are shaped nationally by their economic, 
political and legal backgrounds, by their sources of finance, and by the 
history and culture of the countries concerned. (Cadbury, 2004, 
‘Foreword’, in Clarke (ed), 2004, p ix)   
 
 
Similar to other countries, Singapore’s form of corporate governance had been influenced by 
its economic, political and legal systems; sources of capital and funding; as well as its history 
and culture (Cadbury, 2004). History and culture are, in the words of historian Gerda Lerner 
(in Lewis, 1995-2009), reflected in the thinking (that is, theory), actions, problem solving and 
choices made (collectively, business practices) by past generations. Further and to paraphrase 
American author Judith A Boss (in Merchey, 2004b), theory is not at variance with practice 
since actions in business practice are informed by theory. Sir Adrian Cadbury, chairman of 
the committee that delivered the eponymous Cadbury report (Cadbury, 1992) with an 
accompanying code of best practices that pioneered corporate governance development 
worldwide had omitted one other factor. The influence of corporate scandals, which in the 
UK, US and elsewhere heightened interest in corporate governance (Tricker, 1993) since the 
latter 1980s, was also a factor in Singapore’s corporate governance development.  
 
Summarising, the interconnected impact of macro-environmental, historical, and cultural 
factors as well as industry forces on Singapore’s corporate governance development at both 
the regulatory and company levels is depicted in Figure 2.3, next page. Singapore’s regulatory 
governance via a “hierarchy of rules”, comprising primary and secondary legislations as well 
as non-statutory rules (Corporate Finance Committee, 1998, p 22), serves to promote good 
practices at the company level. These rules evolved over the years in response to the nation’s 
economic development needs (Cadbury, 2004) and corporate scandals (Tricker, 1993). 
History and culture’s role (Cadbury, 2004) is reflected in Singapore leaders’ thinking, actions, 
problem solving, and choices made (Lerner, in Lewis 2005-2009), influenced by theory and 
theory informed practices (Boss, in Merchey, 2004b).  
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Continuing the analysis on corporate governance theory and practice, this sub-section 
examines the theories underlying Singapore’s approach to regulatory governance and the 
practice of corporate governance Singapore-style at the regulatory and company levels. The 
Singapore leadership operationalised its own thinking and actions, since theorised as 
Singapore pragmatism, to pursue the economic liberalisation ideas of Adam Smith and the 
Scottish Establishment. Online sources (references in brackets) provide conceptualisations of 
Singapore pragmatism as "utilitarianism" (Caplan, 2008); “the relentless search for best 
practices” (Wachter, 2009); and “what works in practice rather than abstract theory” 
(Friedman, 2011). It is the opposite of populism in which the Singapore government first set 
policies based on what is good for the country and then convince the people afterwards 
(Caplan, 2010).            
 
Additionally, Singapore’s leadership had arguably operationalised different theories and 
theoretical perspectives from a professional practice framework to: one, develop the nation’s 
regulatory governance and two, influence corporate governance in business and other 
organisations. Besides economic liberalisation ideas, other theories included modern 
mercantilism (Gulati, 1992); neo-liberalism (Rachleff, 2006); and professional practice 
enterprise risk management concepts and techniques (The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004). The different theories applied in the 
practice of corporate governance, Singapore-style at the regulatory level are examined next 
under two general headings, Singapore pragmatism and economic liberalisation. Before 
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proceeding however, some background information on the nation’s early history is necessary 
and useful to provide the setting to the analyses of Singapore pragmatism and economic 
liberalisation.   
  
2.2.2.1 Regulatory Governance 
 
To recap briefly, most accounts of Singapore’s history, for example the oft-cited academic 
text by Turnbull (1989), begin with its founding by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. 
Archaeological evidence available since 1984 pointed to pre-colonial Chinese influence 500 
years earlier, coinciding with the Yuan and Ming dynasties in China and the Johor-Riau 
sultanate in the local region.    Evidently, Singapore was already a significant centre of 
commerce in the 1300s, a busy port benefiting from an earlier wave of global trade driven by 
the Chinese market (Kwa et al, 2009). Since its founding by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819 
however, Singapore was of strategic importance as a free port and trading base to serve 
British commercial interests (Gulati, 1992; Nizamuddin, 2007, Williams, 2009). After World 
War II, Britain made Singapore a separate Crown Colony in 1946, and granted partial and full 
self-government by 1955 and 1959, respectively. Lacking an economic hinterland, Singapore 
joined Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak to form Malaysia in 1963 (Lee, KY, 1998; Kwa et al, 
2009). After expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia two years later on 9 August 1965, 
Singapore’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, and his team set out to build the new country’s 
own economic hinterland.   
 
2.2.2.1.1 Singapore pragmatism 
 
At the regulatory level, Singapore pragmatism was evident in the leadership’s application of 
enterprise risk management concepts and techniques (The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004). In particular, the leadership applied the 
enterprise risk management concepts relating to event identification; risk assessment; risk 
response; and controls. Applying the first two enterprise risk management concepts, the 
leadership identified three risks facing the young nation at independence and all three risks 
were assessed to be critical. Risk A pertained to the quandary of the new nation’s economic 
survival without an economic hinterland following Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia. 
Risk B and Risk C attributable to history and culture threatened achievement of the strategic 
goals and objectives spawned from Risk A.  
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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Risk B pertaining to Guanxi or personal relationships in business transactions, a Chinese 
heritage, (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000; Chen and Glen, 2004) added to the corporate governance 
conundrum. Examples are multiple cross-shareholdings in family business groups (Nam and 
Nam, 2004), and nepotism (Menkhoff and Kay, 2000; Singh, 2005, Lin and Hu, 2007) due to 
“Confucian values” (Sam, 2005, p 59). The ubiquity of family companies in Asia including 
Singapore presented a common issue, the influence of “family ethos”, compounded by 
Confucian values in Chinese firms (Sadleir and Pongpiajun, 2007, p 57). Good corporate 
governance practices, in particular, board independence and shareholder returns took a back 
seat, and “fear of being disrespectful or of losing face” made it difficult to implement an 
effective whistleblowing policy.  
 
Risk C, the prevalent toleration of money politics accepted as common practice and part of 
the regional political culture (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000, 2007), also threatened regulatory 
governance. This risk still exists today in varying degrees in, among others, China (Huang 
and Rice, 2012); Indonesia (Lindsey, 2004); India (Swamy, 2011); Malaysia (Siddiquee, 
2010); and the Philippines (Rama, 2012). Enterprise risk management concepts and 
techniques provided for four possible options as a risk response to the identified and assessed 
risks. Among the possible options to accept, avoid, reduce or share the risks (The Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004), the Singapore leadership 
opted for risk reduction.  
 
The leadership’s risk responses were of two categories in which they were either, responses to 
economic development or, responses to corporate scandals. Applying the enterprise risk 
management concept of event identification (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission, 2004), the leadership recognised that the risk event in Risk A also 
presented opportunities. Singapore capitalised on Risk A to bring about transformational 
change (McNamee, 1998), turning it into economic development opportunities to build the 
nation’s own hinterland (Lee, 2000). The opportunities channelled to economic planning re-
emerged with the strategy to “leapfrog the region”, link up with developed nations, and 
“create a First World oasis in a Third World region” (Lee, 2000, pp 75-6).  
 
Responding to Risk B and Risk C to achieve comparative advantage in a region known for 
corruption, Singapore embraced the rule of law built on the legacy British legal system (Lee, 
2000, 2007). Singapore’s first Prime Minster, Lee Kuan Yew, ensured implementation of the 
law under a culture of efficient, effective and honest enforcement to encourage the inflow of 
investments, as well as to protect investors. This action comported with the enterprise risk 
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management concept and practice to use controls as a risk response or risk treatment (The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004). In this 
instance, control was in the form of laws, regulations, and rules as a response to the assessed 
cultural risks.  
 
Evidently, the rule of law in response to Risk B and Risk C reflected lessons from history 
(Lerner, in Lewis, 1995-2009) and cultural influences from Singapore’s colonial past (Lee, 
KY, 1998, 2000). Lee recorded his observations of the British and Japanese colonial masters 
since his pre-university days which had left an indelible influence on his formative thinking. 
In both volumes of his memoirs, he described admiration for the British’s organisation and 
administrative ability but resentment of the Japanese occupiers who were ruthless in ordering 
people around. Yet, he was vivid in recalling being awed by the Japanese’ use of power and 
penalties for crime to maintain discipline and order.  
 
Residual risk is post response action after the inherent risk, the condition before risk response 
or treatment, had been treated by controls (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission, 2004). Research confirmed that Singapore’s responses at the 
regulatory level to the three critical inherent risks relating to economics and culture were 
successful. Manufacturing activities progressed through four decades in the 1960s to 1990s 
from labour-intensive to skills-intensive, to capital- and knowledge-intensive, and 
technology-intensive (Economic Development Board, 2009). By the 2000s, economic focus 
was firmly entrenched on promotion of innovation and further advancement in the knowledge 
and research front. Singapore had emerged from the post-independence economic survival 
quandary in 1965 well equipped to participate in today’s global economy, where a hinterland 
is less crucial to its survival (Economic Review Committee, 2003). 
  
Lee Kuan Yew credited the rule of law for Singapore’s economic development and escape 
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis unscathed (Lee, 2007; Li, 2007), which published 
research supported (Khan, 2003). Confirming indirectly, Nam and Nam (2004) concluded that 
the Asian financial crisis severely affected Indonesia’s, Malaysia’s, South Korea’s, and 
Thailand’s economies due to poor regulatory governance. Rajan and Zingales, Levine and 
Zervos, and Levine (all 1998, cited in La Porta et al 1998, p 1152) found developed capital 
markets with established financial systems and financial development enhanced economic 
growth. Conversely, La Porta et al’s (1997) research found significantly less developed 
capital markets in countries with weak investor protection regimes. La Porta et al (1998) 
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concluded that common law countries offered the most protection to investors and had strong 
enforcement.   
 
2.2.2.1.2 Economic liberalisation  
 
Labour historian Rachleff (2006, p 460) discussed in an article two aspects of economic 
liberalisation, liberation and “neo-liberalism”, and although both concepts were pertinent to 
Singapore’s experience the country was however not mentioned. Rachleff’s (2006) reference 
to liberation was in the context of the Asian economies liberated from colonialism, and which 
were subsequently destroyed in World War Two (WWII). These Asian nations’ liberalisation 
to pursue their own economic interests was reminiscent of the liberation from feudalism in the 
past (Rachleff, 2006) which Smith (1776) had condemned in the Wealth of Nations. To recap, 
Singapore’s economic liberation from British colonial rule occurred in stages, starting with 
partial self-government in 1955 before full self-government in 1959 (Lee, KY, 1998; Kwa et 
al, 2009). After a brief union with Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, the young independent nation 
was once again without an economic hinterland by August 1965.   
 
Actions taken by the leadership team were evidently informed by theory, and the concept of 
Singapore pragmatism was just examined in conjunction with a business approach to manage 
the nation’s economic survival risks. Contrary to neoclassical economic thinking and 
dependency theory (Nizamuddin, 2007), Singapore successfully implemented modern 
mercantilism (Gulati, 1992) to achieve the immediate goal of building an economic 
hinterland. Neoclassical economic theory eschews state intervention in the economy, while 
dependency theory argues that state intervention harms the economy and states could be held 
hostage by powerful multinational corporations. Nevertheless in an initiative in which history 
and culture was also at play, Singapore’s state planners not only embraced the export oriented 
industrialisation policy but successfully implemented the policy to develop the economy.    
 
Adoption of the export oriented industrialisation policy reflected what Lee Kwan Yew had 
learned from the Japanese who pioneered the policy (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000; Gulati, 1992). 
Successful implementation of this policy was in part enabled by the global infrastructure and 
linkages that the British had established (Gulati, 1992). Under Lee’s leadership however, 
Singapore eschewed the Japanese state intervention model and developed one of its own 
(Gulati, 1992, Williams, 2009). In the Singapore model, the Economic Development Board 
(2009) targeted multinational corporations, especially American, for foreign direct investment 
(Lee, 2000). The export oriented industrialisation policy contributed to East Asia’s rapid 
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economic development (Balassa, 1981, Bhagwati, 1978, Kruger, 1982, all cited in Gulati 
1992, pp 161-2), including Singapore’s (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000).    
 
Neo-liberalism emerged in the 1970s to counter Keynesianism’s dominance since the Great 
Depression and WWII (Rachleff, 2006); however, Singapore had already maintained a market 
friendly environment resembling neo-liberalism since the 1960s. Initially, Singapore’s first 
generation of leaders under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew developed and implemented their 
ideas independently (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000). An example is the Industrial Relations Act 1968 
which provided management control on key staffing matters with the union out of negotiation 
(Nizamuddin, 2007). From 1986 however, other Rachleff (2006) examples of neo-liberalism 
including free trade policies, harmonious three-way employee-employer-government 
partnership, and flexi-wage scheme incorporated ideas from consultative committees. 
Pursuing economic liberalisation, the Singapore model embraced fiscal and monetary policy 
together with tight union control to provide investors with competitive options.   
  
2.2.2.2 Company Level Practices 
 
Singapore’s leadership operationalised different theories and theoretical perspectives from a 
professional practice framework to develop the nation’s regulatory governance, and 
ultimately to build her own economic hinterland for longer term economic survival. The 
concept of Singapore pragmatism, in tandem with economic liberalisation, is arguably also 
evident in the Singapore leadership’s efforts to influence corporate governance practices at 
the company level. Three examples are presented and discussed next in this analysis as 
evidence to support the argument in the preceding statement. Promotion of good corporate 
governance practices among the companies listed on the Singapore Exchange is via, for 
example, the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance; the Singapore Institute of Directors; 
and government-linked corporations. In the following analysis, the objective and focus is on 
the operationalisation of Singapore pragmatism and economic liberalisation in the three 
examples. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives in influencing corporate governance 
practices at the company level as it was conceptualised and intended is assessed later in the 
next section on corporate governance research.    
 
2.2.2.2.1 Code of Corporate Governance 
 
Both the concepts of Singapore pragmatism and economic liberalisation were factors that led 
to the development and adoption of the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance (the 
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Singapore Code) in 2001. The enterprise risk management concepts and techniques applied at 
the company level are events, that is, risks and opportunities, and control and monitoring (The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004). Three events 
influenced a cultural shift in the approach to a liberating disclosure-based regime at the 
company level (Lee, HL, 1998). First, there was a change in leadership from the first Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew who had served from 1965-1990, and his team to the second 
generation (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000). Corporate governance practices at the company level 
under Singapore’s first generation of leadership was a system of controls by way of a strict 
rule of law coupled with firm monitoring by regulatory bodies. This no-nonsense, 
uncompromising command and control approach was essential to pursue the opportunities to 
grow Singapore’s own economic hinterland and to respond to the risks of cultural barriers to 
good corporate governance practices.  
 
Second, Singapore began to face a rapidly changing external environment after two decades 
of prosperity (Lee, KY, 1998, 2000; Montagu-Pollock, 1998). This event harked back to the 
theory of economic liberalisation, although in an updated 21
st
 century version pertaining to 
financial deregulation. The global financial deregulation trend that ignited in the US and the 
UK in the 1970s had spread to other developed economies by the late 1980s and on to Asia in 
the 1990s. Lee Kuan Yew sat on JP Morgan’s International Council in the 1990s, and was a 
Senior Minister in Goh Chok Tong’s (Goh) cabinet. As such, he observed financial 
deregulation unfolding first hand and was able to alert Goh to the increasing external threat on 
Singapore competiveness (Lee, KY, 2000; Montagu-Pollock, 1998). To respond to the risk, 
Goh formed the consultative Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness (CSC) in November 
1996, even before the Asian financial crisis, to map the nation’s future direction. Before the 
CSC reported in 1998, a Finance & Banking Competitiveness Sub-Committee recommended 
additional committees to look into specific financial reforms one of which would lead to 
development of the Singapore Code.   
 
Third, a theory informed practice that emerged in the UK in turn inspired a global movement 
in the 1990s towards flexible trust-based (Morrison 2004), “self-enforcing codes of conduct” 
(Bruyn, 1999 p 44). This approach was reminiscent of eighteenth century Scottish 
philosophical thought analysed in the earlier discussion on the philosophical and theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance. Smith (1776) and the Scottish Establishment construed 
the market economy as both a civil and moral order where private businesses were the civil 
society, with entrepreneurs responsible for their own actions (Bruyn, 1999). The UK’s 
pioneering code of corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992) had since evolved into the 
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Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008). It became an inspiration for code 
development in many countries, and in institutions that included the OECD (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Seidl, 2007).  
 
The financial reforms movement mentioned in event two triggered the development of the 
Singapore Code, especially the CSC Finance & Banking Competitiveness Sub-Committee’s 
recommendation to form three committees including one on corporate finance. Among two 
observations of this Corporate Finance Committee which directly influenced corporate 
governance development, one recommended a “disclosure-based philosophy of regulation” 
(Corporate Finance Committee, 1998, p 20). Another under “liberalisation and development” 
(p 43) called for development of a principles, not rules, based code of good corporate 
governance practices. Acting on the recommendation, the Ministry of Finance, Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, and Attorney-General’s Chambers jointly formed and tasked the 
Corporate Governance Committee to develop the Singapore Code (Corporate Governance 
Committee, 2000).   
 
In its report incorporating the Singapore Code, the Corporate Governance Committee (2001) 
provided a transition period for listed companies to “comply” (p 3) with the principles and 
guidance notes. It may appear from a literal reading that the Singapore Code compliance 
requirement conflicted with the “voluntary nature” (p 2) of the Singapore Code. This needs to 
be interpreted however, in the context of the recommended “disclosure based philosophy” 
(Corporate Finance Committee, 1998, p 17) adopted in the Singapore Code. In this regard, the 
Corporate Governance Committee (2001) advocated a “balanced approach” (p 2) whereby 
listed companies could decide whether or not the Singapore Code prescribed corporate 
governance practices suited their individual situations. In developing her own code, Singapore 
also consulted the Combined Code (Corporate Governance Committee, 2001) and adopted its 
“comply or explain” philosophy (Arcot and Bruno, 2006, p 7). This decision comported with 
the shift in regulatory governance policy not to influence corporate governance through too 
much reliance on legislations (Phan and Mak, 1999) which resulted from financial reforms to 
remain competitive.   
   
2.2.2.2.2 Singapore Institute of Directors  
 
Two events, financial deregulation or the 21st century version of economic liberalisation and 
the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis, coupled with Singapore pragmatism influenced the 
formation of the Singapore Institute of Directors (SID). Formation of a directors’ organisation 
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to promote good corporate governance was first mooted publicly in March 1997 by the then 
Stock Exchange of Singapore president at a seminar on business ethics (Teh, 1997). Regional 
business collapses during the economic crisis led the then Minister of State for 
Communications to repeat the call for a directors’ organisation at the 24th Annual Report 
Awards in November (Ang, 1997). It was envisioned that the institute could shortlist, train 
and discipline directors, whereby listed companies, directors themselves and investors could 
benefit from these services (Ang, 1997).  
 
Another source reported that the business community had appealed to the government to form 
an organisation to promote good corporate governance in companies (Singapore Institute of 
Directors, 2009).  Thereafter, the governmental Feedback Unit spearheaded a pro-tem 
committee in February 1998 to work out the details on issues relating to the formation of a 
directors’ organisation (Tan, 1998a, 1998b). The SID was formally incorporated as a 
company limited by guaranteed in July 1998, aiming primary to work with regulators and 
professional bodies in promoting good corporate governance (Singapore Institute of 
Directors, 2009). SID’s functions include acting as a forum for regulatory feedback; providing 
director training; and disciplining members governed by a code of conduct (Tan, 1998c; 
Singapore Institute of Directors, 2009).                    
 
2.2.2.2.3 Government-linked corporations   
 
Singapore pragmatism is also evident in the effort to influence good corporate governance 
practices at the company level via government-linked corporations (GLCs) held by one of its 
sovereign wealth funds. Singapore adopts a “government corporatist model” in which senior 
officers from both the civil service and military are appointed directors of GLCs (Phan and 
Mak, 1999, p 68) by Temasek Holdings Limited (Temasek). Among the two Singapore 
sovereign wealth funds, one operates like an asset management company while Temasek 
functions more like an equity investment firm (Elson 2008). The directors appointed to GLCs 
or Temasek-linked corporations (TLCs) in which Temasek has equity holdings provide 
corporate leadership that private corporations could emulate (Phan and Mak, 1999; Sam 
2007).  
 
2.3 Corporate Governance Research            
 
Revisiting briefly, Smith (1776) criticised the tyranny of feudalism and mercantilism before 
identifying and describing the new tyranny that emerged in laissez-faire capitalism. Two 
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centuries on, separate ground breaking works on corporate ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932) and the corporate managers’ ascendance (Chandler, 1977) theorised and 
attributed this new tyranny to managerialism. Concurrently, Alchian (1965) and Demsetz 
(1967) extended Coase’s (1937) initial work on property rights applied in Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) principal-agent theory, a contemporary explanation of the corporate 
governance conundrum. Since the time of Adam Smith, the theory and practice of corporate 
governance had arguably evolved to the status of Horse Rittel’s (in Churchman, 1967, p B-
141) description of “wicked problems”.   Among the social sciences, the research of corporate 
governance theory and practice is a young discipline and a recent development (Clarke, 
2004). The term, corporate governance, was neither found in the literature nor was it a field 
for serious academic research until the late 1980s (Tricker, 1993).  
 
In the journal’s inaugural editorial, Tricker (1993) attributed the launch of Corporate 
Governance: An International Review to events in the preceding two decades that had 
heightened awareness to issues in corporate governance. Commencing in the 1970s, questions 
were raised about corporations and society with calls for broader representation on the Board, 
increased corporate accountability, and stronger regulation. For example, a study committee 
in the UK proposed union-appointed employee representatives on the board while the EU 
attempted to require member states to implement the German two-tier supervisory board 
model. Developments in the 1980s however, such as the growth of hostile takeovers in the US 
in the decade’s first half, brought about changes in the way companies were governed. The 
explosions of corporate scandals in the UK, US and elsewhere, and a heightened seriousness 
to study, research, and teach corporate governance came in the second half.  
 
Such developments led to further evolution, and by the early 1990s were sufficient for Tricker 
(1993, p 2) to declare that “the concepts and practices of corporate governance [had] come of 
age”. Tricker (1993) made specific reference in his editorial to the development of a code of 
best practices (Cadbury, 1992) in the UK, more commonly referred to as the Cadbury Code. 
Developed against a background of corporate financial scandals in the UK, the Cadbury Code 
recommended best practices to strengthen corporate governance in listed companies (Arcot 
and Bruno, 2006). Durisin and Puzone (2009) surveyed 1,000 publications and 48,000 
citations in top accounting, finance and management journals from 1993 to 2007, and found 
the Cadbury Code was among the more heavily cited works. By the third five-year period in 
2003-2007, the authors found collective evidence of a matured research field and confirmed 
sophistication, depth, rigour and intellectual consistency in corporate governance research.  
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Presented in Figure 2.4 below, this section examines the types of studies and the 
methodologies found in Singapore research and the theories commonly found in past 
research. The discussion in sub-section 2.3.1 first examines the types of studies and the 
methodologies found in Singapore academic research and business studies. In the absence of 
theory in the Singapore studies, which is explained later, the next sub-section in 2.3.2 reviews 
the theories commonly found in past global research. The primary aim is to highlight the 
theories frequently found in research, among the diverse theoretical perspectives that had 
proliferated to identify and describe the contemporary wicked nature of corporate governance 
practice. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Types of Studies and Methodologies 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.4 above, the research analysed in this sub-section is first grouped at a 
high level into two types. One category contains those that provided information on the state 
of regulatory and corporate governance in Singapore, and in the other category are studies 
that attempted to link corporate governance and company performance. In Singapore, the 
promotion of good corporate governance practices among listed companies gained 
momentum in the late 1990s. Comparatively, Singapore’s response trailed the global interest 
that began earlier in the late 1980s to early 1990s in the US and UK, respectively. This may in 
part had been due to the pragmatic approach to first observe how good practices would work 
out in the developed economies before adoption locally. Even then, the practices would be 
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subjected to modification after careful consideration (Singh, 2005) and due diligence review 
(Wachter, 2009).  
 
Two global practices considered and eventually adopted were a code of corporate governance 
along with the “comply or explain” philosophy (Arcot and Bruno, 2006, p 7), and the 
establishment of a directors’ organisation. Discussed and analysed earlier, these imported 
ideas were implemented with another Singapore-style initiative – the government-linked or 
Temasek-linked corporations – to influence corporate governance at the company level 
especially among the smaller listed companies (SLCs). For the purpose of this research, SLCs 
are companies listed on the Singapore Exchange with market capitalisation of less than SGD 
500 million, and they comprise more than 80% of all listed companies. The effectiveness of 
these initiatives, as they were intended, is examined in this analysis of Singapore research on 
the state of corporate governance.  
   
2.3.1.1 State of Corporate Governance  
 
Research on the state of corporate governance in Singapore at both the regulatory and 
company levels are further classified in two ways to determine the types of studies and the 
research methods employed. The overall approach adopted to typify the research was to: first, 
group the research chronologically into two time periods; and second, classify them by two 
broad types within each of the two periods. Grouping the research chronologically in step one 
was based on using the effective date for compliance with the Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance (the Singapore Code) as a demarcation line. In its report incorporating the 
Singapore Code, the Corporate Governance Committee (2001) provided a transition period 
for listed companies to “comply” (p 3) with the principles and guidance notes. Incorporated 
into the Singapore Exchange’s Listing Manual, listed companies must disclose corporate 
governance practices in annual reports from 1 January 2003 and explain any non-compliance 
from the Singapore Code (Singapore Exchange Limited, 2001).    
 
For the purpose of a chronological demarcation and frame of reference therefore, the result in 
step one grouped the research into two time periods: pre- and post-Singapore Code 
compliance. Then in step two, the research that provided information on the state of corporate 
governance in Singapore was further grouped into either, academic research or, business 
studies. Pre-Singapore Code academic research and business studies on the state of corporate 
governance in Singapore are summarised in Table 2.2a/b on the following pages, followed by 
Table 2.3a/b presenting the post-Singapore Code picture. Research method or methods 
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employed in each of the academic research and business studies are also summarised in the 
respective tables. The discussion and analyses of the academic research and business studies 
on the state of corporate governance in Singapore at the regulatory and company levels 
follow.     
 
2.3.1.1.1 Pre-Singapore Code Research and Studies 
 
2.3.1.1.1.1 Academic research 
 
Pre-Singapore Code regulatory governance (Shinn, 2001; Yeo and Koh, 2001) and free 
market economy (Phan and Mak, 1998 and 1999; Mak and Phan, 1999) were on par with 
Australia, Canada, UK and US. However, the theory and practice of corporate governance in 
Singapore was still underdeveloped (Phan and Mak, 1998; and Phan and Mak, 1999; Mak and 
Phan, 1999; Chee 2004). In another article, Mak and Chng (2000) lamented the tendency of 
Singapore listed companies to opt for the minimum required in best practice corporate 
disclosures. All seven academic researches were based on literature reviews (see Table 2.2a 
below), and although Chee’s article was published in 2004 the contents also included review 
of the pre-Singapore Code literature.      
 
 
Table 2.2a Pre-Singapore Code Academic Research 
 
Type Researchers 
 
Research Method/s 
Journal articles Phan and Mak (1998)  
Phan and Mak (1999) 
 
Literature review 
Conference papers Mak and Phan (1999);  
Mak and Chng (2000);  
Yeo and Koh (2001)      
 
Literature review 
Working papers Shinn (2001);  
Chee (2004) 
 
Literature review 
 
 
 
2.3.1.1.1.2 Business Studies 
 
Table 2.2b on the next page lists four separate pre-Singapore Code business studies on the 
state of corporate governance in Singapore, and they are briefly examined next.  
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Table 2.2b Pre-Singapore Code Business Studies 
 
Type Researchers 
 
Research Method/s 
Opinion surveys of 
companies 
 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
(1997) 
 
Mailed questionnaire to all 
listed companies  
Opinion surveys of 
institutional investors 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers and 
Singapore Exchange Limited  
(2000) 
 
Mailed questionnaire to 
senior management / 
investment managers 
Corporate Transparency 
Index  
The Business Times 
(Thompson, 2000a and 
2000b) 
Rated listed companies’ level 
of financial disclosures in 
earnings releases on the 
Corporate Transparency 
Index 
 
Opinion surveys of board 
directors 
 
Singapore Institute of 
Directors and Egon Zehnder 
International (2000);  
 
2001, 2002: By the National 
University of Singapore’s 
Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting Centre, 
for four institutions  
  
Mailed questionnaire to 
board chairmen of 391 listed 
companies  
 
 
 
Opinion surveys of companies 
 
In the first pre-Singapore Code business study, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (1997) assessed 
Singapore’s corporate governance practices to be good compared to Asian countries but they 
fell short against the UK and US. Based on opinion surveys of listed companies, the study 
gauged the state of corporate governance practices following the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
which observers attributed to weak corporate governance (Nam and Nam 2004). The survey 
was sent to all companies on the then Stock Exchange of Singapore Main Board and 
secondary board (then known as SESDAQ). Seventy-five companies responded, and 20% of 
the respondents were SESDAQ companies which fall within the definition of smaller listed 
companies in this research.  
 
Opinion surveys of institutional investors 
 
Since the preceding survey was based on the opinions of companies, a separate opinion 
survey of institutional investors provided an alternative view. Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
partnered the Singapore Exchange Limited in 1999 to survey the institutional investors’ 
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expectations of businesses, their assessment of corporate governance in Singapore, and how 
this might factor into their investment decisions. A questionnaire was sent to 360 companies 
involved in investment activity, comprising financial institutions in banking, stockbroking, 
asset management, and insurance. Among 47 (13%) responses, the senior management and 
senior investment managers from the responding companies called for improvements to 
enhance disclosures, increase reporting frequency, and good corporate governance practices. 
Overall, the business study found company corporate governance practices in Singapore to be 
on par with Hong Kong and Japan but lagged behind Australia (Pricewaterhouse Coopers and 
the Singapore Exchange Limited, 2000).   
 
Corporate Transparency Index 
 
Two separate gauges which measure a narrow aspect of good corporate governance practices 
among listed companies were inaugurated in 2000 by various organisations with an interest in 
corporate governance. In the first of the two, the Singapore Business Times launched the 
Corporate Transparency Index (CTI) to assess the extent of financial disclosures made by 
listed companies in their earnings releases (Thompson, 2000a). This assessment on a narrow 
aspect of corporate governance practices among Singapore listed companies was from the 
investors’ viewpoint, and scored the means, timeliness of and content in disclosures, and its 
usefulness. The findings were not made available to the public, and snippets of data provided 
in news reports were insufficient for any meaningful analysis.  
 
Opinion surveys of board directors 
 
Also in 2000, the Singapore Institute of Directors inaugurated the second of the two gauges 
on the state of corporate governance. Fulfilling its role to promote good corporate governance 
among listed companies, the Singapore Institute of Directors partnered executive search firm, 
Egon Zehnder International to conduct the inaugural opinion survey of directors. This opinion 
survey focused on the board chairman and directors with the aim to gauge good board 
practices annually which would then serve to guide other companies. The inaugural survey 
which drew responses from 102 companies (the number of smaller listed companies was not 
disclosed) covered board matters relating to structure; practices; remuneration; selection and 
appointment; and terms of appointment. Findings, including the trend towards an increasing 
role for non-executive directors, were found to be consistent with international practices 
(Singapore Institute of Directors and Egon Zehnder International, 2000).   
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Following the inaugural survey, the then University of Singapore (NUS) Corporate 
Governance and Financial Reporting Centre (NUS CGFRC) was commissioned to conduct 
the next two pre-Singapore Code studies. Subsequent studies were sponsored by four 
institutions which in addition to the two inaugural partners, Singapore Institute of Directors 
and Egon Zehnder International, included the Singapore Exchange and Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers as new partners. Reports on both the 2001 and 2002 pre-Singapore Code studies 
conducted by NUS CGFRC were not available on the website which referred visitors to 
obtain them from the Singapore Institute of Directors instead.  A search on the Singapore 
Institute of Directors website, accessed on 15 August 2010, indicated that the annual reports 
were for sale only and the 2001 and 2002 reports were no longer available.       
 
2.3.1.1.2 Post-Singapore Code Research and Studies 
 
2.3.1.1.2.1 Academic research 
 
Chee’s (2004) literature survey, summarised in Table 2.3a below, found a change in attitude 
towards corporate governance in some though not all stakeholders shortly after the Singapore 
Code became effective. More specifically, while attitudinal changes were evident among 
regulators and professional organisations the behaviour of individuals within listed companies 
had only shifted where they absolutely had to arising from the Singapore Code requirements. 
Writing for a professional journal, Mak (2005, p 61) reviewed the literature to rate the 
‘comply or explain’ approach to influence corporate governance a “mixed success so far” in 
early post-Singapore Code days. Another post-Singapore Code academic research published 
in a book combined case studies with interviews of chairmen on company boards, other board 
members, and corporate management tasked with corporate governance (Chew et al, 2009). 
Among the nine case companies profiled, only one of the five examples of good corporate 
governance practices was in a smaller listed company while three of four bad examples were 
smaller listed companies.  
 
 
Table 2.3a Post-Singapore Code Academic Research  
 
Type Researchers 
 
Research Method/s 
Journal articles Chee (2004); Mak (2005) 
 
Literature review 
Book Chew et al (2009) 
 
Case studies via literature 
review; interviews  
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Table 2.3b Post-Singapore Code Business Studies 
 
Type Researchers Research Method/s 
Since 2000:  
Corporate Transparency 
Index (see Table 2.2b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since 2009:  
Governance and 
Transparency Index 
 
From 2000: The Business 
Times (Thompson, 2000a,b) 
 
From 2004: Association of 
Chartered Certified 
Accountants, Singapore  
(ACCA) (Wong, 2005) 
 
From 2006: National 
University of Singapore 
Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting Centre 
(NUS CGFRS) and ACCA 
(Mak and Phoon-cohen, 
2006) 
 
From 2009: NUS CGFRC 
(Yap, 2008) 
 
From 2011:  Center for 
Governance, Institutions and 
Organisations (CGIO) 
Rated listed companies’ level 
of financial disclosures in 
earnings releases on the 
Corporate Transparency 
Index  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Rated compliance with the 
Singapore Code and global 
best practices on the new 
Governance and 
Transparency Index  
Singapore Code compliance 
 
Ernst & Young (2003) Reviewed company practices 
disclosed in annual reports  
The Singapore Corporate 
Governance award, launched 
by the Securities Investors 
Association (Singapore) in 
2003   
  
 
From 2003: NUS CGFRC 
(Khalid, 2003) 
 
 
 
From 2012: Sim Kee Boon 
Institute (SKBI) for Financial 
Economics, Spore Mgt Univ 
(Kwok, 2012) 
Rated compliance with the 
Singapore Code on a 
scorecard; reviewed and 
selected by a panel of judges  
 
Rated company practices on 
the SKBI Singapore 
Corporate Governance Index; 
interviewed analysts and 
institutional investors   
Singapore Code compliance 
and global good practices 
 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
and NUS CGFRC (2004) 
Rated company practices on 
the S&P corporate 
governance disclosure 
scorecard   
Opinion surveys of board 
directors (continued from 
last survey in 2002, Table 
2.2b) 
2003/04, 2005, 2008/09: By 
the NUS CGFRC for the 
Singapore Institute of 
Directors   
Mailed questionnaire to board 
chairmen of listed companies 
Opinion surveys of 
institutional investors 
(continued from last survey 
in 2000, Table 2.2b) 
 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 
Investment Association of 
Singapore, and NUS CGFRC 
(2005) 
Mailed questionnaire to 
senior 
management/investment 
managers   
Singapore Code compliance 
and global good practices 
Mak (2007)   
 
Rated company practices on a 
scorecard; focus groups   
 
Corporate Governance Singapore-Style: 
Practices and Code Compliance among Smaller Listed Companies 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 2, Literature Review                                                                                              42 
 
2.3.1.1.2.2 Business studies  
 
Examined next are seven separate post-Singapore Code business studies on the state of 
corporate governance among listed companies in Singapore listed in Table 2.3b on the 
previous page. 
 
Governance and Transparency Index (formerly, Corporate Transparency Index) 
 
Post-Singapore Code, the Corporate Transparency Index (CTI) that was launched in 2000 
(refer to Table 2.2b) had multiple changes throughout the years as summarised in Table 2.3b 
on the previous page. The CTI remained until the last scoring in 2008, and a professional 
accounting organisation took over from The Business Times to complete the scoring 
beginning in 2004. Then in 2006, the accounting organisation was joined by a university 
research center which led the scoring from there on. Lastly, a complete revamp of the CTI 
occurred with effect from 2009 when the index was upgraded to the Governance and 
Transparency Index (GTI) to be handled by the university research center alone. At the same 
time, another professional accounting organisation – CPA Australia – became the official 
sponsor while The Business Times which launched the initiative in 2000 continued to publish 
the findings. 
 
With the complete revamp of the Corporate Transparency Index, the updated and existing 
Governance and Transparency Index (GTI) is a more comprehensive annual gauge of the state 
of corporate governance among listed companies. Table 2.4a on the next page presents a 
summary of the GTI scoring scheme which is comprised of a base score that reflects the four 
sections in the Singapore Code. The scoring scheme includes a system of bonuses to reward 
global best practices that go farther than what is required in the Singapore Code, and penalties 
for any events of corporate governance concern. Table 2.4b presented on the next page shows 
that the average GTI scores had improved in the past two years. On a separate note, Table 2.5 
that follows further presents a more detailed analysis of the 2011 GTI scores to show in 
particular how smaller listed companies had performed.  
 
Table 2.4a shows scoring on the GTI comprises two components, starting with a base score 
up to a maximum of 100 points for disclosures of corporate governance practices, financial 
transparency and investor relations. By design, companies that merely ‘tick the box’ to 
comply with the minimum Singapore Code requirements can only score about 30 points out 
of the maximum possible. The base score is then adjusted for bonuses in which companies  
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Table 2.4a Governance and Transparency Index Scoring Scheme 
 
Scoring Categories 
 
Maximum 
Points 
Governance (75 points):  
Board Matters 35 
Remuneration Matters 20 
Accounting and Audit Matters 20 
Transparency (25 points):  
Transparency and Investor Relations 25 
 
Base Score 100 
 
Adjustments for bonuses/penalties  + / - 
 
Overall Governance and Transparency Score 143 
 
 
[Source: National University of Singapore Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organizations, 
Governance and Transparency Index, viewed 2 March 2014, <http://bschool.nus.edu/Portals/0/images 
/CGFRC/docs/GTIMethodology_11July2011.pdf>] 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4b 2009-2013 Governance and Transparency Index 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
National University of 
Singapore Research centre (see 
legend below) 
 
CGFRC CGFRC CGIO CGIO CGIO 
 
Year Annual Report was 
published 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
Number of companies scored 677 680 657 644 664 
 
Average scores 33.9 33.5 31.5 34.9 38.0 
 
 
[Source: National University of Singapore Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organizations, Our 
Research, Governance and Transparency Index, viewed 2 March 2014, <http://bschool.nus.edu/CGIO/ 
OurProjects/GovernanceTransparencyIndex/tabid/2096/Default.aspx>] 
 
Legend:  
CGFRC – Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Centre; and 
CGIO – Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organizations.     
 
Note: The CGIO was officially launched on 5
th
 July 2011 (Director’s Message, CGIO 
Newsletter, Issue 1, 31 October 2012, viewed 2 March 2014, 
<http://bschool.nus.edu/Portals/0/images/CGIO/ Newsletter/CGIO%20 newsletter. html) 
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that go beyond ‘ticking the box’ are also rewarded with bonus points where they embrace 
good practices beyond the Singapore Code requirements. On the flip side, companies are 
penalised for weak practices as well as for corporate events that reflect poor corporate 
governance.                  
 
An analysis of the 2011 GTI scores of the smaller listed companies, compared to all 
companies, is presented in Table 2.5 below. More than half (56.4%) of the smaller listed 
companies are, by the definition of the GTI, ‘ticking the box’. There is no pass-fail indication 
in the GTI, but it is assumed for the purpose of this analysis that a passing grade is 50 marks 
and above. Alphabet grades are assumed to be allocated, as follows: F (49 and below); D - to 
B + (50 to 74); A - to A (75 to 84); A + (85 and above). On this basis accordingly, just 18 
(3.3%) of the smaller listed companies obtained a passing grade and only two (less than half a 
percent) smaller listed companies are of A - grade.      
 
 
Table 2.5 State of Corporate Governance in Listed Companies 
By the 2011 Governance and Transparency Index (GTI) scores 
 
                                                             All Companies                    Small Caps 
GTI Scores (a) No % No % (b) % (c) 
85 and above 6 0.9    
75 to 84 7 1.1 2 0.4 0.3 
50 to 74 38 5.8 16 2.9 2.4 
31 to 49 272 41.2 226 40.3 34.2 
Sub-Total 323 48.9 244 43.6 37.0 
30 and below 337 51.1 317 56.4 48.0 
Total 660 100 561 100 85.0 
Companies with GTI 
scores of 50 or more 
 
51 
 
7.7 
 
18 
 
3.3 
 
  
Legend: 
(a) Prepared by the Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations (CGIO), 
National University of Singapore Business School, covering annual reports released 
from 1 January to 31 January 2011 
(b) Percentage of total small caps (< SGD 500 million) 
(c) Percentage of all companies 
 
 
 
Other Post-Singapore Business Studies 
       
Table 2.3b listed six other post-Singapore Code business studies that updated the state of 
regulatory governance in Singapore as well as the state of corporate governance among 
companies listed on the Singapore Exchange. In 2003 itself, the year that listed companies 
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had to comply with the requirements of the Singapore Code, there was a one-time only study 
and the launch of an annual event. The non-repeating study was conducted by an accounting 
firm on 30 listed companies with market capitalisation above SGD 200 million as of 31 
March 2003. This study found adherence with most of the Singapore Code except in the more 
difficult areas of CEO duality and board assessment (Ernst & Young, 2003).  
 
As to the launch of an annual event, the Securities Investors Association (Singapore) and 
partners launched the Singapore Corporate Governance Awards in 2003 to reward listed 
companies’ code compliance efforts and good practices that go beyond the Singapore Code 
(Khalid, 2003). A university research centre scores the companies’ disclosures which are 
reviewed by a committee of the sponsoring organisations to decide on the winners in various 
categories for larger and smaller listed companies. As the scores are not made available to the 
public, no meaningful analysis can be done on the Securities Investors Association 
(Singapore) study based on incomplete data found in news reports.     
   
The year 2004 saw another one-time only study jointly conducted by Standard & Poor’s and 
the National University of Singapore’s Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting 
Centre. This was the first Singaporean study that rated 45 larger listed companies’ corporate 
governance practices against a ‘disclosure scorecard’ (Standard & Poor’s and Corporate 
Governance and Financial Reporting Centre 2004). With a total possible score of 140, the 
highest score in the study was 119, with the lowest score being 16. The other summary 
statistics from the study are: mean, 80.58; median, 92, and almost a third scored from 91 to 
100 with most between 70 and 120.  
 
Two of the post-Singapore Code business studies had continued from the inaugural surveys 
launched earlier in the pre-Singapore Code period and summarised in Table 2.2b. They are: 
first, opinion surveys of institutional investors conducted by an accounting firm, and second, 
opinion surveys of board directors sponsored by the Singapore Institute of Directors. In the 
first continuing study, the Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Investment Association of Singapore, 
and the Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Centre (2005) survey of institutional 
investors found improvements. The findings however, also revealed that further actions were 
needed to strengthen practices. Additionally, most of the survey respondents felt the 
regulatory regime could be toughened, in particular to require mandatory compliance with the 
Singapore Code.  
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As to the other continuing study sponsored by the Singapore Institute of Directors (SID), the 
2003/04 study summarised in Table 2.3b was not available to the public. Summaries of 
findings from both the 2005 and 2008/09 studies were available on the SID website. The 
summaries indicated that the 2005 opinion survey of board members found increased 
awareness on the importance of corporate governance (Anandarajah, 2005). Notwithstanding 
the positive finding however, the updated opinion survey also disclosed that compliance with 
the Singapore Code was lacking in several areas, including remuneration and risk 
management matters (Anandarajah, 2005). In the next 2008/09 study, which was the last, 
there was further deterioration in the areas of board assessment and risk management 
(Anandarajah and Chew, 2009).   
 
Last on the listing in Table 2.3b and certainly not the least, two public company regulators – 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Exchange – jointly commissioned a 
study in 2006. The primary objective of this study was to assess the state of corporate 
governance practices among Singapore’s listed companies, using the Singapore Code as the 
benchmark. It was preceded by two events, and one was the explosion of corporate financial 
scandals in 2004-2005 involving Singapore companies; Table 2.6 on the next page presents a 
sampling of the cases. This event triggered another, which was the first update of the 
Singapore Code in 2005 followed by the amendments that the Singapore Exchange made to 
its Listing Manual to improve corporate governance. While the report did not include an 
overall conclusion on the state of practices, findings showed weaknesses in making difficult 
disclosures; director independence and training; audit committee competence; and risk 
management (Mak, 2007).    
 
2.3.1.2 Linking Corporate Governance and Company Performance       
 
Issues relating to this research puzzle, still “a legitimate and interesting area of investigation” 
(Lawal, 2012, p 22), are complicated and without ready answers. Consulting and ratings firms 
publicised the positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, no 
doubt to promote their respective agenda. McKinsey & Company paved the way with studies 
by Felton, Hudnut and van Heeckeren (1996); Coombes and Watson (2000); and Newell and 
Wilson (2002). The 2000 study was cited in the Corporate Governance Committee’s (2001) 
report that presented the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, a testament to 
McKinsey’s pervasive influence on the concept that corporate governance pays. Since 2002, 
ratings firms in the US including Standard & Poor’s (Plitch, 2005) as well as Governance 
Metrics International, Audit Integrity, and Ethisphere (Dvorak, 2007) entered the market to  
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Table 2.6 Singapore’s Prominent Corporate Scandals, A Summary 
 
(a) 1970s to 1990s  
 
Case No / Company / Year Corporate Governance Issues 
1 Slater Walker Securities, 1975 
 
Insider trading, shares manipulation, and asset 
stripping by owner/manager (Lee KY, 2000) 
2 Pan Electric Industries, 1985 
 
Majority owner‘s unauthorised forward contracts led to 
loan default; no board oversight (Ho et al, 2004; Koh, 
2005a; Milner, 1985; Sullivan, 2000; Walkom, 1986) 
3 Baring Futures, 1995 
 
Reckless use of leverage, excessive risk taking by 
senior staff/rogue trader; no top oversight; lacked good 
process control/monitoring; incompatible functions 
(Behrmann, 1995; Hamilton, 1995; Koh, 2005a; Tait, 
1995)       
4 Amcol Holdings Ltd, 1996 Related party transactions by owner-manager; lacked 
director independence (Chia and Lor, 1996) 
 
(b) 2004 to 2005 (a sampling) 
 
1 Auston International, 2004 Fraudulent financial reporting by both the CEO and 
CFO (Koh, 2004; Quah, 2006) 
2 Informatics, 2004 Fraudulent financial reporting by founder-chairman 
and CEO (Lim, 2004; Wong and Toh, 2005) 
3 Accord Customer Care Solutions, 
   2005 
Fraudulent financial reporting by founder who also 
cheated customers ((Koh, 2005b; Wong, 2006) 
4 Citiraya Industries, 2005 A management staff, brother of the co-founder, was 
charged with corruption; fraudulent financial reporting 
by the co-founder who went into hiding (Chen,2005; 
Lee SS, 2005b; Warden, 2005; Wong, 2005b, c, d) 
5 China Aviation Oil, 2005  Fraudulent financial reporting – CEO hid trading 
losses;  no board oversight of management – internal 
controls override; no authority limits for committing 
company; no training – inaccurate options contracts 
valuation (Lee SS, 2005a; Prystay, 2005; Quah, 2005a, 
b; Wong, 2005a)  
 
(c) 2008 to 2009 (a sampling from 2009)  
 
1 Fibrechem Technologies(Khoo, 
   2009a; Tan, 2009) 
2 China Sun Bio-Chem Technology 
   (Chan, 2009) 
Inadequate accounting records prevented finalisation of 
audited financial statements  
3 Oriental Century  Fraudulent financial reporting (Khoo, 2009c; Khoo and 
Oh, 2009; Lee and Venkat, 2009; Tan, 2009). 
4 China EnerSave  The Business Times, Singapore (27 March 2009) 
stated financial mismanagement; loan default (Khoo, 
2009d) 
5 Sino-Environment Technology  The Business Times (27 March 2009) reported 
financial mismanagement; loan default (Khoo 2009b, 
Tan 2009) 
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provide corporate governance ratings services. Australia’s Corporate Governance 
International provided ratings since 2001, which stockbroking firm Goldman Sachs JBWere 
applied in establishing a positive link between corporate governance and firm performance 
among listed companies (Moncrief, 2005; Gettler, 2006).   
 
Compared to the ubiquitous positive findings among the consulting and ratings firms 
however, a sample of academic studies provided a mixed view. An earlier review sample of 
10 studies looked into various aspects of corporate governance, such as, board composition; 
director independence; ownership composition; separation of Chairman and CEO; 
shareholder rights; and transparency in disclosures. Indicators of firm performance applied 
included stock market prices and various accounting measures for listed companies in 
Canada; Finland; Korea; Malaysia; Nigeria; Russia; and the US, with one study on 27 
countries. Studies by Black (2001); Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); von Nandelstadh and 
Rosenberg (2003); Durnev and Kim (2005); Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) confirmed 
that firm performance was positively associated with corporate governance. However, an 
earlier research by Donaldson and Davis (1991) and a later study by Gupta, Kennedy, and 
Weaver (2006) did not find any correlation in US and Canadian listed companies, 
respectively. Separately, Sanda and Mikailu (2005); Black, Jang and Kim (2006); and Tam 
and Tan (2007) only established linkage on some, but not all, of the corporate governance 
attributes tested.    
 
Singaporean research is of specific interest and a search uncovered four studies completed 
over three decades, the first in the late 1990s; two in the early 2000s; and one in the 2010s. 
The first study (Phan and Mak, 1998, 1999; Mak and Phan, 1999) found limited to no link 
between various aspects of corporate governance to firm performance in a sample of 
Singaporean companies. Another test by Eng, Hong and Ho (2001) to link transparency in 
financial report disclosures to different measures of the cost of capital, another indicator of 
firm value, produced mixed results. The third research measured the value of corporate 
governance indirectly in terms of its effect on financial reporting and audit quality (Goodwin 
and Seow, 2002). With the input of directors and auditors of Singaporean listed companies, 
the researchers discovered strong to weak and no influence of certain corporate governance 
mechanisms on financial reporting and audit quality. In the last and latest research for a 
master’s thesis, Hu (2010) found positive correlation between firm valuation and corporate 
governance.   
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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Leighton and Thain wrote in 1997 (cited in Phan and Mak, 1998, p 227) that research had not 
produced evidence to link board structure to the performance of Canadian companies. Over in 
the US, Black (2001) referred to research from 1985 to 2000 to conclude that the correlation 
between various corporate governance attributes to the performance of American companies 
was weak to none. Subsequent commentaries and analyses on the topic either cited research 
findings to argue that a correlation exists (Bradley, 2004; Reilly, 2006) or it is inconclusive 
(Young, 2003; Quah 2005d; Murray, 2006; Mak, 2009). A sample of more recent research on 
companies in several developed economies published in 2012 and 2013 continue to confirm 
either positive or negative correlations, as well as mixed results. Lama (2012) found positive 
correlation among mid-sized listed companies in Australia, while Noamene and Hassairi 
(2012) confirmed negative results among companies in France. However, tests on companies 
in Japan (Sakawa and Watanabel, 2013); New Zealand (Fauzi and Locke, 2012); and the UK 
(Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012) produced mixed results. Depending on the attributes 
tested, Vintilă and Gherghina (2012a) first confirmed negative results among companies in 
the US in one study but mixed results on a separate test (Vintilă and Gherghina, 2012b).    
 
Almost three decades on and notwithstanding the “equivocal findings” (Lawal, 2012, p 22) on 
the widespread belief that corporate governance leads to good firm performance (Young, 
2003), the topic remains popular with researchers. For instance, a search of the Business 
Source Complete database on the 15
th
 of August 2013 using the search terms ‘corporate 
governance’ and ‘firm performance’ produced 573 results. The oldest of the scholarly, that is, 
peer reviewed, academic journal articles in PDF full text dated back to the 1987 Fall season 
with the latest in August 2013. More specifically, 28 out of 69 (41%) journal articles available 
on the database published from January 2012 to August 2013 were on research into the 
corporate governance and firm performance relationship. These studies covered 21 countries 
including Australia, Bangladesh, China, France, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the 
UK, the US, Venezuela, and Vietnam. While this topic may remain a valid and intriguing area 
for research for some time to come (Lawal, 2012), it is also evident that it had been 
researched extensively and inconclusively.      
 
Given the conflicting evidence from past studies and although written almost 15 years apart, 
both Phan and Mak (1998) and Lawal (2012) identified two problems that continue to plague  
research on the topic. These problems entail determining what constitute good corporate 
governance practices as well as finding better and more reliable measures of firm 
performance. For instance, stock market prices have proven to be especially unsuitable as a 
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performance measure for this purpose due to factors other than good corporate governance 
practices that could affect share valuation. To illustrate, consider a public spat in 2005 
between two of Singapore’s three banks which are the Development Bank of Singapore 
(DBS); Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC); and United Overseas Bank. DBS, a 
government-linked corporation, leads by example (Phan and Mak, 1998, 1999; Mak and 
Phan, 1999)  and consistently ranks high in corporate governance compared to OCBC, 
family-owned and managed (Quah, 2005d; Yee, 2005a). Yet, in October 2005, the price 
earnings multiple of DBS at 12 times was the lowest among the three Singapore banks, while 
that of OCBC was 15 times (Quah, 2005d; Yee, 2005a, 2005b). The DBS CEO’s lament at a 
corporate governance conference that the market rewarded OCBC instead despite DBS’s 
better corporate governance record drew a sharp retort from an insulted OCBC Chairman the 
following day. By the following August however, Yee (2006) found a reversed situation when 
DBS assumed the leadership in share price performance among the three banks.  
 
2.3.2 Theory in Research  
 
It had been determined from the earlier analysis on the types of studies and methodologies 
that the majority of Singapore research was business studies in which theory was not a 
consideration. Additionally, the academic researches were focused on the survey of literature 
where theory was not applicable and this then leaves the two studies on linking corporate 
governance to company performance. In the three articles that reported the same study, Phan 
and Mak (1998, 1999) and Mak and Phan (1999) stated categorically that theory was not 
involved. This arose from difficulties in obtaining good and reliable data to advance “testable 
hypotheses” (Phan and Mak, 1998, p 217) and hence, the researchers offered propositions 
instead to be verified with available data. As for the Eng, Hong and Ho (2001) research, the 
researchers incorporated the hypothesis from an earlier study in 1997 for testing. In the 
absence of theory in Singapore research, a high level search that was not intended to be in-
depth was conducted to obtain an appreciation for the theories frequently found in the 
literature.      
 
Three separate database searches were carried out using the following search terms: 
‘corporate governance theory’; ‘organisation theory and corporate governance’; and 
‘corporate governance research’. The Business Source Premier database was searched for full 
text academic papers published in scholarly peer-reviewed journals from 1970 to 2010. All 
three searches were not designed to come up with a comprehensive list but to find a sample of 
articles with the primary goal to obtain an overview to accomplish two objectives. The search 
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objectives were to establish: first, the corporate governance theories applied in the studies as 
well as the frequency; and second, the nature and purpose of each application.   
 
The first two searches of the database for ‘corporate governance theory’ and ‘organisation 
theory and corporate governance’ returned 49 and 45 results, respectively. All 94 search 
results were reviewed to identify the general content and a total of 47 articles, comprising 27 
and 20 papers each from the two respective searches met the search objectives. 
Unsurprisingly and perhaps even expectedly, agency theory was by far the most commonly 
applied in 33 of 47 studies, or 70%. The other more common corporate governance theories 
applied in the 47 studies that are relevant to this research are listed next in descending order 
according to the number of times applied. 
 
These are: stakeholder theory (9 times or 19%); resource dependence theory and stewardship 
theory (each 7 times or 15%); and transaction costs (3 times or 6%). As to the nature and 
purpose, in 37 of the 47 studies or 78%, the corporate governance theories were applied to 
inform the research into various corporate governance activities and practices. Some of the 
more common areas the theories were applied to, by order of frequency, related to board 
matters; executive compensation; corporate governance structures, including codes; and 
external auditing. However, only 4 of the 47 studies or 9% involved application of agency 
theory and other corporate governance theories as the underlying foundation to develop 
further theories.  
 
Results from the first two database searches are consistent with findings from separate 
examinations of six studies that surveyed and reviewed the literature. This sample of six 
studies was shortlisted from the third database search for articles on ‘corporate governance 
research’ that met the search objectives discussed earlier. Durisin and Puzone (2009), who 
conducted a comprehensive and general review of past studies from 1993-2007, found the 
agency approach dominating corporate governance theorising in past research. The others, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Denis (2001); Hambrick et al (2008); Tosi (2008); as well as 
Filatotchev and Boyd (2009) reviewed studies conducted on specific corporate governance 
activities from the investor’s perspective. As such, the research in all five studies had been 
informed by the principal-agent relationship and together with findings in Durisin and 
Puzone, validates the predominance of agency theory in corporate governance research. 
Similar to the database search findings, Durisin and Puzone also confirmed less application of 
stewardship theory and stakeholder theory to underpin research as well as a lack of new 
theory development.     
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2.4 Summary and Conclusion  
 
Corporate governance issues that emerged from the corporate form of business organisation 
was identified and critiqued in the Wealth of Nations, in which Adam Smith also condemned 
the tyrannies of feudalism and mercantilism. Although corporate governance practice traced 
back to the days of Smith in the latter 1700s, the first work closest to theorising corporate 
governance only emerged almost two centuries on in the early 1930s. Moreover, the corporate 
governance conundrum first described by Adam Smith now addressed by its contemporary 
ubiquitous reference to the principal-agent problem was only theorised in the late 1970s. 
Furthermore the term, corporate governance, did not appear in the literature until the late 
1980s when the subject had developed to the level of serious study, research, and teaching.  
      
The indiscriminate and selfish exercise of power in feudalism and mercantilism, and 
reformation ideas of Smith and the Scottish Establishment provided the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings to corporate governance issues under laissez-faire capitalism. 
Subsequent theorising two centuries after Smith first identified and described the corporate 
governance conundrum drew on property rights, ownership of capital, and the exercise of 
power inherent in feudal and mercantilist tyrannies. Smith and his fellow Scottish 
Establishment thinkers had envisioned the pursuit of individual self-interest under free market 
competition to be operationalised in the spirit of civil society and self-policing. Their vision 
was shattered with the rise of big corporations and power in the hands of corporate managers 
however, and the birth of a new tyranny of capitalism.   
 
Nevertheless, the reformation ideas of Smith and the Scottish Establishment had lived on in at 
least a couple of ways. One was the concept of self-enforcement via a code of conduct to 
combat the principal-agent problem in the corporate form of business organisation and others 
characterised by the separation of ownership and control. A characteristic of wicked social 
problems is diversity and conflict, and self-enforcement and other demands that multiple 
stakeholders expect of corporate managers had elevated corporate governance practice to the 
status of wicked problems. Another reformation idea that had lingered on is economic 
liberalisation which together with the concept of civil society and self-policing had been 
applied in Singapore’s corporate governance at the regulatory and company levels.   
 
Corporate governance, Singapore-style evolved over almost half a century under the influence 
of several factors external and internal to her operating environment. From a macro-
environmental perspective which had been likened to liberation from feudalism, the evolution 
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of corporate governance in Singapore began after liberation from colonialism in 1959 to 
pursue her own economic interest. Other factors were history and culture as reflected in the 
thinking or theory, and the business practices of generations past and present. Among the mix 
of these ideas was the collective thinking of Singapore’s first generation of leaders since 
theorised as her brand of pragmatism. Additionally, there were the reformation ideas of Adam 
Smith and his fellow Scottish Establishment thinkers, in particular the concepts of economic 
liberalisation as well as civil society and self-policing.  
 
Singapore pragmatism was evident in the business-like approach to corporate governance at 
the regulatory level in which enterprise risk management concepts and techniques were 
applied to manage economic survival and cultural corruption risks. Coupling pragmatism with 
economic liberalisation that incorporated other theories such as modern mercantilism and 
neo-liberalism enabled the Singapore leadership to plant and grow the nation’s own economic 
hinterland. The influence of history and culture reflecting Singapore’s British and Japanese 
colonial past were evident in the leadership’s responses to cultural risks that threatened 
corporate governance at both the regulatory and company levels. Singapore’s rule of law was 
patterned after the English legal system and enforced with organisational and administrative 
efficiency and effectiveness learned from the British. Additionally, firm law enforcement was 
influenced by the Japanese ruthless use of power and punishment to maintain order which Lee 
Kwan Yuan, Singapore’s first Prime Minister, had observed as a pre-university student.    
 
Evidence of Singapore pragmatism and economic liberalisation was also apparent in three 
initiatives that the Singapore leadership implemented to influence corporate governance at the 
company level. After two decades of growth, the Singapore economy faced challenges from 
the 1970s era US and UK financial deregulation that spread to other developed economies in 
the 1980s and Asia by the 1990s. To remain competitive, Singapore developed her own 
twenty-first century version of economic liberalisation that led to deregulation in the capital 
market and a softer approach to regulatory governance. Financial deregulation led to the 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance (the Singapore Code), adopted in line with the civil 
society philosophy of self-disclosure and self-policing reminiscent of Adam Smith and the 
Scottish Establishment. Other initiatives were the establishment of the Singapore Institute of 
Directors to educate, train, and monitor members sitting on corporate boards, as well as the 
use of government-linked corporations to lead by example.      
 
Compliance with the Singapore Code, together with the requirement to explain any non-
compliance, was effective from the 1
st
 of January 2003. Academic research prior to 1 January 
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2003 revealed that Singapore’s corporate governance at the regulatory level was on par with 
western economies. At the company level however, academic research and business studies 
found that the state of corporate governance in Singapore listed companies depended on 
which countries the comparisons were with. Corporate governance practices were either on 
par with Hong Kong and Japan or better than other Asian countries, but lagged behind 
Australia, the UK and US. According to one academic research, Singapore listed companies 
tended to take the minimal disclosure approach rather than to embrace global best practices 
readily. In a positive sign of a change in mindset, an opinion survey of board directors 
discovered the role of the non-executive independent director to be increasing.  
 
Research conducted to gauge the success of the civil society approach to influence corporate 
governance practices of listed companies via a code of conduct and the self-disclosure 
philosophy produced mixed results. Even after the implementation of the Singapore Code, the 
attitudes of individuals towards good corporate governance practices still varied among the 
different stakeholders. Regulators and professional organisations were expectedly more ready 
and willing to embrace the form and spirit of good practices, but the actions of individuals 
within corporations shifted only when left with no choice. Based on the annual Governance 
and Transparency Index (GTI) published for the past five years, the average GTI scores of 
listed companies had been trending up over the most recent three. Nevertheless, the GTI 
reveals that more than half of smaller listed companies with market capitalisation below SGD 
500 million were merely checking the box when it came to Singapore Code compliance.      
 
This chapter on the literature review of corporate governance theory, practice, and research is 
the first of three chapters in Part I of the thesis to provide for the staging of the research. 
Three research gaps were observed in past academic researches and business studies on the 
state of corporate governance in Singapore listed companies. Firstly, past academic researches 
and business studies were not informed by theory and secondly, they had either, covered all 
companies listed on the Singapore Exchange or, focused on the larger companies. Lastly, past 
academic researches and business studies had described the corporate governance practices of 
Singapore listed companies based on their self-disclosures in annual reports and other 
documents. To complete providing for the staging of the research, observation one on theory 
is first addressed next in Chapter 3 with observations two and three on research methods 
taken up in Chapter 4.    
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CHAPTER 3  
THEORY UNDERPINNING THE RESEARCH  
 
Theoretical Review and the Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The literature reviews in Chapter 2 on corporate governance theory, practice, and research 
uncovered two findings about theory in past academic researches and business studies on 
corporate governance in Singapore listed companies. In the first finding, all but two of the 
academic researches were based on literature reviews where theory was not involved. Among 
the two academic researches linking corporate governance to company performance, only one 
had included a previous researcher’s theory (Blaikie, 2000, 2010) for testing. Researchers in 
the other academic study could not advance “testable hypotheses”, citing unreliable data 
(Phan and Mak, 1998, p 217). Secondly, none of the business studies had considered theory 
and database searches were conducted instead as an alternative to obtain an overview of the 
corporate governance theories applied in past global research.      
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Among the sample of global research found in the database searches, agency theory was not 
unexpectedly the most frequently applied followed by stakeholder theory, resource 
dependence theory, stewardship theory, and transaction cost theory. To fill the gap that theory 
had not been applied in past research on corporate governance among Singapore listed 
companies, this chapter first examines the theories, concepts and ideas that underpin the 
research. As represented in Figure 3.1 on the preceding page that presents the flow of the 
discussions, the theoretical analysis begins in the next section. Continuing in section 3.3 the 
ultimate aim is to present the conceptual model, comprising of four sets of sensitising 
concepts derived from the theoretical analysis. Three among the four sets of sensitising 
concepts were applied in initial theorising in this chapter, which together with the remaining 
set of sensitising concepts was applied in the research for further theorising.        
    
3.2 Theoretical Review 
 
  
 … the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who 
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests 
is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. 
(John Maynard Keynes, 1997, p 383).   
 
 
 
Time magazine’s (31 December 1965, pp 74-82) essay on the adoption of Keynesian 
economics in the US attributed Keynes’s oft quoted statement above to confidence that his 
ideas would influence future economic policy. Sowell (2006) cited Keynes to advocate 
learning from emerging new thinking and debates among intellectuals, and obtaining a deeper 
understanding of the existing ideas that continue to evolve. Fisher (2004) quoted Keynes to 
debunk the not uncommon thinking of the “practical men” (Keynes, 1997, p 383) among 
researchers who attempt to justify that practice-oriented research can be theory free. In this 
regard, Judith A Boss (in Merchey, 2004b) argued forcefully that it is theory that informs 
practice and theory cannot be falsely separated from practice.  
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A corollary to Judith Boss’ assertion, which in the reverse form states that practice informs 
theory, is evident from the literature reviews in Chapter 2. Examples are the theory of 
managerialism (Chandler, 1977) and the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
derived from the research of practice to explain the corporate governance conundrum. Figure 
3.2 below lists the theories, and concepts and ideas (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000, in 
Llewelyn, 2003, p 663) analysed in this chapter. Ultimately, the sensitising concepts and 
conceptual framework developed in sub-sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively, are applied to 
analyse the findings collected from corporate governance practice.      
 
 
 
3.2.1 Stewardship Theory  
 
A search of Business Source Complete, an online database on business topics, for peer 
reviewed academic journal articles on ‘stewardship theory’ indicated that Donaldson (1990) 
was the earliest on the topic. Subsequent studies published in the 1990s that cite stewardship 
theory and corroborate this observation include: Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997); 
and Turnbull (1997); Muth and Donaldson (1998). The concept of ‘stewardship’ dates back 
much earlier however, and as a biblical term (McCann, 2010) is a common theme in several 
of Jesus’ parables recorded in the New Testament. An example is the parable of the unjust 
steward (Balaciu and Bogdan, 2012) discussed in the book of Luke, Chapter 16, verses 1-8. 
The biblical concept of a steward is that of a “household manager” who is neither the owner 
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nor a low level servant (McCann, 2010, p 20). In this capacity, the steward is a fiduciary and 
has the responsibility to manage the household resources to the interests of the owner.  
 
Donaldson (1990, pp 372, 377) refers to McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y in the 1960 
work, The Human Side of the Enterprise, to present stewardship theory as the antithesis to 
agency theory. In addition to McGregor’s theory, Burton (2000, p 198) also cited the 
relevance of Maslow’s (1954) and Hertzberg’s (1959) work motivators above material things. 
Viewed in the context of Theory X behaviour, agency theory paints the manager in a negative 
light (Donaldson, 1990) as one who pursues his own selfish interests and shirks responsibility 
to the principal-owner. Stewardship theory does not view the relationship between the parties 
as adversarial and portrays the agent as a good steward who exhibits Theory Y behaviour and 
acts in the best interest of owners. A Donaldson and Davis (1989, in Donaldson, 1990, p 377) 
conference paper subsequently published in Donaldson and Davis (1991) provided evidence 
that a combined Chairman-CEO environment removes power conflicts leading to better 
financial performance.  
 
From a “theoretical paradigm” (Donaldson, 1990, p 369) perspective, Donaldson attributes 
the negative view and narrow description of human behavior in agency theory to its 
disciplinary roots in economics. Agency theory therefore, emerged from the management 
field of organisational economics (Barney and Ouchi, 1986, in Donaldson, 1990, p 369). 
Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1989, in Donaldson, 1990, p 377; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991) however, hailed from organisational behaviour research which organisational 
economics eschewed. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) contrasted the dichotomy in 
terms of approaches, which they described as economic in nature in the case of agency theory 
but both sociological and psychological in stewardship theory. Fox and Hamilton (1994) 
applied the contrasting theories to investigate why companies diversify and found managers’ 
desire to maximise organisational performance, that is, stewardship to be more prevalent than 
the principal-agent dilemma.  
 
Summarised in Table 3.1 on the next page is a sample of the subsequent research informed by 
stewardship theory following the earlier published articles of Donaldson and Davis (1991), 
and Fox and Hamilton (1994). While most studies on family businesses predictably focus on 
family members, the study of Vallejo (2009) looked into the commitment of non-family 
employees in family businesses. In the category under ‘theory development’, Hernandez 
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(2012) expanded on the concepts and ideas that underpin the psychology of stewardship. Al 
Mamun, Yasser and Rahman (2013) went beyond agency theory to argue for a combination of 
agency, stewardship, stakeholder, and institutional theories to inform corporate governance. 
Stewardship theory is not specifically mentioned in Clarke and Klettner (2009); however, the 
findings discussed and examined later in the thesis, Part Two reveals the operationalisation of 
the theory in Australian small companies. Shown later in Chapter 6, operationalisation of 
stewardship theory is common in the typical Singapore smaller listed company where the 
founder retains majority shareholding and remains on the management team after public 
listing.  
 
Table 3.1 Stewardship Theory in Research, a Sample 
 
Focus of Studies 
 
Studies 
Board structure and company performance Muth and Donaldson (1998); Nicholson and 
Kiel (2007); Norberg (2009) 
 
Compensation, founder-owners in new 
ventures 
 
Wasserman (2006) 
Family businesses Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009); Vallejo 
(2009); Davis, Allen, and Hayes (2010);  
Giovannini (2010); Eddleston, Kellermanns 
and Zellweger (2012) 
 
Financial reporting (stewardship accounting) Oldroyd and Miller (2011) 
Organisational decision making Tosi et al (2003) 
 
Smaller listed companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange 
 
Clarke and Klettner (2009) 
Theory development Hernandez (2012); Al Mamun, Yasser and 
Rahman (2013) 
 
 
3.2.2 Servant Leadership Theory 
 
Closely related to stewardship is the idea of the servant leader (Caldwell et al, 2012; Boone 
and Makhani 2013) or servant leadership (Dyck and Schroeder, 2005; Caldwell et al, 2012). It 
was first mentioned by Robert K Greenleaf (1970, in Boone and Makhani 2013, p 83) and 
similar to stewardship traced back to Jesus’ parables and other teachings in the Bible 
(Hannay, 2009). Servant leadership’s link to stewardship comes from the call to be a 
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“responsible steward” (Caldwell et al, 2012, p 180) who is committed to serving stakeholders, 
and social responsibility (Jones, 2012). LC Spears (1998, in Irving, 2008, p 85; 2002, in 
McCuddy and Cavin 2008, p 108 and in McCuddy and Cavin, 2009, p 130) listed stewardship 
as a characteristic of servant leadership. Stewardship was also described as one of the 
behaviours (McCuddy and Cavin, 2008; 2009) or “operational themes” (Irving, 2008) of 
servant leadership.    
 
Separately, Barbuto & Wheeler (2006, in Jones, 2012, p 23) used “organizational 
stewardship” to describe one of the traits of the servant leader. Caldwell et al (2012, p 177) 
introduced the terms “ethical stewardship” and “ethical stewards”, among others, to argue for 
a new standard of leadership they called transformative leadership. As Greenleaf (1977, in 
Jones, 2012, p 23) had originally conceptualised, the servant leader facilitates an atmosphere 
within the organisation to develop and grow a sense of community among the members. This 
serves to achieve the goals and objectives of the organisation, one of the objectives of servant 
leadership that Greenleaf (1977, in Jones, 2012, p 26) had intended. Servant leadership is a 
“non-conventional ideal-type of management” (Dyck and Schroeder, 2005, p 707) that veers 
away from the conventional emphasis on materialism and individualism. Other aspects of 
servant leadership entail serving others rather than being served (Boone and Makhani 2013), 
and helping others to develop and grow in maturity (Jones, 2012).  
 
Developing others includes assisting them to achieve goals (Vinod and Sudhakar, 2011; 
Caldwell et al, 2012) which is key to the leader’s other role of implementation after vision 
setting (Vinod and Sudhakar, 2011). The servant leader concept had increased in popularity 
since Greenleaf’s introduction (Jones, 2012), and had emerged into a new research area that 
links “ethics, virtues, and morality” (Parris and Peachey, 2013, p 378). Among the 
applications of the concept in research were construction of an index to measure servant 
leadership; further development of theoretical models to inform practice; and using the 
models to improve practice. Measuring instruments included the: Organizational Leadership 
Assessment model (Laub, 2003, in Irving, 2008, pp 85-6); Servant Leadership Survey 
(Dierendonck and Nuijten, 2011); and Executive Servant Leadership Scale (Reed, Vidaver-
Cohen and Colwell, 2011). One study that led to the construction of a model, for example, 
linked the concepts of servant leadership, shared leadership, and caring relationships to 
knowledge creation (Rai and Prakash, 2012).  
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Shared leadership and caring relationships were among the components of Laub’s 
Organizational Leadership Assessment model (1999, updated 2003, both in Irving, 2008, p 84 
and pp 85-6, respectively). In an earlier study, Irving (2004, in Irving, 2008) provided 
empirical evidence linking servant leadership, based on Organizational Leadership 
Assessment scores, to team effectiveness (Irving, 2008). As a follow on to this, Irving (2008) 
proposed three ways to apply the Organizational Leadership Assessment model as a tool to 
diagnose areas for staff training to increase team effectiveness. Hannay (2010) suggested 
using Hofstede’s (1993, p 91) five “culture dimension scores” to assess how servant 
leadership would fit in a particular culture. Among the ten countries that Hofstede evaluated, 
Hong Kong, before its reversion to China, was the most similar to Singapore in culture. Based 
on Hannay’s method of determination, none of the 10 countries were ideally suited for servant 
leadership although Singapore met three of the five cultural dimensions.     
 
3.2.3 Left-Brain and Right-Brain Theory, and Metaphors 
 
The theory of left and right brain thinkers is applied predominantly in marketing research and 
in particular advertising (Hecker 1981, Rossiter and Percy 1991, Morgan and Reichert 1999, 
Grimes 2006). This theory also appears in organisational behaviour studies on management 
decision making (Mintzberg 1976, Taggart et al 1985, Rigby et al 2009), business ethics 
(Brady 1986) and leadership training (Kutschera and Byrd 2006). Conceptually, analytical 
and objective left brain managers-controllers complement right brain imaginative and creative 
entrepreneurs to form a left- and right-brain partnership in successful organisations (Rigby et 
al 2009). Bain consultants termed them “both-brain” partnerships, citing the late Steve Jobs’ 
creative genius and then COO, Tim Cook’s executive leadership at Apple Computers, among 
others, as examples (Rigby et al 2009, p 80). 
 
Metaphors (Morgan, 1980) are typically used as “a way of seeing” to assist in thinking and 
deepening insight towards understanding (Morgan 1997, p 4). More specifically, meaning is 
created through metaphors which assist in understanding a new or an unfamiliar phenomenon 
by relating it to “what is common” (Morgan 1983, p 602). On a separate note, Llewelyn 
(2003) argued in her article on methodological issues that metaphors provide an effective 
means to theorise the complex organisational blackbox especially in explaining structures and 
processes. Left- and right-brain theory and metaphors are applied in theorising the approaches 
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within organisations to risk-opportunities-controls, but first the enterprise risk management 
concepts included in developing this conceptual model is examined next.    
 
3.2.4 Enterprise Risk Management Concepts  
 
3.2.4.1 Historical Background 
 
In this discussion on enterprise risk management (ERM) concepts, frequent reference is made 
to The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, commonly 
known as COSO. Accordingly, background information is first provided on COSO and the 
five accounting and finance bodies that sponsored its formation along with the corporate 
governance roles of the individual members in these bodies. Among the factors that 
heightened awareness in corporate governance previously reviewed in Chapter 2 was the 
explosion of corporate scandals in the 1980s that plagued the UK, US and elsewhere (Tricker, 
1993). In the US, five accounting and finance bodies collectively formed COSO in 1985 to 
address the wave of fraudulent financial reporting (The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1985-1992; Singleton 2007). These bodies 
represent accountants and financial executives in academia, industry and public practice, and 
each has a role in promoting good corporate governance as it relates to the risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting.  
 
Academics belonging to the American Accounting Association (AAA) are typically 
associated with research, for example into the causes of fraudulent financial reporting 
(Chambers and Crowley, 2003; Federick, 2003; Sweeney, 2003; and Watkins, 2003). Since 
early 2000, the US was hit by the next explosion of high profile corporate financial scandals 
including Enron (Chandra, 2003; Leeds, 2003; Taylor, 2003), Worldcom, Adelphia, Global 
Crossing, and Xerox (Taylor, 2003). Accounting programmes in US universities came under 
pressure to incorporate ethics in the curriculum to train the future generations of accountants 
(Dellaportas, 2006; Williams and Elson, 2010; Klimek and Wenell, 2011; Manalo, 2013). 
Accountants in industry belonging to the Financial Executives International (FEI) and 
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), especially at the management level, set the tone 
for reliable financial reporting within their organisations (King, 2013). They are responsible 
for implementing business systems and business ethics (Metzger et al, 1993; Clarke, 2011) as 
Corporate Governance Singapore-Style: 
Practices and Code Compliance among Smaller Listed Companies 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 3, Theory Underpinning the Research                                                                 63 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
well as provide ethical leadership (Arel et al, 2012) to prevent and detect fraudulent financial 
reporting.  
 
Over in public practice, members in The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) are primarily practitioners involved in rendering opinions on the reliability of a 
company’s external financial statements. Issues faced by public accountants include auditing 
in a globalised environment (Cohen et al, 1993), auditor ethics (Schlachter, 1990), and 
detecting clients’ unethical behaviour (Ward and Deck, 1993; Hunton et al, 2011). In the last 
group, accountants who are auditors in industry and members of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) have a dual role in compliance, financial and operational audits (Kral, 2010; 
Steffee, 2011).  
 
Internally, they provide feedback to management on operational matters, for example, merger 
and acquisition transactions (Dounis, 2008), risk assessments (Kral, 2010), and process 
performance improvement (Greg et al, 2012; Maquire, 2012). A strong internal audit function 
leads to a moderation in the level of earnings management (Prawitt et al, 2009) and even 
reduction (Arel et al, 2012), fostering investor confidence (Holt and DeZoort, 2009). Another 
study reveals that an effective internal audit function increases the likelihood that in-house 
accountants would question the ethics of questionable accounting by senior management and 
other staff (Arel et al, 2012).     
 
3.2.4.2 Risk Management Concepts and Techniques  
 
Among available frameworks, the pioneering Joint Australian/New Zealand Risk 
Management Standard 4360 (AS/NZS 4360) was developed based on existing “risk 
management ideas and processes” and was published in 1995 (Peace, 2009, para 1). An 
American framework, Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework (The Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2004), hereafter the COSO ERM 
Framework, is also widely accepted and applied globally. It is unsurprising that in a Google 
search of risk management frameworks by their names, AS/NZS 4260 and the COSO ERM 
Framework returned the first and second number of results, respectively (Erben, 2008). The 
search listed ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and guidelines (ISO 
31000:2009), then still in draft, a distant third but ahead of other earlier frameworks 
developed in Austria/Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and South Africa.  
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This is not unusual given that ISO 31000:2009 is not only an international standard but has a 
familiar allure since it was developed largely based on AS/NZS 4360 (Erben, 2008; Peace, 
2009). The key ERM concepts and application techniques presented in the remaining 
discussions are drawn primarily from the COSO ERM Framework. Discussions are focused 
on five of the eight ERM components contained in the COSO ERM Framework: 
identification of risk events; risk assessment; responses to risks; controls; and monitoring. 
Additional commentaries from other sources, including ISO 31000:2009, are provided where 
they serve to clarify the concepts and application techniques contained in the American 
framework.   
 
3.2.4.2.1 Events that present risks and opportunities 
 
One certainty faced by organisations is change (McNamee, 1998), and the COSO ERM 
Framework provides for identification, assessment and treatment of events that present risks 
to strategy implementation and achievement of enterprise objectives. The COSO ERM 
Framework also recognises that not all events have negative effects and those that present 
opportunities are to be directed to the organisation’s strategy and objective setting process for 
consideration. Practical challenges related to identifying risk events in the real world can be 
illustrated with an example from military intelligence, as reported by the former US Secretary 
of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld.  
 
Responding to a question on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction at a NATO press 
conference on the 6
th
 of June 2002, Rumsfeld classified three event categories based on 
knowledge of occurrence. These events are the “known knowns” (“we know that we know”); 
“known unknowns” (“we now know we don’t know”); and “unknown unknowns”, that is, 
“we don’t know we don’t know” (Rumsfeld, 2002). Taleb (2008), a former trader who turned 
author and lecturer, expanded on the unknown unknowns calling them black swan events; this 
is explored further in the concluding discussions on controls and monitoring.   
 
3.2.4.2.2 Assessing risks 
 
The COSO ERM Framework suggests application techniques to assess the identified risk 
events that bring about organisational changes in terms of the likelihood of occurrence as well 
as the magnitude of impact. This is illustrated in the risk matrix presented in Figure 3.3 
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below, constructed partly based on an example provided in the draft ISO/DIS 31000 
(International Organization for Standardization 2008) preceding ISO 31000:2009. The risk 
matrix or heat map (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission 2004) also incorporates application techniques provided in the COSO ERM 
Framework. Additionally, the risk matrix or heat map illustrates that risk assessment is 
performed at two levels where inherent risk is first assessed before management action and 
residual risk is re-assessed post management response. Illustrated in Figure 3.3, the inherent 
risk at point ‘A’ was initially assessed to be of critical risk and after management action the 
residual risk had been reduced to high risk.  
 
 
Legend: 
Red – Critical; Canary – High; Green – Moderate; Blue  – Low   
 
[Sources: COSO ERM Framework (2004), Draft ISO/DIS 31000 (2008)]   
 
3.2.4.2.3 Responding to risks 
 
In respect of risk treatment options, the COSO ERM Framework lists four possible responses 
which are to accept, avoid, reduce or share the assessed risks. No action is taken to alter the 
likelihood or impact when risks are accepted while risk avoidance entails exiting existing, or 
not entering new, activities that presents the risks. ISO 31000:2009 clarifies that they are 
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conscious decisions to retain risks or taking on increased risks to pursue opportunities, and to 
remove the risk source, respectively (International Organization for Standardization, 2008; 
Purdy, 2010). In the last two options, deliberate actions are taken to deal with the likelihood 
and/or impact of the assessed risks. One way to reduce the assessed risk likelihood and impact 
is to build internal controls into daily and routine operational procedures while considering 
costs and benefits; an illustration is discussed next. The impact of assessed risks can also be 
shared with, passed on, or transferred to another party through the purchase of insurance 
policies, joint venture agreements, and hedging.  
 
Table 3.2 COSO Guidance on Internal Controls 
  
Release Date 
 
Title of Publication 
 
September 1992 
 
 
Internal Control – Integrated Framework (updated and replaced 
with the May 2013 release)  
 
June 2006 
 
 
Internal Control over Financial Reporting – Guidance for 
Smaller Public Companies 
 
May 2013 
 
Internal Control – Integrated Framework: 2013 
 
 
Source: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (1992, 2006, 2013) 
 
 
The US response to the risk of fraudulent financial reporting illustrates implementation of 
internal controls to reduce both the likelihood of the risk occurrence and the magnitude of 
impact if it does occur. Some initial background information is introduced to provide the 
necessary contextual background before an application example is explained to illustrate. 
COSO developed the initial guidance on internal controls (see Table 3.2 above) 12 years 
before its ERM Framework in response to the first major wave of US fraudulent financial 
reporting in the 1980s. Revisiting earlier discussions, the series of events that followed this 
explosion of corporate financial scandals began with the formation of COSO in 1985 by five 
accounting and finance bodies. COSO sponsored an independent study of the US financial 
reporting system to identify fraudulent financial reporting “causal factors” and “steps to 
reduce its incidence” (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p 1).  
 
One of the Commission’s recommendations required US listed companies to implement 
internal controls that would prevent, or otherwise detect, future fraudulent financial reporting 
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at an early stage with “reasonable assurance” (p 33). Summarising, the Commission 
recommended that COSO develop “additional, integrated guidance on internal controls” (p 
11), which led to COSO’s Internal Control – Integrated Framework (The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1992). Since the development of the 
initial integrated framework on internal controls, the US had been hit again by a second major 
wave of fraudulent financial reporting in the 2000s. Some of the more prominent US listed 
companies caught in this round of corporate financial scandals included Computer Associates, 
McAfee, US Wireless, Enron, Adelphia, ConAgra, and Tyco (Corporate Fraud Task Force, 
2008). Corporate financial improprieties that imploded in the early 2000s were attributed to 
weak ethics (Sweeney, 2003; Watkins, 2003); the US capitalist model (Chambers and 
Crowley, 2003); and corporate corruption (Federick, 2003).  
 
The US Congress reacted with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in which Section 
404 in particular pinned the responsibility for reliable financial reporting on company 
management (Green, 2003; Wiesen, 2003). Adding to the guidance in the 1992 Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework, COSO issued Internal Control over Financial Reporting – 
Guidance for Smaller Public Companies (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission, 2006).  From mid-2010 to the end of December 2012, COSO had 
been working on several initiatives that provide further and updated guidance on assessing the 
effectiveness of internal controls. COSO announced the results of these efforts in mid-May 
2013, releasing an updated internal control framework with two companion volumes on 
illustrative tools and external financial reporting, respectively (McCallum 2013). In Volume II 
of the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting – Guidance for Smaller Public 
Companies, an application example illustrates internal controls that reduce risk likelihood 
(prevent), and impact (detect), if not prevented. Objectives of reliable financial reporting 
reflect financial statement “assertions”, for instance, to ensure the “existence” of assets 
reported is accurate (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission, 2006, p 44).  
 
Due to the likelihood of “fraud risk” (p 50) however, the value of assets reported in the 
financial statements may be inaccurate as they may have been lost to employee theft and 
pilferage. Accordingly, both “preventive and detective controls to safeguard assets” (p 59) can 
be implemented, ultimately to achieve the objective of reliable financial reporting. For 
example, loss from theft and pilferage can first be prevented by storing a gold mine’s 
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inventory under lock and key while access to the warehouse can be restricted to authorised 
personnel only. To cover the likelihood that theft and pilferage may not be prevented, an 
additional detective control is for a warehouseman to weigh and log gold stock movements in 
and out of the warehouse. As well, weekly weighing of the gold inventory and reconciliation 
to the log by internal audit serves to enable early detection of any staff misappropriation for 
immediate remediation action to prevent further losses.       
 
3.2.4.2.4 Controls and monitoring 
 
To ensure that the responses to risks are implemented properly and are indeed operating 
effectively, the COSO ERM Framework further provides for controls together with ongoing 
and periodic monitoring to follow risk treatment. There are two separate aspects to the 
implementation of internal controls in ERM (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission, 2004). In the first instance just examined, the first volume of 
COSO’s ERM Framework containing the Executive Summary and Framework explains that 
for “certain objectives, control activities themselves are the risk response” (p 62). The 
financial reporting objective in the specific example examined is to ensure that gold inventory 
as reported in the financial statements exists and is accurately recorded. Both the preventive 
and detective control activities serve to respond to the risk that the objective may not be 
achieved due to fraud risk, in particular from employee theft and pilferage, or error.  
 
In other instances, control activities such as policies and procedures that include authority 
limits and supervisory reviews serve to ensure that risk responses are implemented as 
intended. Monitoring is among one of the five, and eight, components, respectively in 
COSO’s 1992 and 2013 Internal Control – Integrated Framework and 2004 ERM – 
Integrated Framework. However, COSO’s Guidance on Monitoring Internal Control Systems 
(The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2009) has a 
shorter history. In the words of the COSO Chair, this follow-on guidance served to provide “a 
better understanding and more efficient utilization of the monitoring component” of COSO’s 
Internal Control – Integrated Framework (Rittenberg, 2009). 
 
All three frameworks describe two categories of monitoring in which activities can be 
monitored continuously or subjected to periodic evaluations; the frameworks also prescribe a 
combination of both categories of monitoring. The relationship between controls and 
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monitoring is explained by the concepts of control “design effectiveness” and “operating 
effectiveness” (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2007, para 42, 44). To ensure 
achievement of objectives, control activities initially implemented by management to respond 
to risks that threaten this purpose need to be designed effectively. Thereafter, they need to be 
monitored continuously and tested periodically to determine that they are indeed operating as 
intended (Ramos, 2004a; Ramos, 2004b; Ramos, 2004c).                   
 
Wrapping up this discussion on ERM concepts and application issues, risk management 
initially focused on managing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting (The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1992). It had since evolved to 
encompass other enterprise risks (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission, 2004), and heightened board attention after the 2009 financial crisis 
(Barton et al 2011). Even so, company management finds it a challenge just to get started with 
risk event identification and generate a list of risks that is complete, relevant and specific to 
their organisations (Lavoie, 2011). At the board level, directors are under increasing pressure 
and especially post-financial crisis to understand the risks that management are committing 
their organisations to (Ballou et al, 2011). In a survey of board members to understand what 
they thought of the risk information the management of their organisations were providing 
them, Ballou and his co-authors received feedback from 125 respondents.   
 
Ballou et al found that boards were not being apprised sufficiently on key risks and responses 
but interestingly, most survey respondents felt they were briefed adequately to enable their 
performance as risk overseers. Compounding the challenge of risk event identification is 
coming up with the most worrisome category of unknown unknowns (Rumsfeld, 2002). Taleb 
(2008) expanded on this risk category in similar terms as the COSO ERM Framework - by 
likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of impact. To Taleb (2008), unknown unknowns are 
black swan events which are not only highly improbable and while the likelihood of 
occurrence is unpredictable, they occur with high impact. On a separate note, McNamee 
(1998, p 2) had written ten years earlier that the nature of change is such that it can be “linear” 
or “circular”. It is linear where a prediction can be made based on past understanding and 
circular when change is expected to recur due to past occurrence (McNamee 1998).  
 
McNamee’s view comported with Singapore’s risk dilemma identified in 1965 (discussed in 
Chapter 2), but it had been challenged by updated thinking in a world that has changed and 
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continues to change rapidly. Among the six risk management mistakes listed by Taleb et al 
(2009) that company managers had made, they cautioned against committing the first two 
which is relevant to this discussion. Based on their research, the tendency was to think that 
risk can be managed by first studying the past, and then applying it to predict the unknown 
unknowns or black swan events. In today’s business environment made increasingly complex 
due to globalisation and the Internet, it had become virtually impossible to identify “low-
probability, high-impact”, that is, black swan events (Taleb et al, 2009, p 3). They argued that 
managing risks is not about predicting the future; the focus needs to be re-directed towards 
risk “consequences” (Taleb et al, 2009, p 3), to reduce the impact of such events.  
 
3.3 The Conceptual Model  
  
Applying the advice and guidance in Blaikie (2000, 2010), theorising about the social world 
of corporate behaviour in governance must necessarily begin with concepts. A good theory 
links concepts to each other and explains the relationships among the concepts to “represent 
what happens in the social world” (Blaikie, 2010, p 112). More specifically and importantly, 
concepts applied in the conceptual model provided the setting for the research (Blumer, 1969, 
cited in Blaikie, 2010, p 112-3). Along Blumer’s thinking, concepts were reflected in the 
research problem which was to describe corporate governance practices and Code compliance 
among Singapore smaller listed companies based on the insiders’ views of social actors. 
Then, the penultimate involvement of concepts was in data collection and reduction and 
ultimately, the synthesis and analysis of findings. Furthermore and for the application in this 
research, Blumer (1969, cited in Blaikie, 2010, p 113) advocated the use of “sensitising 
concepts” as opposed to “definitive concepts”.            
 
3.3.1 Sensitising Concepts 
 
Rehashing, the research underlying this thesis is underpinned by the theories of stewardship, 
servant leadership, and left-brain and right-brain thinkers as well as concepts relating to use of 
metaphors and enterprise risk management. By definition, sensitising concepts are not meant 
to be definitive but serve to “provide clues and suggestions” (Blaikie, 2000, p 137) as a guide 
for “research in specific settings” (Bowen, 2006, p 3). Four separate but interconnected sets of 
sensitising concepts derived from the theories, and concepts and ideas explored in the 
literature review just discussed are set out in Table 3.3 on the next page.  
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Table 3.3 Theory-Derived Sensitising Concepts  
 
Sources The Derived Concepts            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Theory, Professional Framework Set No Sensitising Concepts 
 
Stewardship theory 
Servant leadership theory 
1 Stewards 
Stewardship 
 
Left-brain and right-brain theory 2 Left-brain 
Right-brain 
Both-brain 
 
Metaphors 3 Organisational sensemaking 
 
Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated 
Framework (The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
2004) 
4 Risks 
Opportunities 
Controls 
Monitoring 
 
 
 
Discussed in the next sub-section, three among the four sets of sensitising concepts (Set 2-4) 
were applied in initial theorising to construct an abstract-analytical model (Turner, 1987 cited 
in Blaikie, 2010, p 152). This abstract-analytical model and the remaining set of sensitising 
concepts – stewards and stewardship - formed the conceptual model (or, conceptual 
framework in Bowen, 2006) applied in Chapter 6 to synthesise and analyse findings. 
Ultimately, theory was developed from the themes developed from the research findings 
(Bowen, 2006) to achieve the research objective, which was to describe corporate governance 
practices and Code compliance among smaller listed companies.   
 
3.3.2 Initial Theorising: The Abstract-Analytical Model 
 
Construction of the abstract-analytical model followed both the ontological and sensitising 
traditions in the application of concepts (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). The ontological tradition 
entailed identification of concepts that could be linked to provide a conceptual scheme of the 
social world for better understanding (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). Concepts need to be sensitising 
rather than definitive in order to enter the social world to find the common observations 
(Blumer, 1969, cited in Blaikie, 2000, 2010). Figure 3.4 (see next page) presents the abstract-
analytical model which incorporates Sets 2-4 of the sensitising concepts in initial theorising 
on the approaches by managers within an organisation to risks-opportunities-controls. 
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Events, that is, risks and opportunities are set out on the horizontal axis while controls, the 
interrelated enterprise risk management component which includes monitoring, are 
represented on the vertical axis. Additionally, the abstract-analytical model incorporates 
family member metaphors to argue that analytical and objective left-brain managers-
controllers complement right-brain imaginative and creative entrepreneurs to form a left- and 
right-brain partnership in successful organisations. At the far right end, the adventurous 
teenager designates the hard charging entrepreneur who thrives on risks, eschews controls, 
and who is focused solely on profit making. On the other end, the strict parent elicits the well-
meaning cautious controller who has the best interests of the organisation at heart but may 
nevertheless unintentionally stifle creativity. Conceptually therefore, to the extent that both 
parties can forge a collaborative and compromising partnership, as in a successful spousal 
relationship, then the desired risk-opportunity-control conscious organisation may result to 
maximise organisational objectives. 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Among the past academic researches and business studies explored and discussed in the 
literature review in Chapter 2, only one of them which was an academic research had 
considered theory. This particular academic research had adopted theory applied by a 
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previous researcher and incorporated the hypothesis in testing the link between corporate 
governance practices and company performance among Singapore listed companies. The 
research underlying this thesis aimed to fill the gap in theory application in past academic 
researches and business studies on corporate governance among listed companies in 
Singapore. Three sets of theory-derived sensitising concepts based on left- and right-brain 
theory, enterprise risk management concepts, and the use of metaphors were applied in initial 
theorising to build the abstract-analytical model.  These three sets of sensitising concepts: left-
brain, right-brain, and both brain; risks, opportunities, controls, and monitoring; and 
organisational sensemaking, respectively, were incorporated into the abstract-analytical model 
referred to as ‘approaches to risks-opportunities-controls’.  
 
The abstract-analytical model and remaining sensitising concepts derived from stewardship 
theory and servant leadership theory, stewards and stewardship, formed the conceptual model 
that provided context to the research. Next, Chapter 4 addresses application of the conceptual 
model in the synthesis and analysis of findings ultimately to theorise further in describing 
corporate governance practices and Code compliance among smaller listed companies. The 
discussion in Chapter 4 on research methodology also includes how the theory underpinning 
the research comports with the research strategy and paradigm adopted in the research. With 
the theory underpinning the research laid out, the research methodology addressed in the next 
chapter is the remaining necessary piece to provide for the staging of the research. To recap, 
Part One of the thesis to provide for the staging of the research is comprised of Chapter 2, 
Literature Review; Chapter 3, Theory Underpinning the Research; and Chapter 4, Research 
Methodology.        
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Strategy and Methodological Framework 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 4.1 outlines the “core elements” of the research design (Blaikie, 2000, p 33) which is 
the final piece in Part One of the thesis to provide for the staging of the research. Organised 
into three sections, the discussions beginning in Section 4.2 addresses two preliminary matters 
on research design uncovered in the literature reviews in Chapter 2 to present the research 
topic, problem, and questions. Following in section 4.3, the research strategy and paradigm 
adopted in this research to answer the research questions are then discussed and justified 
including how theory addressed in Chapter 3 is incorporated therein. Wrapping up, section 4.4 
presents the methodological framework and specifically the research methods employed to 
first determine the data sources, type and form, and then to select, collect, reduce and analyse 
the data.  
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to revisit the frequent and extensive reference to the 
Singapore Code or the Code in this chapter which had been previously defined in Chapter 1, 
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Introduction. The Singapore Code or just the Code as used hereafter in the rest of this chapter 
refers to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance that was released by the Corporate 
Governance Committee (2001). Consistent with the ‘comply or explain’ philosophy adopted 
in the Code, the Singapore Exchange required listed companies to disclose their corporate 
governance practices in annual reports from 1 January 2003. Listed companies are required to 
provide explanations where the disclosed practices are not in accordance with the Code 
recommendations, referred to as Code compliance in this discussion.            
 
4.2 Preliminary Research Design Matters  
 
 Knowing what you want to find out leads inexorably to the question of how 
you will get that information. (Miles and Huberman, 1984, in Silverman, 
2013, p 123) 
 
 
In referring to the quote reproduced here Silverman (2013, 123) suggested that it is advisable 
to have “prior structuring”, or “prior instrumentation” in the words of Miles and Huberman, in 
designing a study. Research design is not a linear process, and formulating research questions 
to seek answers to the research problem or topic is the “real starting point” in a research 
design Blaikie (2000, p 23). Besides Blaikie (2000), other texts on guidance in research 
design such as Gray (2004) and Grix (2004) also list the identification of the research topic or 
problem at the start of the process.  
 
Next in sub-section 4.2.1, the first of the two preliminary research design matters uncovered 
in the literature reviews on corporate governance research in Chapter 2 is addressed. This 
matter involves the two research gaps pertaining to research methods identified in past 
academic researches and business studies on corporate governance among Singapore listed 
companies. These gaps in the literature were the bases from which the research topic and 
problem was derived, and sub-section 4.2.2 describes how the research questions were 
formulated. The other and second matter entails findings in past researches that had attempted 
to link corporate governance and company performance, both in Singapore listed companies 
as well as in other global listed companies. Discussed in sub-section 4.2.3, the mixed and 
inconclusive nature of the findings coupled with methodological issues raised in past 
researches led to changes in this researcher’s initial research design that was previously 
approved. 
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4.2.1 Research Topic and Problem 
 
Studies on corporate governance of companies listed on the Singapore Exchange, both pre- 
and post-Singapore Code Compliance since the 1
st
 of January 2003, tended to share one of 
two, but rarely both, characteristics. In respect of the first characteristic, these studies either 
covered all the companies listed on the Singapore Exchange irrespective of size or focused on 
just the larger listed companies. As to the second characteristic, the studies either investigated 
Singapore Code compliance with all recommendations or specific Singapore Code principles 
and their accompanying guidelines only. Two studies in particular shared both characteristics 
and which warrant specific mention, and the background to these studies were examined and 
described in Chapter 2 on the literature reviews. One study completed in 2007 (hereafter, the 
2007 study) was commissioned by the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore 
Exchange. Both the regulators are tasked with the joint-responsibility for monitoring 
corporate governance in companies listed on the Singapore Exchange mainboard and the 
Catalist secondary board. The second of the two studies of especial relevance to this research 
is an annual study that computes the Governance and Transparency Index of listed companies.         
 
Two arguments were proffered to justify the research leading to this thesis which covered 
only smaller listed companies, defined in this study as companies with market capitalisation 
of below SGD 500 million. First, smaller companies comprise the majority of all listed 
companies. Based on market capitalisation data on the companies listed on the Singapore 
Exchange, more than 80% had market capitalisation below SGD 500 million as of 31 
December 2013. Furthermore, the fact that past studies tended to either cover companies of all 
sizes or focused on just larger companies disclosed that smaller companies had yet to be 
afforded the emphasis they deserve. Second, while the 2007 study and the annual Governance 
and Transparency Index provided comparatively more comprehensive descriptions on 
corporate governance among listed companies they were limited to a business study 
perspective only. Several observations from an examination of the two studies in particular 
revealed research gaps that presented an opportunity for the research underlying this thesis.  
 
Firstly, both the 2007 study and the annual Governance and Transparency Index were 
business studies and theory was therefore not a consideration in each of the studies. Secondly, 
the descriptions of corporate governance practices and Code compliance in both studies were 
based on self-disclosed information by the listed companies themselves in annual reports. 
Additionally, the annual Governance and Transparency Index only published information that 
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were limited to basic index data comprising the raw scores and adjustments, plus other 
information highlights. Furthermore, although the 2007 study also collected data from two 
focus group discussions, descriptions on practices and Code compliance based on the findings 
gathered from this source were however, in highly summarised form. Thirdly, the total scores 
of listed companies in the annual Governance and Transparency Index indicated that most of 
the smaller listed companies lagged behind in practices and Code compliance. This 
observation was however, not addressed in the descriptions and although the 2007 study 
delved into this issue in the focus group discussions descriptions in the findings as mentioned 
earlier were scanty.   
 
In summary, smaller listed companies with market capitalisation of less than SGD 500 million 
is a sizeable majority of all companies listed on the Singapore Exchange. Additionally and 
evidently, the total scores of listed companies from the published annual Governance and 
Transparency Index indicated that most of the smaller listed companies lag behind in practices 
and Code compliance. More pertinently, more than half (57%) of smaller listed companies 
scored 30 points and below in the 2011 Governance & Transparency Index, graded on 
disclosures in annual reports in the preceding calendar year. This figure rose to 97% when the 
number of smaller listed companies with scores of below 50 on the 2011 Governance & 
Transparency Index is taken into consideration. Two among the handful of studies provided 
relatively more comprehensive descriptions on corporate governance of listed companies but 
were from a business perspective and based on self-disclosures of the companies. An 
academic study underpinned by theory and focused on smaller listed companies is needed 
therefore, to provide descriptions based on insiders’ views of social actors that also address 
the low annual index scores.             
 
4.2.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
The Code is now 13 years old since it was first released in 2001 and it had been updated twice 
already, first in 2005 and mostly recently in 2012. Also, listed companies had been required to 
disclose their corporate governance practices together with departures from the Code in 
annual reports for 11 years already, for the calendar years from 2003 to 2013. As the 
preceding discussion on the research problem had established, the research objective aimed to 
describe the corporate governance practices, including Code compliance, of smaller listed 
companies from the perspective of social actors. The research gathered data to answer four 
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‘what’ research questions, starting on the attitude within smaller companies towards corporate 
governance in general and Code compliance in particular.  
 
More specifically, research findings were sought to describe what they understand corporate 
governance and Code compliance to be and what motivates them to comply or explain. The 
next question that followed was on the issues faced by the smaller listed companies in 
corporate governance, in particular the problems and difficulties encountered and the more 
challenging Code principles and guidelines. Question three was designed to elicit answers to 
describe the impact of the Code in influencing corporate governance practices and compliance 
among smaller listed companies, comparing the pre- and post-Code states. Lastly, views were 
sought on the effect of stakeholders – shareholders; regulators; and various business and 
professional organisations – in influencing practices and Code compliance among smaller 
listed companies and, what further changes are needed.  
 
Summarising, the research aimed to investigate and analyse the corporate governance 
practices of, and Code compliance among, smaller listed companies from the perspectives of 
social actors. The Code refers to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance and smaller 
listed companies include entities with market capitalisation of less than SGD 500 million. 
Social actors in the context of the research included independent directors; executive 
directors; CFOs; auditors; legal and other external advisors; and other corporate governance 
stakeholders. The research questions are: What are the attitudes within smaller listed 
companies (SLCs) towards corporate governance and Code compliance? What are the 
problems and other issues faced by SLCs? What had been the impact of the Code on 
corporate governance among SLCs? What changes are needed to improve practices and Code 
compliance among SLCs? 
  
4.2.3 Changes to the Initial Research Design 
 
As previously intended, the three-stage project was initially designed to achieve both breadth 
and depth of research (Silverman, 2013) on a contemporary Singapore business issue with the 
objectives to explore and prescribe changes. Stage one aimed to develop an index to explore 
corporate governance practices and Code compliance among the smaller companies listed on 
the Singapore Exchange. In stage two, the exploration was to establish whether a relationship 
exists between good corporate governance practices and shareholder value among the smaller 
listed companies (SLCs). The project was to wrap up in stage three to explore how corporate 
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governance impacts SLCs; draw insights into what works and does not; and suggest changes 
to suit such entities. Subsequent to the approval of the initial research proposal however, rapid 
developments in corporate governance practice and research, Singaporean and global, 
necessitated changes to the previous research design as it was originally intended.  
     
In regards to the previously proposed stage one, an annual index which is available to the 
public had already been in place for five years now since the initial research design was 
approved. This is the Governance and Transparency Index calculated by the National 
University of Singapore’s Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organizations, sponsored 
by CPA Australia (Yap, 2008) together with other business and professional organisations. In 
2009, the Governance and Transparency Index replaced its predecessor Governance 
Transparency Index which was first launched in 2000 by The Business Times, Singapore 
(Yap, 2008). Both the current and preceding indices were designed by a former National 
University of Singapore research unit, the then Corporate Governance and Financial 
Reporting Centre. The preceding Governance Transparency Index was sponsored by various 
business and professional organisations in conjunction with the annual Singapore Corporate 
Awards (Quah, 2005c), but the annual ratings were not published for public access. 
 
On the previously proposed stage two, the complex corporate governance and firm 
performance relationship coupled with the inconclusive and confusing findings from past 
researches had led to calls for more robust research methods. Phan and Mak (1998) and Lawal 
(2012) argued that better methods to determine what constitute good corporate governance 
practices and measure firm performance would be needed to advance new knowledge in this 
area. Time and cost considerations are particularly important and practical factors in research 
design (Blaikie, 2000), and the remaining time available to complete the research and thesis 
was especially of critical concern. From a time perspective, to develop new research methods 
to address the twin challenges in the corporate governance and firm performance relationship 
would be a full project in itself. Considering all these issues, the initial aim in stage two to 
establish the correlation between corporate governance and firm performance among 
Singapore’s smaller listed companies had therefore become untenable and was dropped.  
 
Stages one and three in the initial research design were modified and reduced to just two 
stages in the final design. The redesigned stage one was structured as the principal means of 
collecting primary data, which was supplemented in stage two with secondary data. 
Accordingly, stage one entailed the collection of primary data generated by the researcher via 
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two different kinds of semi-structured interviews, the first with individuals and the second 
with a focus group. Data collection in stage two was limited to tertiary data since secondary 
data, both in the form of social artefacts, accumulated since the past year was restricted to 
processing only. The social artefacts served to provide supplemental data for validating data 
collected in stage one, as a form of triangulation using different data sources (Denzin, 1970, 
cited in Blaikie, 2010, p 220).     
 
4.3 Research Strategy and Paradigm 
 
How to answer research questions is often described generally as the research strategy 
(Saether, 1998; Blaikie, 2000, 2007; Baker, 2001; Bryman, 2004; Gray, 2004; Grix 2004; 
Silverman, 2013). In technical research language, it is the logic of enquiry (Blaikie, 2000, 
2007, 2010) as well as the logic of discovery or method (Blaikie, 1993). Other general 
references include research or general approach (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Gray, 2004; 
Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012; Silverman 2013) and research methodology (Blaikie, 2000; 
Collis and Hussey, 2003; Gray, 2004; Grix, 2004). Blaikie (1993, 2000, 2007, and 2010) 
proffers four research strategies – inductive, deductive, retroductive, and abductive – that is, 
four alternative logic or sets of procedures to gather research findings for answering research 
questions.  
 
Among two possible choices – induction and abduction – available to answer the research 
questions, the aim of the abductive research strategy was a natural fit with the research 
objective in this study. As Blaikie (2010, p 84) explained, the aim of the abductive research 
strategy is “to describe and understand social life in terms of social actors’ meanings and 
motives”. The descriptive aspect in the aim of the abductive research strategy comported with 
this study’s research objective that had been introduced earlier. To recap, it was to describe 
the corporate governance practices, including Code compliance, of smaller listed companies 
from the perspective of social actors.  
 
A combination of the idealist ontology and the epistemology of constructionism were adopted 
along with the selection of the abductive strategy. This position assumed social reality to be 
represented in the thinking and interpretations of social actors who construct, conceptualise 
and interpret their own actions and those of others, as well as social situations. Consequently, 
the researcher had to initially enter the world of the social actors to learn the social reality 
from these insiders. Transitioning to the stance of an expert in the next step, the researcher 
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then reinterpreted the reality gathered in order to describe it in the technical language of the 
social scientist. In this regard and discussed in the methodological framework, the conceptual 
model presented in Chapter 3 comprising theory-derived sensitising concepts either 
incorporated into the abstract-analytical model or stand-alone were applied in data analysis.      
 
To wrap up this discussion on research strategy and paradigm, adoption of the ontological 
assumptions of the idealist as well as the epistemological assumptions of constructionism was 
tacit embrace of the interpretivist paradigm. Under this paradigm, the approach of the 
interpretivist is to view social reality as a cycle of interpretations and reinterpretations. The 
ontology of interpretivism sees social reality as the interpretations of the social actors, that is, 
it is pre-interpreted even before the social scientist uncovers it. Application of these 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives in the reduction and analysis of the primary data 
collected in the research is addressed in the next discussion on the methodological framework.       
         
4.4 Methodological Framework 
 
A methodological framework incorporating research methods was built to: first determine 
data sources, type and form; and then select, collect, reduce and analyse the data (Blaikie, 
2000, 2010). The constructed methodological framework presented in Table 4.1 on the next 
page is comprised of a series of work steps from determination of data sources to data 
analysis. Matched against each work step are the specific objectives shown in the second 
column, followed by a summary of the research methods to accomplish the objectives. The 
research methods applied in each of the four work steps are discussed in the four 
corresponding sub-sections that follow.    
 
4.4.1 Work Step One: Determine Data Sources, Type and Form 
 
Two data sources, primary and secondary data, were mentioned briefly earlier in the 
discussion on changes to the initial research design and to the two sources must be added 
tertiary data as well. New and raw researcher-generated primary and qualitative data were 
available for collection in natural social settings and at a micro level (Blaikie, 2000, 2010) via 
semi-structured interviews with individuals and a focus group. This primary data source, 
collected in words in Work Step Three of the research was supplemented by both secondary 
and tertiary data available in the form of social artefacts (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). Sources of 
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secondary data available in words were from 25 news reports and newspaper opinion articles 
from January 2013 to-date. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Methodological Framework 
 
Work 
Steps 
 
Purpose in Each Work Step  Research Methods 
One Determine data sources, type and 
form (Table 4.2) 
 
(a) 
 
Searched the literature 
 
Two Test and decide on data selection (a)  
 
 
 
(b) 
(c) 
 
Conducted research and applied the 
conceptual model to:  
(i)  Compile interview target lists; and 
(ii) Compile a sponsor organisation list  
Pilot tested interview invitations 
Applied judgemental/snowball sampling 
(i)  Targeted directors and professionals 
 
Three Collect both qualitative and 
quantitative data from both 
secondary and tertiary data sources   
(a) 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
Designed interview questions (Table 4.3) 
Employed qualitative methods to: 
(i)  Conduct 21 individual semi-structured  
      interviews; and 
(ii) A focus group interview with 3 
      participants 
Applied both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to: 
(i)  Conduct a content analysis of 
      documents comprising of the social 
      artefacts summarised in Table 4.2;  
      and 
(ii) Assemble other opinions from both 
      secondary and tertiary data 
 
Four Reduce and analyse data 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
(c) 
 
 
 
(d) 
Applied the conceptual model to 
categorise data by four topics (Table  4.3) 
which are presented in Chapter 5 
 
The following are discussed in Chapter 6: 
Analysed findings with conceptual model 
Applied philosophical and theoretical 
perspectives, and the conceptual model to 
search for common themes to describe / 
theorise   
Employed the method of triangulation 
using data assembled in Work Step Three 
(c) above to validate findings collected in 
Work Step Three (b)   
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In the third type of available data, there were three separate sources of tertiary data that had 
already been analysed by the researchers who generated them (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). They 
were also in the form of social artefacts, and consisted of public documents in both numbers 
and words as well as in words only. All three sources of data, and the types and forms of data 
available for collection are summarised in Table 4.2 presented below. Among the listing in 
the table, the tertiary social artefacts were the only items found during the literature searches 
in Chapter 2, in particular the section on corporate governance research. As for the 25 
secondary social artefacts listed in the table, they were not the result of deliberate literature 
searches. Rather, they were matters pertinent to this research that had come to the attention of 
the researcher primarily when reading the news from 2013 to-date.         
  
Table 4.2 Sources of Data, and the Types and Forms of Data Collected 
 
Data Source 
 
Data Type Data Form 
Natural social settings, at a micro level 
 Semi-structured interviews of 21 
individuals 
 Focus group discussion with 3 
participants 
 
Primary; qualitative; 
researcher-generated 
Words 
Social artefacts – 25 documents, comprising 
news reports and newspaper opinion articles 
 
Secondary, qualitative; 
generated by other 
researchers 
 
Words 
Social artefacts, specifically the: 
 2007 joint Monetary Authority of 
Singapore and Singapore Exchange  
study (Mak, 2007); 
 Annual Governance and 
Transparency Index (reviewed in 
Chapter 2); and 
 2009 study on Governance Issues for 
SMEs (Clarke and Klettner, 2009) 
 
Tertiary, qualitative and 
quantitative;  generated and 
analysed by other researchers 
Numbers and 
words 
 
4.4.2 Work Step Two: Test and Decide on Data Selection   
 
A clue from the theory-derived sensitising concepts (Blaikie, 2000, 2010) incorporated into 
the conceptual model suggested that insiders were to be targeted in the data selection to gather 
answers to the research questions. Accordingly, individuals to be approached for the semi-
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structured interviews and focus group discussions had to be involved with corporate 
governance in smaller listed companies (SLCs) listed on the Singapore Exchange, past or 
present. Such individuals tended to fall into one of three categories, in order of preference. In 
the preferred category were independent directors on the board in particular the Audit 
Committee chairman; senior management (CEO, CFO); middle management (financial 
controller, accountant); or professional staff (internal auditor, risk officer). Individuals who 
were external services providers in corporate governance related areas, including external 
audit of financial statements; outsourced internal audit services; and consultants engaged to 
assist with enterprise risk management were alternative targets. Additionally, individuals who 
were also suitable participants were grouped in the category of ‘other interested stakeholders’, 
for example, officers in professional institutions with an interest in corporate governance 
among SLCs.     
 
The plan in an earlier iteration of the research design was to approach a judgemental sample 
of 302 smaller listed companies and separately a group of 14 individuals to participate in 
semi-structured interviews. The grouping of 14 individuals comprised representatives from 
four regulators; five professional organisations representing accountants, auditors, corporate 
directors, and investors (institutional and retail); two university research centres; and three 
mid-tier professional accounting firms. In a pilot test, invitation letters were sent via email to 
15 smaller listed companies and all 14 individuals in the group. While there was not a single 
response from the companies, invitations to the grouping of 14 institutions met with some 
success which resulted in eight responses although only four representatives agreed to 
participate. Three of the four responses that did not result in interviews were from regulatory 
bodies which declined to participate on policy grounds, and the other was a professional 
organisation.        
 
Arising from the poor results of the pilot test, an adjustment had to be made to the selection of 
individuals for the semi-structured interviews. The revised approach restricted the invitation 
to participate in an interview to 73 targeted individuals, specifically professional 
acquaintances only who were connected with corporate governance in SLCs. These targeted 
individuals were senior executives and Audit Committee members, or committee members of 
professional organisations, or practitioners from professional services firms. Additionally, a 
snowball sampling method (Jones, 2012; Mahdi, 2012) was applied to enhance the response 
rate among the invited individuals. Other research that have applied the snowballing 
technique are Moriarty and Bateson (1982); Ramesh (2008); Myers and Ogunc (2008); 
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Bowling (2010); Contandriopoulos (2010); and Aransiola and Asindemade (2011). These 
additional efforts in the adjusted approach resulted in an additional 17 individuals who 
responded positively and participated in an interview, with three resulting from snowballing.   
 
Separately, an attempt was made to recruit additional interview participants by means of a 
seminar cum focus group discussion. Targeted individuals were invited to a free seminar that 
addressed enterprise risk management and internal audit issues faced by smaller listed 
companies. Attendees were then invited to stay on after the seminar to participate in the focus 
group discussion. To attract potential attendees, three professional organisations representing 
accountants, directors, and internal auditors; a mid-tier public accounting firm; and a local 
university were approached to sponsor a seminar each but none were interested. In the end, 
one seminar cum focus group discussion was organised and held in the researcher’s name and 
personal capacity. Invitations were sent via email to almost 200 targeted individuals and 
companies, and seven responded positively and signed up to attend. On the day of the event, 
five of the individuals and three among them stay on after that to participate in the focus 
group discussion.           
 
4.4.3 Work Step Three: Collect Data via Qualitative and Quantitative Methods  
 
With a cross-sectional study (Blaikie 2000, 2010) design, this study describes the corporate 
governance practices and Code compliance of the smaller listed companies at a point in time. 
This picture captured the attitudes and behavioural issues, including values and belief 
systems, within the smaller listed companies towards corporate governance in general and 
Code compliance in particular. Other aspects of the social life investigated were: issues 
smaller listed companies faced in corporate governance; the effect of the Code and various 
stakeholders in influencing their practices; and improvement changes needed. Two popular 
qualitative research methods, the semi-structured personal interview (Wallstrom, Karlsson 
and Salehi-Sangari (2008) and focus group interview (Ghosh, Dhumal and Chawla, 2011), 
were employed to collect data to describe this social life.  
 
The semi-structured interview is a common, tried and tested qualitative method that had been 
applied in research since the 1970s and 1990s seen, for example, in Thurley (1971); French et 
al (1973); and Dibb (1995). More recent studies that used this method included: Lee et al 
(2002); Stanton and Weiss (2003); Wentling (2004); Fitzpatrick (2006); Binder and Clegg 
(2006); Siu and Boa (2008); Brierly (2010); and Knight (2012). Semi-structured interviews 
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with 17 of the 21 individuals were carried out over a six-month period, from October 2012 to 
March 2013; the remaining four were interviewed during the pilot testing in April 2012. The 
four broad categories of questions, together with the respective sub-part questions, to facilitate 
discussions by the participants at each of the semi-structured interviews are presented in Table 
4.3 on the next page.     
 
Separately, the seminar cum focus group discussion event was held on the 27
th
 of March 2013 
where data were collected from the three participants who stayed for the subsequent group 
interview. The nature of the discussions covered the same four broad areas in the individual 
interviews, along with the sub-questions to prompt sharing from the participants. One 
variation to the group interview was the emphasis on the Code compliance issues faced by 
smaller listed companies relating in particular to enterprise risk management and internal 
audit. In addition to primary data collected from the individual interviews and the only group 
interview, both primary and secondary data were gathered from the two sources of social 
artefacts summarised in Table 4.2.   
 
 As it was originally intended to mean, the concept of triangulation or use of mixed methods 
serves as a validity check to corroborate findings from a different method (Blaikie, 2000, 
2010). The two research methods applied to collect data, that is, content analysis of 
documents, and semi-structured individual and group interviews, entailed triangulation in one 
instance and not in another. In the instance involving triangulation, quantitative data was first 
collected from the content analysis of documents, specifically the annual Governance and 
Transparency Index. This was then corroborated with qualitative data gathered from the 21 
semi-structured individual interviews and the sole focus group interview in the second stage 
of the research. Triangulation was not involved in the second instance where the two 
qualitative methods were employed to collect qualitative data concurrently that would 
describe corporate governance practices and Code compliance among smaller listed 
companies. In the second instance therefore, use of the two qualitative methods was intended 
to provide an additional avenue to collect data especially given the difficulty in securing 
interviews.  
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Table 4.3 Topics and Lead Questions 
to Guide the Content Analysis of Documents and the 
Individual Face-to-Face and Group Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Topic One: Attitudes within smaller listed companies towards corporate governance and 
Code compliance 
 
Lead Questions: 
 
1.1 What is corporate governance to smaller listed companies? 
1.2 What motivates smaller listed companies to adopt corporate governance practices, and 
embrace the requirement to comply or explain in Code compliance? 
    
 
 
Topic Two: Difficulties and other issues faced by smaller listed companies in corporate 
governance and Code compliance 
 
Lead Questions:  
 
2.1 What problems and difficulties do smaller listed companies have in following the Code 
principles and guidelines?  
2.2 What are the more challenging Code principles and guidelines to smaller listed 
companies? 
 
 
 
Topic Three: Impact of the Code on practices during the past 10 years  
 
Lead Questions:  
 
3.1 What was the state of corporate governance in smaller listed companies before 2003, that 
is, before the Code requirement to comply or explain became effective? 
3.2 To what extent had it changed, if at all, in the early years since implementation of the 
      Code? 
3.3 What about now, that is, 10 years later?   
 
 
 
Topic Four: Changes needed to improve corporate governance practices and Code 
compliance among smaller listed companies 
 
Lead Questions:  
 
4.1 What else should the regulators tasked to promote corporate governance do to improve 
corporate governance practices and Code compliance among smaller listed companies?  
4.2 To what extent can organisations with an interest in corporate governance contribute to 
this initiative? 
4.3 What do the smaller listed companies themselves need to do? 
4.4 What about the shareholders?   
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4.4.4 Work Step Four: Reduce and Analyse Data 
 
With the exception of the secondary data generated by other researchers, most of the primary 
data gathered by the researcher were qualitative in nature and in words. Given the basic 
research objective to describe and the uncomplicated qualitative findings generated from the 
interviews and social artefacts, the collected data was easily and sufficiently managed with 
simple to no technology. The NVivo software was initially considered, but it was concluded 
that the benefits would be negligible since it took time to learn the application while the 
straightforward data analysis could be accomplished manually. Discussions in the personal 
(Moriarty and Batson, 1982; Dibb,, 1995; Siu and Bao, 2008) or individual (Valentine, 1993), 
and focus (McLarty, 2005) or group (Nelson and Frontczak, 1988), semi-structured interviews 
were by topics.   
 
Accordingly, it was just a simple process of transcribing the hand written interview notes into 
electronic format organised by the four broad topics and lead questions shown in Table 4.3 
and discussed previously. Separately, the secondary Governance and Transparency Index data 
that were in numbers were captured on an Excel spreadsheet for subsequent analysis. Data 
reduction and analysis entailed a summary and accumulation of the interview findings 
gathered from the individual and group discussions as well as from social artefacts, looking 
for common themes. In respect of the social artefacts, this involved the content analysis of 
newspaper articles, media and other organisational reports, and other collected documents 
containing primary data related to the research topic. To enable and facilitate the data 
reduction and analysis, the social artefacts were first organised manually into piles, by the 
four topics and their corresponding lead interview questions.  
 
The philosophical and theoretical perspectives adopted with the choice of the abductive 
research strategy together with its underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions 
were applied in the data reduction and analysis. To revisit, the idealist ontology and the 
epistemology of constructionism adopted with the abductive research strategy were consistent 
with the philosophical and theoretical perspectives under the paradigm of interpretivism. 
Ontologically, social reality was viewed as the construction, conceptualisation, and 
interpretation of social actors. Epistemologically therefore, the researcher had to first enter the 
social actors’ world to collect their thoughts and interpretations of the social world from the 
insiders’ perspective. Subsequently and during the reduction and analysis of the research data, 
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the researcher reinterpreted the reality gathered to search for common themes describing the 
findings in the technical language of the social scientist.      
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Three gaps in past academic research and business studies on the state of corporate 
governance in listed companies provided an opportunity for this research.  Past research and 
studies did not focus on the smaller listed company or consider theory, and tended to 
understand and describe corporate governance practices based on the companies’ self-
disclosures in published documents.  This study was dedicated to researching smaller listed 
companies, defined to be those with market capitalisation of less than SGD 500 million and 
which comprised more than 80% of all companies. The study applied the abductive research 
strategy to understand and describe corporate governance practices of companies from the 
perspectives of the social actors. Three types of data – primary, secondary, and tertiary – were 
identified and the first two types were collected in qualitative form, with the third in both 
qualitative and quantitative forms.    
 
The conceptual model was applied to target directors and professionals through snowball 
sampling including, for example, members of the board, CEOs, CFOs, and individuals in 
professional practice. Individual and group semi-structured interviews were conducted to 
collect primary, new, and raw data, guided by leading questions in each of four categories of 
themes. These four groups of leading interview questions pertained to: attitudes and 
motivation; difficulties and problems; Singapore Code impact on practices; and changes to 
improve. The conceptual model was also applied in the reduction of the findings which are 
presented and discussed next in Chapter 5. Following thereafter, the findings were synthesised 
and analysed with the conceptual model to describe and theorise further in Chapter 6. Also 
discussed in Chapter 6 is the use of the triangulation method and tertiary data to validate and 
corroborate the research findings. Lastly, the philosophical approach was that of abduction 
and interpretivism with an idealist ontology, going from the insiders’ views (the epistemology 
of constructionism) to outside expert (reinterpretation of findings). 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO: 
 
REPORTING THE RESEARCH 
 
SINGAPORE PRAGMATISM IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS 
 
Data Collection and Reduction 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The staging of the research in Part One of the thesis was comprised of three chapters on the 
literature searches; theory and the conceptual model; and the research methodology. 
Collectively, the respective discussions in the three chapters provided the contextual 
background, theoretical context, as well as the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings to 
the methodological framework adopted in the research. This is the first chapter to Part Two of 
the thesis containing three chapters on research findings, findings analysis, and conclusion 
that in combination provides a report on the research. Data collection and reduction are 
presented in this first of the three chapters, followed by synthesis and analysis of the findings 
in Chapter 6, and reflections on the research in the concluding chapter.         
 
Prior to getting into the details, there are two administrative matters to take care of to ease 
into the presentation of the findings. Firstly, Figure 5.1 presented above provides an overview 
of how the research findings are laid out and discussed in this chapter. The layout of the 
research findings discussed here in sub-sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.4 follows the organisation of the 
four interview discussion topics previously presented in Table 4.3 of Chapter 4, Research 
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Methodology. Secondly, it is again necessary to revisit the frequent and extensive reference to 
the Singapore Code or the Code and Code compliance in this chapter which had been 
previously defined. The Singapore Code or the Code refers to the Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance first released in 2001 and last updated in 2012. Additionally, Code 
compliance refers to the Singapore Exchange requirement for listed companies to disclose 
their corporate governance practices, or otherwise explain any departure from the Code, in 
annual reports from 1 January 2003.       
 
5.2 Research Findings 
 
 The goal [of qualitative research] is not to produce a standardized set of 
results that any other careful researcher in the same situation or studying 
the same issues would have produced. Rather it is to produce a coherent 
and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based 
on and consistent with detailed study of that situation … In fact, I would 
argue that, … it is impractical to make precise replication a criterion of 
generalizability in qualitative work. (Schofield, 1993, cited in Blaikie, 
2000, p 254)     
 
 
Reliability and validity (Blaikie, 2000, 2010; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Bryman, 2004) are 
two aspects in determining the credibility of findings. Results are deemed reliable where they 
can be replicated in inductive (Blaikie, 2000, 2010), that is, repeated in positivistic studies 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003). Schofield (1993, in Blaikie, 2000) discussed the type of findings 
generated from qualitative research and the difficulty of replicating or corroborating findings 
with qualitative data. Some researchers argue that it is impossible to replicate findings using 
qualitative methods since in interviews researchers are the measuring instruments and each 
human instrument is different (Blaikie, 2000, 2010). Furthermore, Bryman (1988, in Blaikie, 
2000, p 250) contends that “[i]n all probability, it is not replication that is important so much 
as replicability.”  
 
Nevertheless and to revisit the methodological framework, the method of triangulation was 
applied to validate findings from the semi-structured individual and group interviews in a 
limited way. As summarised in Table 4.1 and 4.2 in the previous chapter, qualitative and 
quantitative data from secondary and tertiary data sources were also collected in Work Step 
Three of the research. These data were from social artefacts, in which 25 documents that 
provided qualitative data from secondary data sources were comprised of news reports and  
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Table 5.1 Profile of Individual Semi-Structured Interview Respondents 
 
Reference Position  
 
Other Experiences  
(Past and Present) 
 
(1) (2) 
IIR 1 Non-Executive Chairman; 
Independent Director  
CEO; CPA   ✓  
IIR 2 Non-Executive Chairman; 
Independent Director 
CEO  ✓ 
IIR 3 Executive Director; CEO  Independent Director ✓  
IIR 4 Executive Director; CFO  ✓  
IIR 5 Executive Director  CFO; Audit Manager (public 
accounting) 
✓  
IIR 6 Independent Director  Corporate Restructuring  ✓  
IIR 7 Independent Director  Audit Partner (public accounting)  ✓  
IIR 8 Independent Director Chief Investment Officer ✓  
IIR 9 Independent Director Independent Training Consultant; 
Corporate & Executive Trainer; 
School Teacher    
✓  
IIR 10 Independent Director  Audit Partner (public accounting)  ✓  
IIR 11 Independent Director CFO ✓  
IIR 12 Independent Director  Audit Partner (public accounting) ✓  
IIR 13 Independent Director Corporate Restructuring; CEO; CFO ✓  
IIR 14 CFO  Audit Supervisor (public accounting); 
Corporate Accountant 
✓  
IIR 15 Audit Partner (public 
accounting) 
Finance Committee (non-profit 
organisation)  
✓  
IIR 16 Director, Risk and Control 
Solutions (public 
accounting) 
Corporate Internal Auditor ✓  
IIR 17 Independent Consultant  Corporate Internal Auditor;  Risk 
advisory services (public accounting) 
✓  
IIR 18 President (business 
organisation) 
Lawyer ✓  
IIR 19 President (professional 
organisation) 
Adjunct Professor; Partner, Risk 
Advisory Services (public accounting)  
✓  
IIR 20 Co-Director (university 
research centre)  
Professor; Independent Director and 
Audit Committee Chair  
✓  
IIR 21 Vice-President (professional 
organisation) 
Professor and Associate Dean 
(Curriculum and Teaching); 
Programme Director (professional 
accounting)  
 
✓  
   
Total 
 
 
20 
 
1 
 
Legend:  
(1) Individual face-to-face interview; (2) Individual telephonic interview via Skype  
 
IIR: Individual Interview Respondent     
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newspaper analyses dated from January 2013 to March 2014. Additionally, three specific 
tertiary sources of data comprising two Singapore researches presented earlier in the literature 
reviews, together with an Australian study on Governance Issues in SMEs provided both 
qualitative and quantitative data. The data collected from these social artefacts and reduced in 
Work Step Four of the research are not presented and discussed in this chapter. These tertiary 
sources of data applied to corroborate the primary data gathered from the 21 semi-structured 
individual interviews and the sole focus group interview are discussed in Chapter 6 on 
synthesis and analysis.     
 
Summarised in Table 5.1 on the preceding page is a profile of the 21 individuals who 
participated in face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The table also shows the one 
individual who could not meet in person but participated in a telephonic interview via Skype 
instead. Table 5.2 on the next page profiles the seven individuals who signed up for the 
seminar cum focus group discussion. This summary table also discloses the five individuals 
who showed up at the event, and the three who stayed on for the group interview. Three 
among the seven event registrants had previously participated in an individual interview, two 
of the three attended the seminar to validate preliminary interview findings, and one stayed 
for the group discussion. Discussions in the individual and group interviews were similarly 
along the four topics summarised in Table 4.3 in the preceding chapter. These topics were 
based on the four ‘what’ research questions and were supported by lead questions listed in 
Table 4.3, to spur discussions and enhance data collection in the individual and group 
interviews.       
 
To recap, the abductive research strategy together with the underlying idealist ontology and 
epistemology of constructionism was chosen to gather findings to answer the four sets of 
‘what’ research questions. The four topics and accompanying lead questions in Table 4.3 
guided discussions in the individual and group interviews, and also the collection of 
qualitative and quantitative data from the social artefacts mentioned above. Consistent with 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted with the abductive research strategy, 
the findings gathered reflected the insiders’ view of social reality based on the social actors’ 
construction, conceptualisation and interpretation. The researcher reinterpreted these findings 
from the stance of an expert to describe them in the technical language of the social scientist. 
Data reduction consisted of developing themes from the raw research findings and the results 
are organised and presented next, by the four topics, in this chapter for subsequent analysis in 
the next chapter.  
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Table 5.2 Seminar cum Focus Group Discussion Participants 
 
Reference Position 
 
Other Experiences  
(Past and Present) 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 Independent Director Corporate Restructuring; CEO; 
CFO 
 
✓ ✓   
 CFO Audit Supervisor (public 
accounting); Corporate 
Accountant 
 
✓ ✓ ✓  
GIR 1 Risk Manager Audit Supervisor (public 
accounting) 
 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
 In-House Legal Counsel Lawyer 
 
✓    
 In-House Legal Staff 
 
 ✓  ✓  
GIR 2 Executive Director, 
Business Risk Services 
(public accounting) 
 
Audit Manager (public 
accounting) 
✓  ✓ ✓ 
GIR 3 Independent Consultant  Corporate Internal Auditor;  
Risk advisory services (public 
accounting) 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  Total 7 3 5 3 
 
Legend: 
 
(1) Registered for the seminar cum focus group discussion 
 
(2) Also participated in an individual face-to-face interview 
 
(3) Was present at the seminar  
 
(4) Stayed for the focus group discussion  
 
GIR: Group Interview Respondent 
 
 
In each of the four sections which correspond to the four research questions, the processed 
research findings are organised under each theme developed during data reduction. Hence, 
each section heading reflects the four discussion topics and research questions, and the four 
sections contains two to four sub-sections each corresponding to the number of lead 
discussion questions under each topic. Reinterpretation of the research findings by the 
researcher are then described in the language of the researcher’s technical language under the 
respective developed themes. The processed research findings are presented in bullet points to 
avoid presentation clutter, as well as to facilitate easy retrieval for subsequent analysis in the 
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next chapter. Shown in bracket at the end of each reinterpreted research finding, organised by 
developed themes, is the finding’s source, that is, either from the individual and group 
interviews or content analysis of documents. A schema of this presentation format is 
illustrated in Table 5.3 below.     
 
Table 5.3 Schema: Presentation of Reduced Research Findings 
 
Heading/Research Finding 
 
Description 
Section heading By each of the 4 discussion topics corresponding to the 
research questions 
 
Sub-section heading By each of the 2 to 4 lead discussion questions under each 
topic 
 
Heading to research findings By each developed theme 
 
Research findings Reinterpreted by the researcher, in the researcher’s technical 
language, showing in bracket at the end the source of each 
research finding   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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5.2.1 Attitudes and Motivation  
 
5.2.1.1 Views on Corporate Governance  
 
A compliance burden 
 In a company previously family-controlled, it is: 
 An added complication where corporate governance matters are of more 
importance to independent directors and executive directors have a hard time 
with a changing world. (IIR 1; IIR 14) 
 Seen as “not natural”; see further comments at 5.2.3.2, Extent of Changes in the 
Early Years. (IIR 7) 
 Corporate governance is viewed as a chore that equates to a lot of work. Code 
compliance is taxing to staff, even to a chief financial officer who is accustomed to 
onerous reporting requirements, because it is largely an academic exercise. (IIR 6; IIR 
14; IIR 20) 
 Corporate governance is bothersome and burdensome. (IIR 7) 
 Code compliance incurs additional costs and is viewed as impractical (IIR 10)  
 
An obligation to comply 
 Corporate governance is a necessary evil and hence, the tendency is to just do the 
minimum or find ways to get around it rather than embracing the spirit of the Code. 
(IIR 2; IIR 7; IIR 8; IIR 9; IIR 10; IIR 11; IIR 12; IIR 13; IIR 14; IIR 15; IIR 16; 
IIR7; IIR 18; IIR 19; IIR 21; GIR 1)  
 Disclose as little as possible; worried about the competition (IIR 11) 
 Will not embrace 100% IIR 11) 
 Cultural. (IIR 15)   
 Companies recognise that there is no choice but to follow the Code, in order to 
maintain the standing of a listed company. (IIR 3; IIR 9; IIR 11; IIR 12) 
 If the company can get things done by breaking rules, management will do it (IIR 
11) 
 If they can go private for funding or have enough reserves, would delist and get 
out of an impediment (IIR 11) 
 If the company wants to attract investments, then corporate governance cannot be 
viewed as an added cost but more is expected and hence more to do (IIR 12) 
 The board (especially the independent directors) and owner-managers feel compelled 
to follow the Code to avoid penalties. (IIR 4)  
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 It is an afterthought, especially when the time comes for the annual corporate 
governance report preparation. Conceptually, the Code requirement is to comply or 
explain but in practice however, there is pressure to comply. (IIR 5) 
 Would not care without guidelines, and if not required. (IIR 4; IIR 6; IIR 8; IIR 10) 
 Afraid to break rules and do not want queries from the Singapore Exchange. (IIR 6) 
 Taken for granted. (IIR 8) 
 
Ethics and Responsibility  
 Owner-managers in family-managed companies among the older generation can 
accept corporate governance better where honesty is present. (IIR 2) 
 Owner-managers decided to embrace corporate governance once the family business 
went public. They accepted the basic principles for transparency in the company, and 
feel they owe it to the shareholders as it is their rights. Ultimately it is the integrity of 
the owner-manager that is crucial. (IIR 3; IIR 10)  
 The thought of running a public company spurs owner-managers to recognise and 
accept the need for basic decency and not to abuse the privilege of a public listing. 
(IIR 5)  
 Smaller listed companies were aware of the Code when listed (IIR 13) 
 The question is whether they believe in it or not. 
 They are likely to be not so serious about it 
 Corporate governance is something ‘good’ to be done; if it is good, then it should be 
done (IIR 15) 
 
Meaningless 
 Companies had failed even with the Code. (IIR 3) 
 Corporate governance does not mean anything. (IIR 9) 
 Corporate governance is on the back burner and does not mean much as the focus is 
on profitability and strategy. (IIR 10) 
 There are not many companies which are serious about corporate governance and/or 
the Code. (IIR 13)  
 S-Chips are a case in point  
 Chinese companies listed in Singapore but management and operations are 
based in China. 
 Besides being far removed physically, they are also outside of Singapore’s 
jurisdiction 
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 They get listed in Singapore to get funding, and the management of some S-
Chips soon finds ways to loot the company   
 
Regulatory device, intervention; not business enhancement (IIR 11) 
 Reasons for it 
 Regulators regard it as protection – to protect shareholders and the general public 
 Responsibility for being listed 
 Control and compliance purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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5.2.1.2 Motivation to Adopt Practices, and Embrace Comply or Explain 
 
Attitude, awareness, and leadership among executive management 
 Attitude of the substantial shareholder and CEO (IIR 4; IIR 7; IIR 10) 
 Awareness and buy-in (IIR 8; IIR 10) 
 Leadership of the substantial shareholder and CEO, and executive team share the 
same values. (IIR 9)   
 The top guy has to believe in corporate governance for it to be accepted (IIR 13; IIR 
16) 
 
Corporate governance-firm performance link 
 An unsettled debate 
 That investors are willing to pay a premium for the shares of a company with 
good corporate governance. 
 Inconclusive evidence, but there is anecdotal acceptance of the belief.  
 
Profiling and self-promotion 
 Truth in self-disclosures is doubtful. (IIR 3; IIR 10) 
 Doing it for show and for recognition. (IIR 5; IIR 8; IIR 9; IIR 10; IIR 12)  
 Business branding (IIR 11)  
 
The resolve of independent directors 
 Governance matters are of more importance to independent directors (IDs). 
Independent directors in active boards and the audit committee especially, push for 
practices and Code compliance. (IIR 1; IIR 6) 
 Independent directors are more concerned, and the Audit Committee Chairman is on 
the ball. (IIR 6) 
 Driven by professionalism and the pressure placed on the IDs. (IIR 12)  
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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5.2.2 Corporate Governance and Code Compliance Issues 
 
5.2.2.1 Problems and Difficulties  
 
A stale board 
 The tendency is to have the same people on the board, and who are getting older; no 
rejuvenation. (IIR 7) 
 
Costs 
 Owner-managers are cost conscious. (IIR 1; IIR 2; IIR 4; IIR 12; IIR 13) 
 All the more so in an ownership-management change situation (IIR 13) 
 Business survival comes first and corporate governance takes the back seat (IIR 
13) 
 Cost was the main reason for initial resistance. (IIR 2; IIR 6; IIR 7; IIR 8; IIR 9; IIR 
10; IIR 11; IIR 12; IIR 14; IIR 15; IIR 19; IIR 20; IIR 21) 
 Besides independent directors (see next) - internal audit; risk management; 
independent financial advisors; consultants 
 Can be quite substantial to get independent directors. (IIR 2; IIR 8; IIR 9; IIR 10: IIR 
11) 
 
Executive directors and management 
 Rely on the CFO (IIR 6) 
 Want to focus on business, not regulatory requirement (IIR 11; IIR 12) 
 Looking after own vested interests 
 Not likely to champion corporate governance 
 
Family-business culture 
 Owner-managers know the business well and do things their way without seeking 
advice and consultation. (IIR 2) 
 There is an insider versus outsider divide, as staffs prefer and tend to approach the 
executive chairman only. In Chinese companies, staffs only want to deal with insiders 
only. (IIR 2)     
 
Independent director 
 Independent directors (IDs) versus executive directors (EDs) 
 Natural to be they versus us (IIR 12) 
 The tendency is to “screw” the IDs 
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 Independent directors not there fulltime and other limitations but still need to 
sign-off on risk management and internal controls; a concern (IIR 112) 
 
 IDs versus majority shareholder 
 A strong majority shareholder typically wins in disclosure disagreements, 
resulting from the tendency to appoint friendly parties (friends, consultants, 
previous financial controllers) to the board. (IIR 4; IIR 16) 
 
 CEO versus CFO (IIR 12) 
 IDs depend on the CFO 
 The board needs to support the CFO 
 The CFO needs to trust the board to back him up 
 
Minority institutional shareholders 
 Getting more vocal (IIR 11; IIR 12) 
 Company had been put in defensive mode in the AGM which is taking more time 
(IIR 11) 
 Asking tough questions (IIR 12) 
 
Ownership, control and management changes (IIR 113) 
 May be the result of a reverse takeover or a loan default. 
 New owner-manager may not understand corporate governance, and therefore do not 
know what to do. 
 New owner/s need to make changes to turn around the company. 
 The Code is the least of their concerns at this time.  
 
Resources 
 Smaller companies have less manpower, are limited by staff capability, not used to 
such staff infrastructure and tend to use a consultant instead of hiring to staff 
internally. (IIR 1; IR 3; II6; IIR 10; IIR 11; IIR 18) 
 Places more work and responsibility on an already overloaded CFO (IIR 6)  
 Finding independent directors the majority shareholder is comfortable with. (IIR 4)  
 It is a situation of whether management is equipped to incorporate a corporate 
governance process and mechanism. (IIR 8) 
 Unable to recruit the right people. (IIR 9; IIR 10; IIR 15; IIR 20; IIR 21) 
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 Need to pay attract (IIR 19) 
 
The comply or explain misnomer 
 As the Code requirements got more stringent, non-compliance with the requirements 
could not be easily disposed of with explanations. (IIR 2)  
 A farce (IIR 5) 
 The requirements are too prescriptive to be able to decide not to comply. (IIR 5) 
 Want to comply rather than explain. (IIR 8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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5.2.2.2 Challenging Code Principles and Guidelines 
 
CEO duality 
 Other issues often arise even where the chairman and CEO positions are held by 
separate individuals: 
 It is a matter of face for the founder-owner to desire the chairman position. An 
atmosphere of ‘no respect’ may prevail when an independent director is the 
chairman while the founder-owner is the CEO instead. (IIR2) 
 Where a trusted friend is appointed to be a ‘nominee chairman’ then that would 
not be in the spirit of the Code. (IIR 2) 
 The challenge becomes one of appointing a chairman with a ‘questioning’ 
mindset and who can maintain a mutual respect with the founder-owner CEO. 
(IIR 2) 
 When the chairman and CEO are related the latest Code changes require the 
board to be comprised of at least 50% of independent directors. Difficulty 
finding enough independent directors (IDs) (IIR 2; IIR 3; IIR 4; IIR 8)  
 A situation of who is in charge may arise (IIR 6; IIR 21) 
 Cannot recruit a non-executive chairman, as the controlling shareholder still wants to 
run the company. (IIR 4) 
 Growth in the smaller company is usually dependent on one or two individuals. 
 No choice but to comply now, as even Wee Cho Yaw at the United Overseas 
Bank (UOB) which had been provided a transition period previously had recently 
separated the two functions. (IIR 9)    
 A balance of power issue (IIR 13) 
 Need lead-ID where not separated (a 2005 change). 
 Even in new rule that requires a majority (at least 50%) of IDs when separated 
roles are handled by related parties, it still depends on the quality of IDs. 
 
Director tenure 
 No ready pool of candidates makes nine years as a reasonable maximum difficult to 
meet, and may see smaller a board as a result. (IIR 1; see IIR 7 below) 
 Independent directors are wary to sit on small cap boards. (IIR 3) 
 The 9-year term limit is “really tough” (IIR 7; IIR 11); Singapore is small and the 
issues are (IIR 7): 
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 The problem with access to the small and limited universe of independent 
directors (IDs). (IIR 7); 
 How to approach new ones. (IIR 7); 
 Owner-managers do not want competitors on the Board. (IIR 7); and 
 It is not always possible to find IDs, and the tendency is to make “do with people 
you know”. (IIR 7)  
 Shortage of professionally trained IDs - No “pals” or close relationship. (IIR 
11) 
 High accountability expected of IDs - people not keen to be IDs especially 
due to unfamiliarity with the company; would take it on only if the major 
shareholder is known  (IIR 11) 
 Up to the Nominating Committee to justify non-compliance (IIR 8) 
 Companies prefer to keep existing and experienced IDs who already have 
knowledge of the company’s business model, risks and risk management process. 
 
Internal audit 
 The difficulties include:  
 Too small to have own function (IIR 1; IIR 9); not many in smaller listed 
companies (IIR 7); do not see the value (IIR 13) 
 Standards and quality issues in a small audit shop. (IIR 1) 
 Need for the internal auditor to meet with others. (IIR 1) 
 Cannot afford a full-time person (IIR 6) 
 Not enough work (IIR 6) 
 Staff retention is difficult given the lack of job training, rotation, and other 
issues (IIR 7) 
 In-house governance issues; cultural views of authority; less transparency; and 
not a senior, strong, and independent enough voice. (IIR 1; IIR 9; IIR 11; IIR 13; 
IIR 19; GIR 2; GIR 3) 
 Business is first (IIR 13) 
 Even with an in-house IA – not given stature; depends on quality(IIR 13) 
 Long-term – most see IA as stepping stone to CFO (IIR 13) 
 The audit committee wants to have eyes and ears on operational issues and 
matters; owner-managers accept the need for internal audit (IA) as a necessary 
function; rely on in-house fulltime IA to enable sign-off on risk management and 
internal controls.  (IIR 11) 
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 But not line managers who have to explain discrepancies that the IA reports 
on. (IIR 11) 
 Hence, a better alternative is to outsource to an accounting or consulting firm; the 
advantage from dealing with a third party is objectivity. (IIR 1; IIR 7) 
 This is subject to the pros and cons of an in-house versus outsourced IA 
function (IIR 13) 
 
Lead independent director 
 Independent directors were reluctant to appoint one, fearing loss of face to the CEO 
and other executive directors. (IIR 1) 
 
Remuneration disclosures 
 Remuneration of top executives. Chose not to disclose as shareholders do not know if 
compensation is fair. It is not fair for shareholders to decide; one way is to use 
consultants. (IIR 3) 
 The number of disclosures had increased, and while the requirements had gone above 
the spirit of the Code the value to investors is doubtful. (IIR 5)  
 
Risk Management 
 To set up a risk management process, beginning from adoption of a framework to the 
sign-off by directors at the end, is too onerous. It would take a few years to put the 
process in place given the need to get the audit committee on board and train the staff 
towards a risk management mindset. (IIR 2; IIR 14) 
 An absolute statement expected by the Code makes it harder to make disclosures; the 
Singapore Exchange is asking for too much. (IIR 1; IIR 2; IIR 3; IIR 6; IIR 11; IIR 
12; IIR 13; IIR 14; IIR 19; IIR 21; GIR 1; GIR 2; GIR 3) 
 Absolute nonsense; no clear scope on what risk is (IIR 13) 
 More stringent than US Sarbanes-Oxley which is focused on financial reporting 
risks (GIR 2)  
 Easy for CEO/CFO to sign-off, but how to ensure things are in place 
especially in overseas entities? 
 In most cases, independent directors learn of problems through the benefit of 
hindsight 
 Negative assurance would seem to be more reasonable 
 No sufficient time with public feedback; knee-jerk reaction and public pressure 
for action, especially as it related to China Sky 
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 The company and especially the independent directors are being forced to be more 
risk averse; need to take risks to make money. (IIR 5; IIR 9; IIR 11)  
 Most of the smaller listed companies do not have dedicated resources, and need 
guidance (IIR7; IIR 8; IIR 9). They tend to: 
 Relegate the function to the company secretary or financial controller, on a part-
time basis. (IIR 7); or 
 Need an outside consultant or rely on internal audit. (IIR 8; IIR 12) 
 No choice but to comply, not because they are able to and execution is the crux of 
the matter. (IIR 9)    
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5.2.3 Impact of the Code  
 
5.2.3.1 Pre-Code State of Corporate Governance  
 
New concept 
 Pre-Code, people who knew about corporate governance were restricted to those in 
professional practice and professional managers  (IIR 13) 
 Singapore Exchange Listing Manual; baseline requirements (IIR 16)  
 Left to good habits (IIR 17) 
 
Rating [On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being excellent)] 
 It was a ‘5’ in pre-Code days. (IIR 1)  
 Tough to assess. (IIR 12; IIR 8; IIR 19) 
 A range of 3 to 4 (IIR 14) 
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5.2.3.2 Extent of Changes in the Early Years 
 
Rating [On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being excellent)] 
 Tough to assess. (IIR 12) 
 It was a ‘5’ (IIR 14) 
 
Theoretical  
 In the initial years the Code principles, such as, CEO duality, were seen as theory. 
(IIR 13)  
 Not much awareness (IIR 15) 
 Code response to fraud (IIR 17) 
 
Unnatural, and even unreasonable and unfair for the family business 
 The family business went public for three reasons, which were to raise capital; gain 
image, visibility, and profile; and to get out of having to provide personal guarantees 
on bank loans. At the initial public offering, the company sold as little shares as 
possible, less than 50%, to keep non-family shareholders in the minority. Therefore, 
corporate governance was seen as “not natural” for the family business since the 
owner-managers were self-accountable before the Code, but which now calls for 
accountability to the public. Owner-managers did not bother to spend time to read and 
understand the Code, and were reluctant to study and get educated on corporate 
governance. Lacking in understanding, they concluded in general that the Code was 
unreasonable based on hearsay. (IIR 7) 
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5.2.3.3 Code Impact Ten Years On 
 
As a response to corporate financial scandals 
 At the end of the day, it depends on the integrity of top management, and no degree of 
corporate governance guidelines would help. (IIR 8) 
 Listed companies still get into trouble, but the Code created awareness (see the “more 
awareness” theme below). (IIR 8) 
 
Current attitude among owner-managed family businesses 
 The younger generation of owner-managers views the listed company as a legacy of 
the founder and the family patriarch. Hence, the tendency is to keep the listed vehicle 
on one side and conduct new businesses under unlisted companies. (IIR 7) 
 There is risk exposure however, where the new business/es is/are not under the listed 
arm. (IIR 9)  
 
More awareness 
 Board network (IIR 8) 
 Less appointment of friends 
 The network is however, still needed 
 Like familiarity, as it is natural to go with familiarity for cohesiveness, 
common beliefs, and culture; 
 Yet, independence must be fulfilled or face questioning from bankers, 
auditors, and others 
 Cannot just rely on the Singapore Institute of Directors to recommend 
 Independent directors 
 Independent directors (IDs) are more aware/alert and independent. (IIR 9; IIR 12; 
IIR 14) 
 A question remains on whether they have questioned or merely signed off 
based on the word of others (IIR 9) 
 Previously, tended to toe the line and just listened to a strong CEO (IIR 12) 
 IDs are now more careful to raise questions (IIR 8; IIR 12) 
 Partly due to the lesson from the Air Ocean case. (IIR 8; IIR 12; IIR 14); 
 Board discussions and decisions are minuted – a self-protective measure. (IIR 
8); and 
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 The current trend is to tell internal audit to consider the risks identified and 
assessed in the risk management process, in order to overcome gaps in risk 
controls. (IIR 8)  
 IDs need to pay attention, know what they are doing, and not take things at 
face value. (IIR 12) 
 Now IDs cannot be removed easily and are more protected to speak out; 
reasons for removal have to be disclosed making it more difficult for the CEO 
to remove someone he/she dislikes. (IIR 12; IIR 14)     
 In general  
 Did not care initially, but now more or extremely aware. (IIR 6; IIR10; IIR 11; 
IIR 14; IIR 15; IIR 16; IIR 17 ; IIR 18) 
 “Has done good” (IIR 12) 
 Corporate governance had improved “a lot” (IIR 7) 
 Especially among “those [companies] which want excellence”. (IIR 7) 
 A very obvious improvement - most companies had implemented and 
complied with the requirement for board committees; previously it was just 
for audit but the Code had included the nominating and remuneration 
committees as well. (IIR 8).   
 Corporate governance awareness now is strong and owner-managers are familiar 
with Code requirements. They want to comply and not resist anymore, even 
though it is not mandatory. (IIR 8)  
 The Code ten years on (IIR 13) 
 Since then, the Code is the corporate governance version of the ‘bible’ (IIR 
13) 
 Most now understand what corporate governance is about, at least the  theory  
 But practice is the issue; many still do not know what good practice is 
(“doing is tough”) 
 Still a challenge 
 Useful guidelines 
 The Code had been incredibly valuable, although more so to the independent 
directors than the executive directors. It had provided a means for independent 
directors to question the company, and to get things done much as checklist.  (IIR 
1; IIR 10) 
 Things get formalised, for example, compelled to appoint internal auditor and 
board committees. There is accountability when things go wrong. (IIR 4)    
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 On hindsight, the Code is seen as a good thing since listed companies need 
corporate governance guidelines, not because of dishonesty but to keep 
management on their toes.  (IIR 6) 
 Good to have the Code, but: 
 “The devil is in the details”; and 
 There is a need to have a good feedback mechanism to counter the tendency 
for more and new requirements; refer to 5.2.4, Improvement Actions and 
Changes - Regulators (IIR 7) 
 As the world gets more complex, it is getting more useful even to the executive 
directors and management. (IIR 10)    
 
No change 
 Just putting up with the cost, but happy to be left alone. (IIR 4) 
 No much changes; not clear that there had there been any good out of it. Yet 
fraudulent activity in companies still had happened and there still had been some 
black sheep. The Code was good intention but naïve; the law abiding will always 
comply and crooks will find ways to cheat. Since laws already exist, the need for the 
Code is doubtful  (IIR 5)  
 To the entrepreneurial mind, the business is all about taking risks and making money, 
and there is no need for corporate governance. (IIR 2; IIR 5; IIR 9; IIR 10; IIR 11; IIR 
14; IIR 16)  
 No change (II R 20) 
 
Rating [On a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being excellent)] 
 Tough to assess. (IIR 12) 
 A range of 6 to 7 (IIR 14)  
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5.2.4 Improvement Actions and Changes 
 
5.2.4.1 Regulators  
 
A Code for Smaller Companies 
 Understand the needs of smaller companies which are family-owned and owner-
managed. Question the value of onerous disclosures, for example, remuneration. Too 
many disclosures are just information overload. (IIR 5)  
 
 Relax disclosure requirements for owner-managed companies which should be 
distinguished from companies managed by professional managers, such as the 
government linked companies. (IIR 5)   
 The suggestions are to:  
 Eliminate waste of resources from having to make annual disclosures in 
annual reports;  
 Keep it simple so as not to lose the message;  
 Allow website disclosures instead especially for owner-managed companies, 
and 
 Permit voluntary annual report disclosures to once every five years.  
 
Code is ineffective 
 The requirement to comply or explain becomes meaningless when the real reason for 
non-compliance is not disclosed, for example, on remuneration matters. (IIR 2) 
 Make the Code mandatory, but maintain balance (see cost-benefit balance below) and 
give time for the need to embrace the spirit of it to ‘sink in’. (IIR 2) 
 Code has no bite and not effective, when one could just explain if they do not comply. 
(IIR 3)  
 The Code is not meant to be clear, and is just a guide. It is just a paper exercise to 
explain, for example, the risk management process when it may not in fact be in place 
because it is not audited. Definitely not into the spirit of comply or explain; it is just a 
paper exercise and it is easy to just get someone to write it up. (IIR 4) 
 It is too prescriptive. Let companies decide what needs to be addressed. (IIR 5) 
 
Conflict of interest 
 Is the Singapore Exchange in a conflicting role as the regulator?  
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 Regulatory and operational functions will be separated when the organisation 
is large enough. (IIR 9) 
 For example, the regulatory and operational functions at both the Civil 
Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and the Port of Singapore Authority 
(PSA) are not split. 
 Talent pool may be limited which may be recruited but a critical may yet be 
lacking to justify. 
 
Cost-benefit balance 
 Regulators generally had not been too hard except on risk management. (IIR 1)  
 Resist reproducing what the US and Europe had done where the compliance costs 
is greater than things can go wrong. (IIR 1) 
 Afraid of overkill. (IIR 11) 
 Don’t want the business community to react. 
 Other agencies facilitate business growth  
 Counter to regulations 
 For example, the EDB and IRAS incentives 
 Generally business friendly 
 Did a lot with the last round of Code changes. (IIR 2; IIR 3)  
 Balance is needed, for example, the framework to detect fraud is not practical. 
 However, there is a need to keep pushing for Code compliance; otherwise, it will 
take longer for the spirit of the Code to sink in.  
 
Crux of the problem 
 There is a tendency to: 
 “Just regurgitate best practices” from the US, UK and Australia; and 
 “[Not] accept feedback” (IIR 7)  
 “We’re Asian” and need to “be a frontier to do things Asian”, and therefore should: 
 Think like the first generation of leaders, for example, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh 
Keng Swee, and 
 Not just “[follow] others blindly just to have it”. (IIR 7) 
 Too prescriptive; lack experienced officers; asking company wrong questions (IIR 
13) 
 Going after independent directors rather than perpetrators (IIR 13) 
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Engage the listed companies  
 When listed companies wanted to engage the Singapore Exchange (SGX) (IIR 7) 
 The SGX did not meet with them; 
 They were “scared to commit” and told the listed companies to “just comply”; 
and 
 This created a problem as the listed companies ended up consulting lawyers.  
 “To what extent to get feedback” (IIR 7) 
 Resist the tendency to focus on lawyers and accountants who do not “fight for 
market participants” 
 “Discuss, not just ask for feedback” 
 “Be prepared to debate” with the “attitude of fostering” a “dynamic” and 
“relevant” capital market; 
 Need to have a good feedback mechanism; and 
 “Foster energy and enthusiasm” by embracing, not ignoring listed companies 
which approach the SGX to provide feedback on onerous rules that get too 
troublesome and burdensome.   
 In respect of S-Chips (Chinese-based companies listed in the Singapore Exchange) as 
another example, there is a need to:  
 Engage; dialogue; and not project a “too busy attitude”; 
 Communicate what the regulators want, so that S-Chips do not just engage 
lawyers; and 
 Encourage cross-border discussions: 
 On not just issues here but regulatory conditions in China; 
 To familiarise with their practices and to take the “pulse on the community”; 
and 
 To speak their language, and not just expect them to have to learn English. 
(IIR 7) 
 Too extreme in dealing with smaller companies (IIR 12) 
 The Singapore Exchange throws things at you 
 Not afraid to call you up 
 Look at it; then tone down 
 Treating big company differently? 
 Need to be less judgmental  
 Pre-judge smaller listed companies 
 Do not overreact 
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Independent directors’ role 
 Expect independent directors (IDs) to be facilitators rather than watchdogs to 
challenge management. (IIR 2) 
 It is onerous enough as it is. Do not mandate IDs as watchdogs making it more 
difficult. This would defeat the purpose as IDs would either, run the company and 
stifle decision making, or quit sitting on small company boards altogether. (IIR 3)  
 
Making it mandatory 
 Director training (IIR 8) 
 Make it a requirement to obtain: 
 Certain core education hours; and 
 A fundamental appreciation .  
 Include certain aspects of the Listing Manual under the Securities and Futures Act to 
make it more punitive  (IIR 8) 
 Not to legalise all aspects; and 
 Not to punitive. 
 Push needs to come from regulators, not the CFO or others; state requirements clearly 
(IIR 14; IIR 17) 
 
Self-enforcement  
 Regulators have not done much in this area (IIR 4; IIR 14; IIR 16)   
 Do not compel. Is the purpose of the Code to penalise all, to catch the bad ones, 
or guidelines in case something bad happens?  
 The company can still live with it even if the Code gets enhanced, but if it gets 
any more difficult it would then get unreasonable and not serve any purpose.  
 Rather than the current “top-down” approach (IIR 7) 
 Encourage best practice; 
 “Use the Code as [the] carrot, not stick”; 
 Develop a “culture” to “do it from within” and “not forced on”; and 
 For example, good and responsible directors rotate themselves out, and self-
renew.  
 Code compliance is currently not mandatory, as in not legislated (IIR 10) 
 Not advocating for it be it made mandatory; 
 “Not possible” to do so. 
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The “End Game” 
 “Where do we want to go?” (IIR 9) 
 For example, in wealth management it is to attract investments. 
 Make money or regulate? (IIR 21) 
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5.2.4.2 Business and Professional Organisations  
 
Achievements 
 Doing alright. (IIR 1; IIR 2) 
 Had created awareness. (IIR 9; IIR 10) 
 Keeping interested parties informed of changes. (IIR 1)  
 They, including short sellers and the press, serve as a secondary watchdog and 
intermediary for minority to flush out company issues and shortcomings. (IIR 3) 
 Institutions and organisations with an interest in corporate governance among listed 
companies: 
 Already are organising and offering training courses, but see improvements 
below. (IIR 8) 
 The Securities Investors Association Singapore (IIR 8): 
 Had done enough to organise and offer corporate awards; 
 But, not all companies go for awards.  
 Set up for different reasons; corporate governance helps to fulfil their roles. (IIR 
11) 
 
Improvements 
 In respect of relations with regulators, need to influence change rather than be 
reactive to changes and not ’blow with the wind’. (IIR 2) 
 Tend to support the regulators and toe the line. (IIR 7) 
 Tend to go along, happy that: (IIR 11) 
 Someone started the movement  
 The Monetary Authority of Singapore is taking the lead   
 Cannot be prime movers / drivers 
 Just endorsers 
 As advisors, auditors and lawyers must lead and get their clients to do more as 
management tend to act for themselves rather than the shareholders. (IIR 2) 
 Protect the public when it is the people versus the client. Currently, not tough enough 
and think of themselves too. This is likely due to appointment for a fixed period and 
therefore, less likely to push thinking of the job and billing more fees. (IIR 2) 
 “Champion the participants”, not just “pretending” to. (IIR 7) 
 Institutions/organisations only “sell” themselves (IIR 9) 
 Neither helping smaller listed companies, nor 
 Fighting for them  
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 Benefits to listed companies  
 None to smaller companies. (IIR 4)  
 The current issue is on what and how to organise and offer essential training 
courses. (IIR 8) 
 Increase the base of directors (IIR 9) 
 Categorise by industry and skill specialisation 
 “Hope they can open doors” 
 Too passive (IIR 12) 
 No updates 
 Institute of Chartered Accountant Singapore and CPA Australia  
 Not pushing corporate governance besides CPE requirements 
 For example, director training 
 Will not work; listen more to regulators (IIR 14) 
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5.2.4.3 Companies 
 
Advice on the initial public listings 
 It is better for smaller companies not to get listed, especially when there is no need to 
raise funds in the capital market. (IIR 3; IIR 9) 
 Costs 
 Costs of being listed, such as, paying dividends and compliance costs may 
exceed interest expense. (IIR 3) 
 Costs for compliance obligations, including appointment of independent 
directors (IDs) and fees for a big name auditor. (IIR 9)  
 Difficulty finding IDs since those who are able may not be willing to serve, and 
the company likely ends up with inexperienced IDs. (IIR 9) 
 Not to list even up to SGD 100 million (in the past, companies would list to raise 
just SGD 30-40 million just for face), as it is only worth the costs for SGD 500 
million or more; better to go for private equity or seed fund. (IIR 9) 
 List for the right reasons: reputation; market purpose; raise funds; want staff to be 
proud and suppliers to be comfortable. Calculate the costs before listing and bear with 
it and accept as cost for doing business. (IIR 4)  
 
Board of Directors 
 General 
 The board should not take a top-down approach but encourage and cultivate an 
engaging attitude within the company. (IIR 7) 
 Independent directors 
 Need to recruit independent directors who believe in CEO-duality as well as a 
strong and professional audit committee chairman to make risk management more 
comfortable. (IIR 3) 
 Need to play an active role (IIR 16) 
 
Director Training 
 Attend training courses 
 Owner-managers are entrepreneurs and good managers at making money; they 
know a little about corporate governance but not the essence of it. (IIR 2) 
 Wait for the older executive directors to retire 
 10 years is not enough time (IIR 9) 
 The younger generation is more used to attending training (IIR2; IIR 10; IIR 
13), and their thinking helps. (IIR 9)    
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 Not easy to change attitudes (IIR 13; IIR 14; IIR 19) 
 Executive directors typically do not go for training (IIR 9; IIR 10; IIR 13; IIR 14; 
IIR 18) 
 Their established “system” is “work and make money” (IIR 9) 
 They would rather be out on the golf course closing deals and making money 
(IIR 10)  
 Need to see benefits (IIR 13)  
 A matter of education; see benefits of listing (prestige); may not appreciate 
how to practice good corporate governance (IIR 13) 
 For example, Kenny Yap at Qian Hu has a clear idea of corporate 
governance, meaning “he gets it” but while it may look good from the outside 
what is inside? (IIR 13) 
 Not compulsory (IIR 14) 
 
Generational Issues 
 The third generation in a family-owned and managed business is more likely to 
embrace corporate governance. (IIR 1; IIR 10)  
 It is a generational issue; the younger generation is more educated on the subject. (IIR 
2) 
 On the thought as to whether the smaller listed company would one day embrace the 
spirit of the Code (IIR 10; IIR 11) 
 It will never happen (IIR 10); nothing will (IIR 11) happen. 
 It will always be compliance-focused (IIR 10); will do the minimum (IIR 11). 
 Will live with it, and the goal is no questions from the regulators. (IIR 11) 
 It may need a generational change  
 Where the younger generation would have grown up with the Code. 
 They would perhaps be more open to acceptance. 
 As opposed to the initial resistance some of the older generation when the 
Code was first released.    
Internal Auditors 
 Provide skills training and job rotation. (IIR 7) 
 
Top management leadership 
 Corporate governance takes more work as the business is affected; for example, the 
top must push risk management, otherwise the staff will not care. (IIR 2) 
 Requires the vision, motivation of the CEO-main shareholder, who must want to: 
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 Grow the company and succeed; and 
 Become a significant listed company which strives to: 
 Achieve “reputation of brand image”; 
 Be regarded by regulators and the investing community; 
 Associate with known and reputable people sitting on other boards, invite 
them to serve, and avoid the tendency to have the same people on the board; 
and 
 Improve corporate governance quality, form a varied board with a lawyer, 
accountant, and practitioner (in the company’s core business) among the 
independent directors. (IIR 7) 
 Practice the spirit of the Code (IIR 17) 
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5.2.4.4 Shareholders 
 
Background information and general observations 
 Institutional Investors (IIR 7; IIR 10) 
 Singapore is not like the US with big players 
 Some investment funds and foreign investors are quite active in Singapore 
 Funds and other institutional investors are not active. (IIR 10; IIR 13) 
 Retail  
 There is no one to represent the minority shareholder. (IIR 4) 
 Retail investors rely on the Securities Investors Association Singapore to 
represent them. (IIR 10) 
 Too many holding small lots to enable building up to a cohesive force. (IIR 
10) 
 Culturally,  
 Retail shareholders’ attitude is selling rather than staying on to fight. (IIR 3)  
 They buy or sell based on whether they like the company’s branding, 
personalities, or if the shares are priced too low. (IIR 7)  
 Liquidate, rather than make changes and buy/sell to make a quick profit. (IIR 
9) 
  They are share flippers. (IIA 10) 
 Many are “loyal shareholders” holding the a company’s shares for years, for 
example, OCBC Bank (IIR 7); 
 They tend not to attend AGMs to understand the issues but make investment 
decisions based “on other factors” (IIR 7); and 
 The situation is “not real”, in the sense that “will people ever come forward?” 
 For example, many local SMRT (a local train and bus service provider) 
drivers had grievances but did not speak up and a large majority supported 
the strike by the Chinese drivers (IIR 7). 
 
AGMs 
 Negative observations 
 An extremely painful experience arising from the expected practice of serving 
buffet lunches, and the preponderance of retirees among shareholders. (IIR 1)  
 Regulators should allow non-shareholders, such as analysts, to ask questions. (IIR 
1) 
 Inactive shareholders and few attend the AGM. (IIR 2)   
 Corporate Governance Singapore-Style: 
Practices and Code Compliance among Smaller Listed Companies 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 5, Findings                                                                                                              123                     
 
 Queries raised, if at all, are not the right questions. For example, they ask about 
the food rather than issues that matter. (IIR 2) 
 Not really interested even if they attend the AGM; they go just to eat. (IIR4) 
 Cannot do more (IIR 11) 
 Don’t understand corporate governance 
 Positive observations 
 Had been more active in the last five year, that is, more participative in 
questioning the board and company performance. (IIR 3; IIR 13) 
 An obvious change in shareholders who attend AGMs had been that they now 
come prepared to ask relevant questions. (IIR 8)  
 Retail are “more vocal” now about director fees; see further improvements below. 
(IIA 10) 
 Both institutional and retail investors had improved (IIR 12) 
 More demanding. 
 Questioning more now. 
 Attendees at AGMs are more professional; previously, just happy with 
dividends and attended AGMs for the food. 
 Now they tend to write directly to the Singapore Exchange.  
 
Further improvements 
 Need to be more robust in asking for more information in company disclosures. (IIR 
2; IIR 21) 
 Be a sophisticated investor, and be able to understand the risks companies’ are taking. 
(IIR 9)  
 While more vocal (see positive observations above), retail investors are in the “wrong 
direction” (IIR 10)                                                                                                                             
 Standards are still lacking. 
 Retail investors going through the financial statements are minor exceptions.  
 
 
 
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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5.3 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Twenty-five persons participated in individual semi-structured interviews and a focus group 
interview conducted to collect answers to four research questions, ultimately to describe 
corporate governance practices and Code compliance among smaller listed companies. The 
Code refers to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, and smaller listed companies 
include those listed on the Singapore Exchange with market capitalisation of less than SGD 
500 million. Both data collection and reduction were organised under four topics relating to 
the four research questions, with a total of 11 lead questions. These four main and 11 sub-
categories of lead research questions which generated findings that were reduced to a total of 
55 themes are summarised in the Table 5.4 below.  
 
Table 5.4 Overview of the Research Findings  
 
 
 
Main Categories  Sub-Categories  No of 
Themes 
1 Attitudes and motivation 1.1 Views  on corporate governance 5 
  1.2 Motivation to adopt practices, and 
embrace ‘comply or explain’ 
4 
 
 
  Sub-total 9 
2 Corporate governance and Code 
compliance issues 
2.1 Problems and difficulties 9 
  2.2 Challenging Code principles and 
guidelines  
6 
 
 
  Sub-total 15 
3 Impact of the Code 3.1 Pre-Code state of corporate 
governance 
2 
  3.2 Extent of changes on the early 
years 
3 
  3.3 Impact of the Code ten years on 5 
 
 
  Sub-total 10 
4 Improvement actions and changes  4.1 Regulators 10 
  4.2 Business and professional 
organisations 
2 
  4.3 Companies 6 
  4.4 Shareholders 3 
 
 
  Sub-total 21 
   Total 55 
 
A key highlight of the findings to the question of what corporate governance is to smaller 
listed companies (SLCs) was best reflected in the words of two individual interview 
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respondents. One respondent mentioned that it would depend on who one talks to (IIR 14), 
and the other concurred that it would depend on who you ask (IIR 21). Whilst this beginning 
research question elicited findings that were reduced to five themes, there was however a 
general consensus that did emerge. A companion question pertaining to the motivating factors 
that cause SLCs to adopt good corporate governance practices and embrace the Code’s 
‘comply or disclose’ philosophy produced another five themes.  
 
The two lead questions to probe the difficulties and other issues that SLCs face in corporate 
governance and Code compliance led to a combined total of 15 themes that were not 
unexpected. Unsurprisingly, most respondents had little to no comments on the first two lead 
questions on how the Code had impacted corporate governance in SLCs compared to pre-
Code days and in the mid-term period. These two lead questions generated five themes 
combined, while the last lead question on the impact 10 years on prompted findings that were 
reduced to five themes alone. Finally and expectedly, the four lead questions in the last 
category to explore improvements and changes needed among four principal corporate 
governance stakeholders spawned the most themes for regulators followed by the SLCs. A 
synthesis and analysis of the research findings which includes a validation of the results via 
the method of triangulation, albeit in a limited way, follows next in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS ANALYSIS 
 
 
Synthesis and Analysis 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following reduction of the data collected in the research which were summarised in Chapter 
5, this chapter presents the synthesis and analysis of the findings. It is set out in two sections, 
commencing in section 6.2 with a description of the practices and Code compliance among 
smaller listed companies (SLCs). This description is based on the researcher’s reinterpretation 
of the perspectives of social actors, consistent with the idealist ontology and epistemology of 
constructionism adopted together with the abductive strategy. Then section 6.3 presents a 
conceptual framework to further theorise why things are the way they are with corporate 
governance practices and Code compliance among SLCs. This further theorising applied the 
conceptual model developed in Chapter 3, comprising of an abstract-analytical model 
generated from initial theorising together with a set of sensitising concepts on stewards and 
stewardship. The abstract-analytical model itself was constructed from three sets of theory-
derived sensitising concepts developed from theory discussed in Chapter 3.       
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As in the presentation of the research methodology in Chapter 4 and the findings in Chapter 5, 
the definitions of certain terms frequently referred to in this chapter need to be revisited. The 
Singapore Code or Code refers to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance which the 
Singapore Exchange (SGX) had incorporated into its Listing Manual. Code compliance refers 
to the SGX’s continuing listing rules that require listed companies to disclose compliance 
with the Code principles or otherwise disclose reasons for departure therefrom. The corporate 
governance practices of, and Code compliance among, smaller listed companies or SLCs in 
short is the fulcrum of the research. Lastly, SLCs are defined to include those with market 
capitalisation of less than SGD 500 million, and they make up more than 80% of all 
companies listed on the SGX.                 
 
6.2 Practices and Code Compliance from the Lens of Social Actors  
 
 
Descriptions in this section follow the orientation of the four topics and the respective lead 
discussion questions under each topic. This organisational approach was applied in the 
reduction of primary data collected from the individual and focus group semi-structured 
interviews, as well as secondary and tertiary data from the content analysis of documents. 
Categorised into four sub-sub-sections from 6.2.1 to 6.2.4 shown in Figure 6.2 above, the 
discussion and analysis first draw on the reduced primary data summarised in the preceding 
Chapter 5. The discussion and analysis begins with the attitudes and motivation within 
smaller listed companies (SLCs) to embrace corporate governance practices and Code 
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compliance. It transitions to the issues faced in corporate governance, then the impact of the 
Code on practices, ending with the actions and changes to improve practices and Code 
compliance among SLCs.    
 
In sub-section 6.2.5, the discussion and analysis then employed reduced secondary and 
tertiary data that were also collected in Work Step Three of the methodological framework 
summarised in Table 4.1, Chapter 4. More specifically, the secondary and tertiary data were 
collected from the review of social artefacts, that is, the content analysis of documents. 
Secondary data included 25 documents containing news reports and newspaper opinion 
articles but restricted to the period from January 2013 to the date of this thesis that were 
relevant to the research. In respect of the tertiary data, they were culled from two Singapore 
business studies, one in 2007 and the other an annual corporate governance index, along with 
a 2009 Australian academic research. The purpose was to apply the method of triangulation to 
validate some of the findings based on primary data generated from the individual and focus 
group interviews with the secondary and tertiary data.     
 
6.2.1 Attitudes and Motivation  
 
6.2.1.1 Views on Corporate Governance 
 
While opinions of the individual and focus group interview respondents on how smaller listed 
companies perceived corporate governance and Code compliance were expectedly varied, 
they could nevertheless be broadly categorised under five themes. They could be described as, 
in descending order of the frequency of mentions, an obligation to comply; a compliance 
burden; a responsibility; meaningless; and a regulatory device. Among the five themes, the 
view that corporate governance and Code compliance is an obligation to comply was a de 
facto consensus.     There was a widespread view that smaller companies would not care about 
corporate governance if it was not required and as one executive director shared, they would 
be happy to be left alone.  
 
The lament of a compliance burden is real, especially for a company that is still largely 
family-owned after a public listing and is owner-managed. A drastic change from being self-
accountable to being told of accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders had been 
difficult for owner-managers especially where they retained a majority shareholding. Related 
to the two themes that Code compliance is an obligation and a burden was another that 
viewed corporate governance and Code compliance as an interventionist regulatory device 
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which does not enhance business. To the regulators, corporate governance and Code 
compliance is necessary to protect the investing community, that is, both the shareholders and 
the general public at large. Regulators and other stakeholders had promoted corporate 
governance as necessary for risk control and Code compliance purposes, an ethical 
responsibility that had resulted from being listed. 
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Figure 6.3  Approaches to Risks-Opportunities-Controls (Revisited)  
(The Abstract-Analytical Model, incorporating 
enterprise risk management concepts, organisational behaviour theory, and metaphors)
 
 
 
 
To be sure, certain owner-managers had accepted the responsibility that comes with being a 
public company and as one independent director observed, the honest and ethical owner-
manager found it more palatable. Most owner-managers focused on profitability and strategy, 
were sceptical about the purported but inconclusive link between corporate governance and 
firm value and viewed the Code to be meaningless. These five themes that surfaced from 
individual interviews led to initial theorising in the abstract-analytical model developed in 
Chapter 3, and reproduced in Figure 6.3 above. This abstract-analytical model revisited 
portrays the controlling regulators as diametric opposites to the hard charging, risk-
opportunity conscious entrepreneurs who want to be unobstructed in pursuing risks to make 
money. Further theorising on corporate governance in smaller listed companies is discussed 
later in section 6.3, building on this initial theorising which formed the conceptual model that 
provided context to the research.    
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6.2.1.2 Motivation to Adopt Practices, and Embrace Comply or Explain  
 
Four motivating factors had been suggested to be behind what pushes some smaller listed 
companies to embrace corporate governance practices and the Code’s requirement to comply 
or explain more readily. The most frequent suggested theme was the attitude, awareness, and 
leadership among executive management, and the preceding analysis showed that attitude 
comes from being ethical and honest about accepting responsibility for corporate governance. 
Awareness is related to the acceptance for responsibility which recognises that being publicly 
listed is a privilege to access the capital market and comes with the requirement to be held 
accountable. Leadership of the majority shareholder in setting the tone at the top for ethical 
and responsible behaviour is a critical influence within the organisation.  
 
Where this influence spreads and leads to awareness and buy-in from other senior executives 
and staffs, then an ethical culture can take hold in the organisation. This motivation theme 
comports with stewardship theory and servant leadership theory reviewed in Chapter 3, and 
which led to the two sensitising concepts of ‘stewards’ and ‘stewardship’ incorporated into 
the conceptual model. Ethical owner-managers acting in the best interest of the company fit 
the description of Theory Y behaviour, as opposed to Theory X behaviour which describes 
managers who pursue their own interests. Antithetical to agency theory, stewardship theory 
informs the scenario of an ethically responsible owner-manager growing the company in the 
interests of all stakeholders.    
  
A strong audit committee headed by a chairman serious about corporate governance and who 
leads the independent directors to push the organisation towards Code compliance had been 
cited as another motivating factor. Then there were owner-managers who saw good corporate 
governance practices as a good profiling opportunity; however, this motivation had been 
perceived as in the words of one respondent, “doing it for show”. The themes of the three 
motivating factors analysed – executive management attitudes, awareness, and leadership; the 
resolve of independent directors; profiling and self-promotion – formed the basis for further 
theorising discussed later in the chapter. Another motivating factor suggested by just one of 
the interview respondents come under the theme of the alleged link between corporate 
governance and firm performance or value. It was encouraging to note that the respondent 
wisely recognised the inconclusive evidence on this unsettled debate which had been analysed 
earlier in the literature review in Chapter 2.             
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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6.2.2 Corporate Governance and Code Compliance Issues 
 
6.2.2.1 Problems and Difficulties 
 
Expectedly, problems and difficulties faced in corporate governance and Code compliance 
generated numerous comments from the interviews and the data reduced under nine themes 
was a close second to the discussion on regulators. This was expected given two themes that 
surfaced from the preceding discussion on how corporate governance in general and Code 
compliance in particular had been viewed by smaller listed companies (SLCs). Revisiting, the 
overriding consensus was that most SLCs would not be bothered with corporate governance 
and Code compliance if it was not a regulatory requirement built into the Singapore 
Exchange’s Listing Manual. Furthermore, to the individuals tasked with governance and who 
were directly responsible for corporate governance and Code compliance in their companies it 
was seen as, in the words of one, “bothersome and burdensome”.          
 
Unsurprising, cost and resource constraints were the most mentioned under the lead 
discussion question of problems and difficulties faced in corporate governance and Code 
compliance. Being shrewd businessmen, the entrepreneurial owner-managers were expectedly 
and understandably cost-conscious and cost were cited as the main reason for the initial 
resistance to Code compliance. One executive director who is also the CEO shared that 
independent directors can cost quite a substantial sum to bring on board. For this reason, the 
latest requirement for at least 50% independent directors in the event of issues associated with 
the matter of CEO-duality could be debilitating to the smaller company’s finances. The 
majority of smaller listed companies are ill equipped to incorporate a corporate governance 
process and mechanism, and end up using the services of an external consultant rather than 
building up in-house capability.   
 
Besides the issues raised summarised under the two themes of ‘costs’ and ‘resources’, 
observations with the theme of ‘independent directors’ (IDs) brought up problems and 
difficulties IDs faced in SLCs. Increasing Code compliance requirements led to the general 
perception that IDs had been turned into watchdogs for the regulators, what one ID described 
as resulting naturally in a “they versus us” situation. In the scheme of the abstract-analytical 
model revisited earlier in Figure 6.3, the executive directors (EDs) comprising the CEO and 
other owner-managers who are likely family members had also become diametrical opposites. 
One ID mentioned that the tendency had been to “screw the IDs” rather than cooperating 
willing, and IDs were perceived as eager to increase operating costs just to meet compliance 
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requirements. Additionally, the strong majority shareholder and CEO and/or Chairman who 
had the support of friendly parties appointed to the board would invariably win in 
disagreements over disclosures. Furthermore, IDs depended on the CFO for information on 
company operations and in disclosures disagreements between the CEO and CFO, the CFO 
had to be able to trust that IDs would provide backing.        
 
Among the remaining six themes developed from the interview respondents’ observations, 
three themes relating to a stale board; family-business culture; and ownership, control and 
management changes were each opined by one interviewee only. Accordingly, the remaining 
discussion and analysis will focus on synthesising the multiple respondent observations and 
opinions grouped under the three remaining themes. First, under the theme of executive 
directors (EDs) and management two IDs observed that these individuals only want to focus 
on the business and not regulatory requirements. Hence, they were not likely to champion 
corporate government in their companies and another ID added that EDs and management 
relied on the CFO to handle the role instead. These observations of the respondents were also 
taken into consideration and had been reflected in the abstract-analytical model in Figure 6.3 
revisited earlier.   
 
Second, minority institutional shareholders had been getting ever more vocal in raising tough 
questions in the annual general meetings (AGMs). This phenomenon had resulted in putting 
members of the boards and management on the defensive, and AGMs had been taking more 
time. Third, with the ever increasing regulatory requirements added by the Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) to its Listing Manual, the ‘comply or explain’ philosophy adopted in the 
Singapore Code had morphed into a misnomer. One ED described the situation “a farce” 
since the requirements had become too prescriptive to preclude any decision not to comply, 
and a CFO felt the SGX had gone beyond the Code requirements. An ID concurred with this 
observation, and yet another ID lamented that as Code requirements had become more 
stringent non-compliance could not be easily explained away.         
 
6.2.2.2 Challenging Code Principles and Guidelines 
 
With six themes derived from the observations and opinions of interview respondents, this 
area of Code compliance shared third place with the discussion on improvement actions and 
changes needed in smaller listed companies. The six challenging Code principles and 
guidelines cited by the respondents, in descending order of the frequency of citations, were: 
risk management; internal audit; CEO-duality; director tenure; remuneration disclosures; and 
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lead independent director. The individual respondents mentioned in the preceding discussion 
on problems and difficulties who had decried the farcical face of ‘comply or explain’ no 
doubt had risk management in mind. Synthesis and analysis of the reduced data presented in 
Chapter 5 is restricted to the first four themes but exclude the remaining two. This is because 
the observations and opinions of interview respondents were limited to two on remuneration 
disclosures, and just one on the matter of the lead independent director.     
 
6.2.2.2.1 Risk Management 
 
Disclosures on risk management was not new but had been a Code guideline subsumed under 
the internal control principle since the inaugural 2001 Singapore Code, with some changes in 
the revised 2005 Code. It is the latest requirement in the 2012 Code requiring directors to 
provide an absolute statement however, that raised concern and many found to be too 
onerous. This complaint arose from the need to set up a risk management process, from 
adoption of a framework to sign-off by directors. To one independent director (ID), it “would 
take a few years” to put a process in place, bring the audit committee up on board and train 
staff towards a risk management mindset. Another concern was how to ensure a risk 
management process was indeed in place even after the CEO and CFO had signed-off.   
 
This is especially so in overseas entities since the board and management usually hear of 
control lapses in overseas operations after the fact. Thirteen respondents from both the 
individual and focus group interviews felt that the requirement for an absolute statement made 
it more difficult to disclose, and the Singapore Exchange (SGX) was asking too much.  Four 
IDs concluded that the smaller listed companies (SLCs) they were involved with did not have 
dedicated resources and needed guidance to implement the SGX requirement. Nevertheless, 
one ID realised that execution was the key to implementation success and there was no choice 
but to comply and even then it was not because the company was able to.  Various approaches 
included relegating the risk management function to the company secretary or financial 
controller on a part-time basis; or rely on internal audit; or hire an outside consultant.      
 
One independent director (ID) deemed the latest requirement to be “absolute nonsense” given 
the lack of clarity on the scope of risk. A practitioner who provides Code compliance 
consulting assistance to smaller listed companies compared the SGX requirement to the US 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. Notwithstanding that it is non-statutory, the Singapore rule is 
nevertheless regarded to be much broader in scope since the US SOX requirement is 
specifically limited to financial reporting risks. An executive director-CFO and two IDs were 
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concerned that companies and in particular the IDs had been “forced” to be more risk averse 
when risk taking is necessary to pursue money making opportunities. The ID who criticised 
the requirement as nonsensical opined that the SGX had not given sufficient time for public 
consultation, as it would have been more reasonable to require negative assurance instead.    
 
6.2.2.2.2 Internal Audit                     
 
To five independent directors (IDs), size was the common limiting factor that explains why an 
in-house internal audit function is not commonly found in smaller listed companies (SLCs). 
The small scale of operations within SLCs precludes critical mass to achieve economies of 
scale and prevents the internal audit function from delivering value. As a result of size, SLCs 
may not be able to afford a full-time person but even where it was possible issues relating to 
work standards and quality would likely occur. In a one person internal audit shop, there 
would not be any peers for the internal auditor to meet with, exchange ideas, and obtain 
technical and moral support. Additionally, there may not be enough work to keep the internal 
auditor busy. Furthermore, staff retention would also likely be a problem in the absence of job 
training and rotation as well as a career path. Most internal auditors see the in-house audit 
function as a stepping stone to a position in an operational area or even as a career path to the 
CFO position in the longer term.  
   
Another area that presents difficulties arising from in-house governance issues was cited by 
four IDs and two outsourced service practitioners. Since business comes first, even a full-time 
in-house internal audit function would not be given stature especially where work quality is 
an issue. One of the outsourced service practitioners, formerly an in-house internal auditor in 
a SLC, recounted the stint with the SLC without much management support. There was some 
management support on “straight forward, simple things” such as internal control matters but 
not in the areas of risk management or in operations. The culture within this SLC, which is 
not uncommon, was for internal audit not to question or challenge management decisions or 
actions. Going nowhere within the company, this frustrated internal audit staff left the employ 
of the SLC in question as a result. 
 
This situation in SLCs can be remedied with a good and strong ID, typically the audit 
committee (AC) chairman, who would insist on an internal function. To the AC chair as well 
as other committee members, they would want to have eyes and ears on operational issues and 
matters. Within the SLC management, owner-managers would be more likely to accept a full-
time internal audit function as an enabler to signing off on risk management and internal 
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controls. That leaves the line managers who as a group would not be likely to be welcoming 
since they would have to explain discrepancies uncovered in an internal audit review.       
 
Six IDs and two outsourced service practitioners brought up the two areas of difficulties 
relating to the internal audit function in smaller listed companies (SLCs) discussed above. All 
but two of these individuals had surfaced the two sets of issues to support the overall 
conclusion that the most expedient solution for SLCs would be to outsource the internal 
function. The four who advocated outsourcing referred to three reasons (the number of 
individuals associated with each reason is in brackets): objectivity with a third party (4); staff 
retention (2); and costs-benefits (1). One ID preferred an in-house internal audit function in 
order to maximise the leveraging of the function as an enabler to Code compliance and the 
Singapore Exchange requirement relating to risk management. For the remaining ID, there are 
arguments for and against an in-house internal audit function versus outsourcing and each 
SLC should evaluate the merits and drawbacks to arrive at a decision.          
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6.2.2.2.3 CEO-Duality 
 
Eight individuals, comprising one executive director (ED); six independent directors (IDs); 
and one outsourced service practitioner provided observations and opinions on this topic. 
Separating the dual roles of the chairman and CEO as provided in the Code is essentially a 
balance of power issue. Growth in the smaller listed company (SLC) is usually dependent on 
one or two of these individuals. Not many observations were made on the basic separation of 
the chairman and CEO which had been in place since the inaugural 2001 Code. The sole ED 
who opined on this topic touched on the difficulty of compliance in the SLC where he works. 
They had not been able to recruit a non-executive chairman since the controlling shareholder 
would still want to run the company and the chairman would then be in name only.  
 
There is no choice but to comply with this requirement now, for even one of the three local 
Singapore banks which had been granted a transition period is now in compliance. This is 
because this requirement had been updated twice in both of the revisions to the Code in 2005 
and 2012. In the revision to the 2005 Code, a lead ID was to be appointed in the situation 
where the two positions were not separated. When the chairman and CEO are related, the 
2012 Code containing the latest changes require the board to be comprised of at least 50% of 
independent directors. Two EDs and IDs each opined on how this latest revised requirement 
had presented a new Code-compliance challenge which would arise from the difficulty of 
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finding enough IDs. Another ID commented that even where at least half the board must be 
IDs and they could be recruited, the fact remains that it still depends on the quality of the IDs.       
 
On a separate yet related matter on CEO-duality, other issues often arise even where the 
chairman and CEO positions are held by separate individuals. One ID who is also non-
executive chairman considered it a matter of face for the founder-owner to be the chairman 
instead. The ID expanded on this to observe that an atmosphere of “no respect” may prevail 
when an ID is chairman with the founder-owner as CEO. Also, where the ID is chairman a 
situation as to who is in charge may arise and cause unwanted and undesired confusion within 
the company. Furthermore, where a trusted friend is appointed to be a ‘nominee chairman’ 
then that would not be in the spirit of the Code. Furthermore, the challenge becomes one of 
appointing a chairman with a ‘questioning’ mindset and who can maintain a mutual respect 
with the founder-owner CEO.  
 
6.2.2.2.4 Director Tenure 
 
This issue arose from a new Guideline 2.4 in the 2012 Code that set a term limit of nine years 
for independent directors (IDs). It was evidently on the minds of one executive director who 
is also CEO and four IDs who provided their observations and opinions on the matter. The 
ED/CEO was concerned that the nine term limit would be difficult to meet and he wondered 
out loud on where the ready pool of candidates would come from, and one ID concurred. 
Another ID concurred, and observed that the nine-year term limit is “really tough” given a 
problem with access to the universe of IDs and owner-managers do not want competitors on 
the board. This ID opined that smaller listed companies (SLCs) would have difficulty 
approaching new IDs and may end up with the tendency to “go with people you know.”  
 
A third ID attributed the compliance difficulty to the shortage of professionally trained IDs; 
the exclusion of friends or others with close relationships; and the high accountability 
expected of IDs. On the last reason, people or even the majority shareholder who do not know 
the company well would be reluctant to accept the appointment to the board. The fourth ID 
opined that SLCs prefer to keep their experienced IDs who are already familiar with the 
company’s business, risks, and risk management process. Accordingly, it would then be left 
to the Nominating Committee to explain and justify non-compliance in the company’s 
disclosures on corporate governance. On a separate note, the ED/CEO opined that the SLC to 
which he belongs may see a smaller board as a result.    
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6.2.3 Impact of the Code 
 
6.2.3.1 Pre-Code State of Corporate Governance 
 
Just a handful of individuals commented on the pre-Code period presumably since that had 
been more than 10 years ago and they were hazy about the history back then. One 
independent director (ID) observed that pre-Code, people who knew about corporate 
governance were restricted to professionals in public practice and professional corporate 
managers. To an academic who once sat on a board, in the pre-Code days the Singapore 
Exchange’s (SGX) Listing Manual provided the baseline corporate governance guidelines. 
Lastly, the president of a business organisation observed that in the pre-Code days, corporate 
governance was left to good habits. Curiously, no one mentioned the Companies Act which 
provided certain legal requirements on board matters and in particular the audit committee.   
 
Interview respondents were requested to rate the pre-Code state of corporate governance on a 
scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being excellent. Only two individuals provided ratings on pre-Code 
state of corporate governance Singapore’s: one ID rated it at ‘5’ and a CFO’s ranking was a 
range of 3 to 4. Two other IDs and an outsourced services practitioner indicated that it was 
difficult or tough to assess and did not provide any ranking. Drawing an arbitrary line in the 
middle and numbering it at 5.5 which is the arithmetic average of 1 to 10, then 1 to 5 fall 
below and 6 to 10 go above the average. Based on the considerations of the two individuals, 
they had rated Singapore’s pre-Code state of corporate governance to be below average.              
 
6.2.3.2 Extent of Changes in the Early Years 
 
Two of the three individuals who commented on the pre-Code state of corporate governance 
also provided observations relating to this interim period, and they were joined by two other 
individuals. The same independent director (ID) who commented earlier observed that in the 
initial years, the Code principles, such as CEO-duality, were viewed as corporate governance 
theory. Separately, the president of the business organisation who also commented earlier 
mentioned that the Code was issued in response to fraud. The president’s position is different 
from that of this researcher’s analysis in the literature review in Chapter 2 which attributed 
the development of the 2001 Code to global events on financial liberalisation. Later in the 
revision of the 2005 Code however, this researcher had attributed that interim update of the 
Code to corporate scandals; refer to Table 2.6 in Chapter 2.   
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A third individual, the president of a professional organisation observed that there had not 
been much awareness with corporate governance and the Code in this interim period. Another 
ID who had not commented on the pre-Code period joined in to offer observations on family 
owned and managed businesses in this interim period instead. Owner-managers in family 
businesses which had completed an initial public offering experienced the business equivalent 
of a cultural shock when the newly listed company came under the regulatory spotlight. 
Corporate governance was seen as “not natural” for them since the owner-managers were 
self-accountable before the Code, but post-Code they then had to provide accountability to the 
public. Owner-managers did not bother to spend time to read and understand the Code, and 
were reluctant to study and get educated on corporate governance. Lacking in understanding, 
they concluded in general that the Code was unreasonable based on hearsay. 
 
As to ranking the state of Singapore’s corporate governance in this interim period, interview 
respondents were told to use the same scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being excellent. One ID who 
had not responded before reacted that it was too “tough to assess” and passed on providing 
any feedback. The same CFO who provided a ranking in the pre-Code period also ranked the 
state of corporate governance in this interim period.  Corporate governance in this interim was 
assessed at ‘5’, a slight improvement over the pre-Code period which was rated in the range 
of ‘3’ to ‘4’ but still below average. The ID who had provided a rating in the pre-Code period 
together with the rest of the other interview respondents felt comfortable in assessing Code 
compliance in the interim period.              
 
6.2.3.3 Code Impact Ten Years On 
 
A divergent view was found among certain directors in relation to the impact of the Code on 
corporate governance practices of the smaller listed companies more than 10 years on. On one 
side, some argued that the Code had unequivocally created more awareness to the concept of 
corporate governance, described as ‘extremely aware’ to ‘awareness is strong’ now than 
before. The counter argument is that there had not been any change to corporate governance 
awareness, and one person described it as being tolerated and it would not be missed if taken 
away. Another questioned whether any value had come out of the Code, and viewed it as a 
duplication of laws that are already in place to cover matters addressed in the Code. An area 
where there was agreement is that guidelines are necessary and the Code had been useful in 
providing that. Independent directors in particular had found it ‘incredibly valuable’ as a 
checklist to get company management to do things that would not have been accomplished in 
the past.      
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6.2.3.3.1 More Awareness 
 
In respect of independent directors (ID), two IDs and a CFO observed that post-Code and 10 
years on, there had been more awareness and alertness on director independence. One of the 
two IDs offered that a question remained however, on whether IDs had been diligent in 
questioning or had merely signed off based on the representations of others. The other ID 
added that in the past, IDs had tended to toe the line and be supportive of a strong-willed 
CEO. Two individuals commented that IDs had since been more careful to raise questions, in 
part due to the Air Ocean case.  
 
In the case, an ID was charged under the Companies’ Act for been negligent in discharging 
the duties of a director. One ID had since taken on self-protection measures, such as, requiring 
that board discussions and decisions be minuted, and had internal audit look into identified 
and assessed risks from the risk management process. Another ID had since paid careful 
attention to issues, know what was going on, and not take things at face value. This same ID 
and a CFO both referred to the protection available for speaking out, that the CEO cannot 
remove someone from office due to disagreements without disclosing the reasons.  
 
Eight individuals comprising three IDs; a CFO; and four officials representing business, 
professional, and research organisations concurred that the Code had been instrumental in 
creating awareness in corporate governance. One ID described the situation as having 
improved “a lot” especially among companies that pursued excellence in corporate 
governance practices. Another ID cited the spread in formation of three board committees 
required in the Code compared to just the audit committee pre-Code. This same ID felt that 
corporate governance awareness had improved to the level of ‘strong’ with owner-managers 
being familiar with Code requirements.  
 
The ID who likened the Code to corporate governance theory after it was initially released 
observed that most had since understood what corporate governance is, at least in theory. A 
challenge that remained however is practice and many still are not aware of what good 
corporate governance practice is. In hindsight, one ID viewed the Code as a set of useful 
guidelines for listed companies and as a means to keep management on their toes. Another ID 
sees the Code as increasing in usefulness to the executive directors and management 
especially as the world grows more complex.   
 
[The remainder of the page is intentionally left blank] 
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6.2.3.3.2 Rating 
 
The same ID who had passed on rating in the previous period responded in similar manner 
contending that that it was too “tough to assess”. Again, except for the CFO who completed 
assessments in the two previous periods none of the others took an interest in this exercise. 
On the same scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being excellent, the CFO updated his rating on the state 
of corporate governance 10 years on to a range of ‘6’ to ‘7’. To recap and compare, this 
CFO’s ratings in the two previous periods are presented in Table 6.1 below which are 
compared to the third period which had improved to above average. 
 
 
Table 6.1 The CFO’s Rating on the State of Corporate Governance 
 
Pre-Code Post-Code – 5 Years on Post-Code – 5 Years on 
3 to 4 5 6 to 7 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Improvement Actions and Changes 
 
6.2.4.1 Regulators 
 
Two recurring messages for the regulators revolved around the philosophy of comply or 
explain adopted in the Code, and the need for striking a balance in regulatory governance. 
Some directors felt that the soft approach of the Code lacked ‘bite’ and which had therefore, 
rendered it ineffective to spur compliance. One independent director called for the Code to be 
made mandatory while cautioning against going overboard, and to allow time for the spirit of 
the Code to sink in. On the matter of balancing the cost-benefit of regulations, many felt the 
last round of changes to the Code and Singapore Exchange Listing Manual rules were too 
onerous. Apart from director tenure and relating the composition of independent directors to 
CEO-duality, there was the listing manual rule for an absolute statement from the directors 
and management on risk management. An executive director and CEO worried that turning 
independent directors into watchdogs could have two undesirable effects. One scenario sees 
the independent directors running the company and stifling decision making; another 
envisages that they may shy away from siting on the boards of smaller listed companies 
altogether.   
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6.2.4.2 Others 
 
Business and professional organisations with an interest in corporate governance are generally 
viewed to have contributed to creating corporate governance awareness, although one saw 
them as self-directed rather than helping smaller listed companies. Another director wished 
they could be more pro-active in influencing regulatory changes, and move away from a 
reactive and ‘blowing in the wind’ mindset. Moving on to the companies themselves, change 
is expected to be slow in coming to the family-owned and owner-managed smaller listed 
companies, especially where the older generation is still active.  While they need corporate 
governance training the most, they are also the least likely to attend any training courses, if at 
all. Lastly, the prevailing perspective on shareholders of the smaller listed companies is that 
they have yet to make an impact in influencing corporate governance in these companies. 
More specifically, they need to be more robust in requesting disclosures of additional 
information, and raise appropriate queries at AGMs.           
 
6.2.5 Corroborating Findings from Secondary and Tertiary Data 
 
In this sub-section, the method of triangulation is applied with secondary data and tertiary 
data to validate certain of the primary data collected in the semi-structured individual and 
focus group interviews. Both the secondary data and tertiary data were collected from various 
sources of social artefacts summarised in Table 4.2 in Chapter 2. To recap, the secondary data 
were collected from 25 documents that were comprised of news reports and newspaper 
opinion articles. The tertiary data were collected from a 2007 business study, an annual 
corporate governance index, and a 2009 academic research article. Organised into two parts, 
the first data validation uses the secondary data from the annual corporate governance index 
and the second data validation uses the tertiary data news reports and newspaper opinion 
articles.    
 
6.2.5.1 Tertiary Data 
 
Scoring on the Governance and Transparency Index comprises two components, starting with 
a base score up to a maximum of 100 points for disclosures of corporate governance practices, 
financial transparency and investor relations. By design, companies that merely ‘tick the box’ 
to comply with the minimum Code requirements can only score about 30 points out of the 
maximum possible. The base score is then adjusted for bonuses in which companies that go 
beyond ‘ticking the box’ are also rewarded with bonus points where they embrace good 
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practices beyond the Code requirements. On the flip side, companies are penalised for weak 
practices as well as for corporate events that reflect poor corporate governance.         
 
 
Table 6.2 State of Corporate Governance in Listed Companies (Revisited) 
 
By the 2011 Governance and Transparency Index (GTI) scores 
 
                                                             All Companies                    Small Caps 
GTI Scores (a) No % No % (b) % (c) 
85 and above 6 0.9    
75 to 84 7 1.1 2 0.4 0.3 
50 to 74 38 5.8 16 2.9 2.4 
31 to 49 272 41.2 226 40.3 34.2 
Sub-Total 323 48.9 244 43.6 37.0 
30 and below 337 51.1 317 56.4 48.0 
Total 660 100 561 100 85.0 
Companies with GTI scores 
of 50 or more 
 
51 
 
7.7 
 
18 
 
3.3 
 
  
Legend: 
(a) Prepared by the Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations, National 
University of Singapore Business School, covering annual reports released from 1 
January to 31 January 2011 
(b) Percentage of total small caps (market capitalisation, less than SGD 500 million) 
(c) Percentage of all companies 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 presented analyses the 2011 Governance and Transparency Index scores of the 
smaller listed companies (SLCs) compared to all companies, which is revisited from the 
literature review in Chapter 2. More than half (56.4%) of the SLCs are, by the definition of 
the Governance and Transparency Index, ‘ticking the box’. This is an interesting statistic and 
which validates one of the key findings from the semi-structured individual and focus group 
interviews. To revisit, the primary data from the research revealed that SLCs tended to just do 
the minimum or looked for ways to get around it.  
 
In other words, and as corroborated with the tertiary data from the Governance and 
Transparency Index, SLCs would do anything rather than to embrace the spirit of the Code. 
There is no pass-fail indication in the Governance and Transparency Index, but it was 
previously assumed that for this analysis, the passing grade is 50 marks and above. Revisiting, 
the assumed alphabet grades are, as follows: F (49 and below); D - to B + (50 to 74); A - to A 
(75 to 84); A + (85 and above). On this basis accordingly, just 18 (3.3%) of the SLCs 
obtained a passing grade and only two (less than half a percent) SLCs are of A - grade.          
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6.2.5.2 Secondary Data 
 
In a newspaper opinion article, the author shared an anecdote about a conversation with the 
CEO of a major listed company. Although said half-jokingly, the CEO said something to the 
effect that corporate governance applies to others but not to him (Cheng, 2014). A McKinsey 
consultant shared a similar anecdote in the early 2000s about his experience with a CEO who 
contended that corporate governance was the concoction of consultants. More specifically, he 
wanted to see the evidence for himself that corporate governance indeed pays before he could 
accept the concept (Newell, and Wilson, 2002). Cheng’s anecdote is tacit confirmation of a 
similar finding from primary data collected in semi-structured interviews relating to attitudes 
and motivation towards corporate governance. Most of the smaller listed companies just go 
through the motions in Code compliance without being serious about embracing the spirit of 
the Code.         
 
6.3 Theorising Corporate Governance in Smaller Listed Companies  
  
A theoretical framework was constructed to further describe the corporate governance 
practices and Code compliance among the smaller companies listed on the Singapore 
exchange. This theoretical framework construction process began with the identification of 
sensitising concepts, which was discussed and presented in Chapter 3 relating to theory. The 
identified sensitising concepts served as a guide, more accurately “clues and suggestions” 
(Blaikie, 2000, p 137) during the research process in particular at the time of data collection 
and data reduction. Some of the sensitising concepts began to firm up as definitive concepts 
during this stage of the process, and themes also started to emerge from the research findings. 
As the sensitising concepts started to firm up, this led to initial theorising that resulted in the 
generation of the abstract-analytical model depicted in Figure 6.3 shown earlier in this 
chapter, page 129. 
 
At the same time the combination of these concepts began to firm up, the shape of a 
theoretical framework started to form. The theoretical framework is presented in Figure 6.4 
on the next page which is supported by the abstract-analytical model in Figure 6.3 on page 
129. The theoretical framework presented in Figure 6.4 was constructed to describe four types 
of owner-managers, the entrepreneurs, in smaller listed companies (SLCs). Specifically, the 
Entrepreneurs and Corporate Governance theoretical framework, supported by the 
Approaches to Risks-Opportunities-Controls abstract-analytical model, theorises the attitudes 
of owner-managers in SLCs towards corporate governance in general and Code compliance in 
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particular. A brief synopsis of the theoretical descriptions, which draw on both the theoretical 
framework and abstract-analytical model simultaneously, follows next. 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance conscious entrepreneurs are the type of owner-managers who embrace 
the spirit of the Code and recruits truly independent directors who work actively with 
executive management in the interest of the company. He takes a balanced risks-
opportunities-controls approach, in partnership with the independent directors (outsiders) and 
the controllers among executive management (insiders), to pursue opportunities without 
excessive risks while ensuring controls over inherent business risks. While corporate 
governance aware entrepreneurs are well aware of good practices, they choose not to engage 
in conscious efforts to fully embrace the spirit of corporate governance. They accept bringing 
in active independent directors to serve on their boards but choose not to comply with other 
Code provisions, preferring for example, a right-brain approach (Figure 6.3) to risks-
opportunities-controls. 
 
A branch of the corporate governance aware entrepreneurs are the savvy owner-managers 
who recognise that good corporate governance is a criterion among others used in decisions, 
for example, the selection of business partners. They capitalise on this widely practiced notion 
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therefore, to project a positive image in company disclosures on their corporate governance 
practices, whether or not the disclosures reflect the actual, and the real, situations. Lastly, 
vintage entrepreneurs are at the opposite end of the spectrum to the corporate governance 
conscious entrepreneurs, and as the label suggests they are the quintessential and classic right-
brain entrepreneurs. Vintage entrepreneurs view corporate governance and Code compliance 
negatively, with a ‘have to’ attitude. Their companies are most likely to ‘tick the box’ in Code 
compliance, and to be among the bottom scorers on the Governance and Transparency Index.  
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion  
 
Smaller listed companies (SLCs) primarily viewed corporate governance in general and Code 
compliance in particular as both an obligation to comply and a compliance burden. There was 
a widespread view that SLCs would not care about corporate governance if it was not 
required and as one executive director shared, they would be happy just to be left alone. In 
this regard, the finding that SLCs would just do the bare minimum or find ways around it 
rather than embrace the spirit of the Code was corroborated with secondary data. The lament 
of a compliance burden is real, especially for a company that is still largely family-owned 
after a public listing and is owner-managed. A drastic change from being self-accountable to 
being told of accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders had been difficult for 
owner-managers especially where they retained a majority shareholding.      
 
Four motivating factors had been suggested to be behind what pushes some smaller listed 
companies to embrace corporate governance practices and the Code’s requirement to comply 
or explain more readily. The most frequent suggested theme was the attitude, awareness, and 
leadership among executive management, and the preceding analysis showed that attitude 
comes from being ethical and honest about accepting responsibility for corporate governance. 
Ethical owner-managers acting in the best interest of the company fit the description of 
Theory Y behaviour, as opposed to Theory X behaviour which describes managers who 
pursue their own interests. Antithetical to agency theory, stewardship theory informs the 
scenario of an ethically responsible owner-manager growing the company in the interests of 
all stakeholders.  
 
Cost and resource constraints were the most mentioned under the lead discussion question of 
problems and difficulties faced in corporate governance and Code compliance. Besides the 
issues raised summarised under the two themes of ‘costs’ and ‘resources’, observations with 
the theme of ‘independent directors’ (IDs) brought up problems and difficulties IDs faced in 
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SLCs. Increasing Code compliance requirements led to the general perception that IDs had 
been turned into watchdogs for the regulators, what one ID described as resulting naturally in 
a “they versus us” situation. The six challenging Code principles and guidelines cited by the 
respondents, in descending order of the frequency of citations, were: risk management; 
internal audit; CEO-duality; director tenure; remuneration disclosures; and lead independent 
director. 
 
Interestingly, the president of a business organisation observed that in the pre-Code days, 
corporate governance was left to good habits. Separately, the president of a professional 
organisation observed that there had not been much awareness with corporate governance and 
the Code in the interim period. A divergent view was found among certain directors in 
relation to the impact of the Code on corporate governance practices of the smaller listed 
companies more than 10 years on. On one side, some argued that the Code had unequivocally 
created more awareness to the concept of corporate governance, described as ‘extremely 
aware’ to ‘awareness is strong’ now than before. The counter argument is that there had not 
been any change to corporate governance awareness, and one person described it as being 
tolerated and it would not be missed if taken away.   
 
Two recurring messages for the regulators revolved around the philosophy of comply or 
explain adopted in the Code, and the need for striking a balance in regulatory governance. 
Some directors felt that the soft approach of the Code lacked ‘bite’ and which had therefore, 
rendered it ineffective to spur compliance. One independent director called for the Code to be 
made mandatory while cautioning against going overboard, and to allow time for the spirit of 
the Code to sink in. On the matter of balancing the cost-benefit of regulations, many felt the 
last round of changes to the Code and Singapore Exchange Listing Manual rules were too 
onerous. Business and professional organisations with an interest in corporate governance are 
generally viewed to have contributed to creating corporate governance awareness, although 
one saw them as self-directed rather than helping smaller listed companies.  
 
Change in the companies is expected to be slow in coming to the family-owned and owner-
managed smaller listed companies, especially where the older generation is still active.  While 
they need corporate governance training the most, they are also the least likely to attend any 
training courses, if at all. Lastly, the prevailing perspective on shareholders of the smaller 
listed companies is that they have yet to make an impact in influencing corporate governance 
in these companies. More specifically, they need to be more robust in requesting disclosures 
of additional information, and raise appropriate queries at AGMs. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION  
 
Reflections on the Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The first three chapters in Part One of the thesis that included the literature review; theory and 
the conceptual model; and research methodology provided for the staging of the research. Part 
Two of the thesis which is comprised of Chapter 5, Findings; Chapter 6, Findings Analysis; 
and this concluding chapter relating to reflections on the research collectively provides a 
report on the research. Figure 7.1 above lays out the presentation and discussion in this 
concluding chapter to wrap up the reporting of the research in Part One of the thesis. It begins 
in section 7.2 with a summary of the research and findings. Section 7.3 follows with 
discussions on the contribution of knowledge, section 7.4 on shortcomings and limitations of 
the research, and section 7.5 wraps it up. As in the preceding chapters, references to the 
Singapore Code or Code and Code compliance in this chapter are in respect of the Singapore 
Code of Corporate Governance.       
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7.2 Summary of the Research and Findings 
 
7.2.1 The Research 
 
A methodological framework was developed to carry out the research in four steps. In Work 
Step One, a literature search was conducted to determine the data sources, type and form that 
would be available for the research. Field testing was carried out in Work Step Two with the 
ultimate aim to decide on data selection.  Based on the conceptual model developed to 
provide context to the research, a search on the potential targets to be invited for interviews 
was carried out. From this research, two target lists were developed: the interviewee target 
list, and the list of potential sponsors to hold one or more seminar cum focus group 
discussions. Using the interviewee target list, a sample of potential interviewees was selected 
to send out pilot invitations via email. Similarly, the potential sponsors for one or more 
seminar cum focus group discussion were approached first via email.  
 
Results of the pilot tests were not encouraging and modifications were made to targeting 
individuals for interviews. In the adjusted approach, judgemental sampling was initially 
applied to target business and professional contacts who met the research criteria. This 
modified approach proved to work better and some of the targeted personal contacts 
responded positively to an interview. Once an interview had been scored, snowball sampling 
was implemented to request interviewees’ assistance to recommend someone they knew who 
might be agreeable to be interviewed. The snowball sampling approach worked and generated 
a few more interviewees that would otherwise not had materialised. As for the seminar cum 
focus group discussion/s, none of the organisations approached in the pilot testing was 
interested in sponsoring an event. As an alternative, one seminar cum focus group discussion 
event was held in the personal capacity of a doctoral student and researcher.     
 
With the two preceding work steps completed, 21 participants were garnered for semi-
structured individual interviews. As for the seminar focus group discussion, seven individuals 
signed up to attend a free seminar on enterprise risk management. The seminar participants 
were also invited to stay on after the seminar for the optional focus group discussion and four 
among the seven registered to participate. On the day of the event however, five of the seven 
registered showed for the seminar and three stayed on for the focus group discussions. All in 
all, a total of 24 persons participated in Work Step Three of the research – 21 in semi-
structured individual interviews and another three in the semi-structured focus group 
discussion.  
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The discussions were guided by two to three lead questions prepared for each of the four 
categories of research questions summarised under four topics. These topics are, as follows: 
attitudes and motivation; problems and difficulties; impact of the Code; and actions and 
changes for improvement. In Work Step Four, reduction of the qualitative data collected 
entailed organising the findings by the same categories of lead questions fielded in data 
gathering. In all, the data reduction exercise generated 55 themes organised under each of the 
four topics. Improvement actions and changes for regulators had the most themes at 10, 
followed by problems and difficulties in Code compliance with nine themes. Challenging 
Code principles and guidelines relating to Code compliance tied with improvement actions 
and changes for regulators at six themes each. Data collection and reduction in Work Steps 
Three and Four were documented and discussed in Chapter 5. Work Step Four in the 
methodological framework also included the synthesis and analysis of data and was presented 
in Chapter 6.   
 
7.2.2 Overall Findings 
 
A key highlight of the findings to the question of what corporate governance is to smaller 
listed companies (SLCs) was best reflected in the words of two individual interview 
respondents. One respondent mentioned that it would depend on who one talks to (IIR 14), 
and the other concurred that it would depend on who you ask (IIR 21). Whilst this beginning 
research question elicited findings that were reduced to five themes, there was however a 
general consensus that did emerge. A companion question pertaining to the motivating factors 
that cause SLCs to adopt good corporate governance practices and embrace the Code’s 
‘comply or disclose’ philosophy produced four themes.  
 
The two lead questions to probe the difficulties and other issues that SLCs face in corporate 
governance and Code compliance led to a combined total of 15 themes that were not 
unexpected. Unsurprisingly, most respondents had little to no comments on the first two lead 
questions on how the Code had impacted corporate governance in SLCs compared to pre-
Code days and in the mid-term period. These two lead questions generated five themes 
combined, while the last lead question on the impact 10 years on prompted findings that were 
reduced to five themes alone. Finally and expectedly, the four lead questions in the last 
category to explore improvements and changes needed among four principal corporate 
governance stakeholders spawned the most themes for regulators followed by the SLCs.  
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SLCs primarily viewed corporate governance in general and Code compliance in particular as 
both an obligation to comply and a compliance burden. There was a widespread view that 
SLCs would not care about corporate governance if it was not required and as one executive 
director shared, they would be happy just to be left alone. In this regard, the finding that SLCs 
would just do the bare minimum or find ways around it rather than embrace the spirit of the 
Code was corroborated with secondary data. The lament of a compliance burden is real, 
especially for a company that is still largely family-owned after a public listing and is owner-
managed. A drastic change from being self-accountable to being told of accountability to 
shareholders and other stakeholders had been difficult for owner-managers especially where 
they retained a majority shareholding.      
 
Four motivating factors had been suggested to be behind what pushes some smaller listed 
companies to embrace corporate governance practices and the Code’s requirement to comply 
or explain more readily. The most frequent suggested theme was the attitude, awareness, and 
leadership among executive management, and the preceding analysis showed that attitude 
comes from being ethical and honest about accepting responsibility for corporate governance. 
Ethical owner-managers acting in the best interest of the company fit the description of 
Theory Y behaviour, as opposed to Theory X behaviour which describes managers who 
pursue their own interests. Antithetical to agency theory, stewardship theory informs the 
scenario of an ethically responsible owner-manager growing the company in the interests of 
all stakeholders.  
 
Cost and resource constraints were the most mentioned under the lead discussion question of 
problems and difficulties faced in corporate governance and Code compliance. Besides the 
issues raised summarised under the two themes of ‘costs’ and ‘resources’, observations with 
the theme of ‘independent directors’ (IDs) brought up problems and difficulties IDs faced in 
SLCs. Increasing Code compliance requirements led to the general perception that IDs had 
been turned into watchdogs for the regulators, what one ID described as resulting naturally in 
a “they versus us” situation. The six challenging Code principles and guidelines cited by the 
respondents, in descending order of the frequency of citations, were: risk management; 
internal audit; CEO-duality; director tenure; remuneration disclosures; and lead independent 
director. 
 
Interestingly, the president of a business organisation observed that in the pre-Code days, 
corporate governance was left to good habits. Separately, the president of a professional 
organisation observed that there had not been much awareness with corporate governance and 
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the Code in the interim period. A divergent view was found among certain directors in 
relation to the impact of the Code on corporate governance practices of the smaller listed 
companies more than 10 years on. On one side, some argued that the Code had unequivocally 
created more awareness to the concept of corporate governance, described as ‘extremely 
aware’ to ‘awareness is stronger’ now than before. The counter argument is that there had not 
been any change to corporate governance awareness, and one person described it as being 
tolerated and it would not be missed if taken away.   
 
Two recurring messages for the regulators revolved around the philosophy of comply or 
explain adopted in the Code, and the need for striking a balance in regulatory governance. 
Some directors felt that the soft approach of the Code lacked ‘bite’ and which had therefore, 
rendered it ineffective to spur compliance. One independent director called for the Code to be 
made mandatory while cautioning against going overboard, and to allow time for the spirit of 
the Code to sink in. On the matter of balancing the cost-benefit of regulations, many felt the 
last round of changes to the Code and Singapore Exchange Listing Manual rules were too 
onerous. Business and professional organisations with an interest in corporate governance are 
generally viewed to have contributed to creating corporate governance awareness, although 
one saw them as self-directed rather than helping smaller listed companies.  
 
Change in the companies is expected to be slow in coming to the family-owned and owner-
managed smaller listed companies, especially where the older generation is still active.  While 
they need corporate governance training the most, they are also the least likely to attend any 
training courses, if at all. Lastly, the prevailing perspective on shareholders of the smaller 
listed companies is that they have yet to make an impact in influencing corporate governance 
in these companies. More specifically, they need to be more robust in requesting disclosures 
of additional information, and raise appropriate queries at AGMs.            
 
7.3 Contributions to, and Implications for, Practice 
 
Contributions from this study to practice can be traced back to the three primary gaps in past 
research that provided the motivation for the research. Revisiting and summarising once 
more, they are, one, almost all the past research relevant to this study had been business and 
not academic studies where theory was not a consideration. Two, smaller listed companies 
(SLCs), defined by market capitalisation (below SGD 500 million) and which comprise more 
than 80% of all listed companies, had not been granted the exclusive attention that they 
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deserve. Three, the descriptions of practices and code compliance among listed companies in 
past studies had been primarily based on self-disclosures of the companies.  
 
To be concise and precise, this study considered theory to focus on the practices and Code 
compliance among SLCs in order to provide fresh insights from the perspectives of the social 
actors themselves. Importantly, the majority (81%) among the social actors interviewed in the 
study are actively engaged in corporate governance among SLCs. These individuals are either 
board members – executive and non-executive directors (24%); and independent directors 
(38%) – or executive management (5%), and professional service providers (14%). Most, if 
not all, of the findings in four categories – attitudes and motivation; corporate governance and 
Code compliance issues; impact of the Code; and improvement actions and changes – are 
relevant to all parties. In the next three sub-sections, the contributions to knowledge are 
analysed by the implications that the study presents for practice impacting managers, 
academics, and public policy.  
 
7.3.1 Implications of the Study for Managers 
 
Generally, managers can learn about how the social actors – the independent directors as well 
as officers in the institutions and service providers with an interest in corporate governance – 
view practices among SLCs. More specifically at the company level however, they can review 
how their organisations’ experiences compare to the corporate governance and Code 
compliance issues presented in the findings. Above all, findings on improvement actions and 
changes for the regulators, companies, and shareholders are arguably of particular and special 
interest to managers. From a regulatory standpoint, management action or inaction on their 
organisation’s corporate governance and Code compliance practices would influence future 
public policy decisions that in turn impact managers and their organisations.  
 
7.3.2 Implications for Academics 
 
From an academic perspective, the focus of the study to fill three specific gaps in the literature 
along with a fresh and replicable research methodology is expected to appeal to the research 
community. Firstly, a compendium of theories incorporating enterprise risk management 
concepts, organisational behavior theory, and metaphors were applied to construct an abstract-
analytical model to underpin the study. Then in the synthesis and analysis of the findings, a 
theoretical framework was constructed and applied to describe corporate governance and 
Code compliance practices among SLCs. Secondly, the study was dedicated to SLCs, 
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deliberately defined broadly by market capitalisation to include companies under SGD 500 
million to allow for comparison with other capital markets in future research.  
 
Thirdly, the idealist ontology combined with the epistemology of constructionism together 
with the selection of the abductive strategy was adopted to provide a fresh approach to the 
study. Unlike past research that described corporate governance and Code compliance 
practices from the listed companies’ self-disclosures, the different approach in this study 
sought the perspectives of the social actors themselves. The researcher’s tacit embrace of the 
interpretivist paradigm took the position to view social reality as the social actors’ 
interpretations which were then reinterpreted in the language of the researcher. Primary data 
from this source were triangulated with secondary and tertiary data to corroborate the 
findings, resulting in the application of both quantitative and qualitative analysis.             
 
7.3.3 Implications for Public Policy 
 
The implications of this study for public policy are drawn out by way of comparisons with the 
2007 study and the other recurring annual Governance and Transparency Index (GTI) study. 
To recap briefly, the 2007 comprehensive study on the state of corporate governance in 
Singapore listed companies was jointly commissioned by two regulatory agencies. The 2007 
study described corporate governance and Code compliance practices based primarily on the 
listed companies’ self-disclosures in annual reports. It was supplemented with limited 
interpretations of social reality by social actors who participated in two focus group 
discussions. Currently, the annual GTI study provides regulators with an update on the state 
of corporate governance in Singapore listed companies. Descriptions in the annual GTI study 
however, are based purely on the listed companies’ self-disclosures in annual reports and 
other statutory reporting.  
 
In respect of, and relative to, both the 2007 study and annual GTI study, the findings in this 
study are both corroborative and supplemental in nature. The qualitative analysis of both 
primary and secondary data in this study corroborated the quantitative analysis of the 
companies’ self-disclosures in both the 2007 study and annual GTI study. Essentially, the 
‘tick the box’ mentality among the majority of SLCs towards corporate governance and Code 
compliance practices revealed in their self-disclosures were mirrored by the social actors’ 
interpretation of the social reality. Additionally and compared to the annual GTI study, this 
study provided an alternative perspective on the state of corporate governance among SLCs 
exclusively from the lens of the social actors’ interpretations. Moreover, in respect of the 
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2007 study, this study provided regulators with an updated perspective on the improvement in 
regulatory actions and changes desired by the social actors. The improvement actions and 
changes that these social actors expected from the regulators uncovered in this study were 
more much comprehensive than the limited findings provided in the 2007 study.  
     
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
 
The concluding comments in this chapter would neither be complete nor provide a balanced 
view without consideration of the shortcomings and limitations related to the study, as well as 
the problems encountered. Objectivity in data gathering was subjected to compromise at two 
levels arising from the research strategy and data collection method selected, and the low 
number of interview respondents secured. At the philosophical level, adoption of the 
interpretivist paradigm produced findings that were first, from the interpretations of the social 
actors interviewed and next, reinterpreted and described in the language of the researcher. 
Lower on the research method level, problems in attracting interview respondents led to a 
judgemental and snowball sampling approach which resulted in all but three participants 
sourced from the researcher’s professional contacts. Arising from the low response, the 
descriptions were limited to findings collected from a total of 24 persons of whom 21 
participated in individual interviews and three in a focus group discussion, respectively. 
 
On a separate note, the findings and analysis generated in this study presented at least three 
opportunities for further future research. Given that the findings in the study are easily 
replicable, one immediate future research is to simply extend the sample of interview 
respondents to validate the findings in this study. Moving forward, the research could be 
repeated say, every five years to update the state of corporate governance among SLCs from 
the perspective of the social actors using the qualitative approach adopted here. Still another 
possible future research opportunity stems from the theoretical framework constructed to 
describe the corporate governance and Code compliance practices among SLCs, which may 
be tested and refined further.  
 
7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Descriptions on the corporate governance practices and Code compliance of the companies 
listed on the Singapore Exchange in past studies had relied on the companies’ self-
disclosures. Past studies either covered all listed companies or focused on the larger entities 
although smaller listed companies (SLCs), with market capitalisation below SGD 500 million, 
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comprise the majority of listed companies.  Additionally, two of the past research most 
relevant to this study were business studies and as such were void of any consideration of 
theory. The study completed for this thesis, which is submitted for the Doctor of Business 
Administration degree, aimed to be different in at least three ways.   
 
Firstly, it is focused on the SLCs only which deserve to be given prominence since they 
comprise more than 80% of companies listed on Singapore Exchange. Secondly, descriptions 
on the corporate governance practices and Code compliance of SLCs are based on the 
insiders’ perspectives of social actors. Thirdly, the study was underpinned by an abstract-
analytical model that incorporated a combination of enterprise risk management concepts, 
organisational behavior theory, and metaphors. Analysis and synthesis of the findings, 
supported by the abstract-analytical model, led to further theorising that describes the attitudes 
and motivation among entrepreneurs in SLCs towards corporate governance and Code 
compliance.  
 
Besides the addition of a different academic study to the literature and the contribution of new 
knowledge, findings in the study present implications for practice impacting managers, 
academics, and regulators. Among other benefits, managers can benchmark their 
organisations’ experiences with corporate governance and Code compliance to the social 
actors’ interpretation of the state of practices among SLCs. The qualitative approach adopted 
in the study together with the construction of a theoretical framework supported by the 
abstract-analytical model underpinning the research is expected to appeal to the academic 
community. This is in part due to several opportunities for future academic research which 
could be extended to study the state of corporate governance among SLCs in other capital 
markets.  
 
First, the research could be easily replicated to validate the findings. As well, the research 
could be updated periodically say, every five years or in conjunction with an update to the 
Code. Second, the theoretical framework could not only be tested and verified with data from 
SLCs in other countries but it could also be subjected to further theorising. To the regulators, 
the findings provide an updated state of corporate governance and Code compliance among 
SLCs from the interpretation of social actors who are closely associated with such entities. 
The findings in particular provide comprehensive feedback from executive and independent 
directors, executive management, professional service providers, and other stakeholders on 
the regulatory improvement actions and changes on their respective wish lists.    
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